This week our Extremism and Violence team released their long-awaited full report entitled The Edge of Violence.  The report presents a two year investigation into the process of al Qaeda inspired radicalisation by comparing ‘homegrown’ violent extremists with non-violent radicals who share some of the same values, objectives and complaints of al Qaeda inspired groups.  The report covers the UK, France, Denmark and the Netherlands, but also Canada.

 The report’s findings are based on analysis of 62 convicted terrorists across the five countries, 28 non-violent radicals, including 20 in depth interviews with radicals, and a further sample of 70 young Canadian Muslims.  The idea behind this methodology was to try to isolate the violent individuals as much as possible.  The term radicalisation can be misleading.  Most people refer to it being the process by which an individual adopts an extremist mindset that justifies terrorism, and in some cases seeks to plot and carry out terrorist attacks.  However, to be radical or to have radical ideas is not necessarily to be violent, or even socially problematic.  Counter-terrorism efforts and the security services are not ‘thought police’.  Their concern should be radicalisation that leads to violence, not other types of radicalisation that do not. 

 If I had to pick out one finding from the research, it would probably be the fact that the phenomenon of ‘homegrown’ violent extremism shares more in common with other groups of predominantly angry young men – like those who join gangs – than it does with non-violent radicals.  It is often argued that anger at foreign policy, an identity crisis of second / third generation immigrants, and exposure to radical concepts and thinkers, are the causes of radicalisation that leads to violence.  However, our research found these things experienced broadly across all of our sample groups, and cannot be the cause of violence. Rather, violent individuals were distinguished by the draw to the excitement and thrill of al Qaeda as an anti-establishment movement.  Their understanding of key religious concepts was of a superficial, ‘cut and paste’ nature, yet the assurance of their own interpretation was unshakeable.  Non-violent radicals, on the other hand, stressed the importance of context, history, Socratic-type ignorance and the importance of continual learning. 

 The report offers a number of recommendations for governments, individuals and communities who are grappling with this problem.  It argues for a liberal approach to radical ideas and cautions about what role the government can have in countering the al Qaeda narrative.  Perhaps most significantly, the report highlights the importance of encouraging political and social activism as a potential antidote for violent radicalisation.  The challenge is to make social activism more exciting and radical. Exciting forms of peaceful social activism – such as travelling overseas to volunteer – can help compete with the ‘thrilling’ appeal of al Qaeda.  Al Qaeda must be stripped of its glamour by highlighting the ignorance, incompetence and narcissism of ‘homegrown’ terrorists.  

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