The National Risk Register
Some of the NRR’s key points:
* Following the approach of the UK NSS, the NRR is ‘intended to capture the range of emergencies that might have a major impact’, rather than blindly favouring any single risk, such as terrorism. This is something that the former Permanent Secretary, Security, Intelligence and Resilience at the Cabinet Office, Sir Richard Mottram, has argued persuasively for.
* Risks are assessed depending on their likelihood and potential impact. According to these criteria, pandemic flu is judged the most significant risk currently facing the UK.
* It is important to note, however, that the document seeks to avoid ranking risks, stressing that it is ‘not predicting that any particular type of emergency will materialise or that, if it were to do so, it would happen on a specific scale’.
* Sensibly, risks are categorised into accidents (such as industrial or transport), natural events (hazards) and malicious attacks (threats).
* The register then goes on to offer a detailed examination of the specific risks in each category, as well as what might be done in response to their occurrence.
* Interestingly, it also offers specific advice from the perspective of both business and individuals, communities and families – providing links to Government departments relevant to the particular risk and the context in question.
Reading through the Register there are several concerns, however, that immediately spring to mind:
1. Closing the rhetoric-reality gap – as highlighted above, the Register focuses on the multitude of risks facing the UK. This marks a departure from some of the Ministerial chatter regarding the predominant threat of terrorism, particularly in the run up to the Commons vote on 42 days. Comments by the Home Office Minister, Tony McNulty, about the potential of ‘two or three 9/11s’ or ‘two 7/7s’ on the same day especially stick in the mind. Hopefully, with the publication of the UK NSS, reinforced today by the Risk Register, the political rhetoric can begin to catch up with the practical reality – reflecting the diverse range of risks that we face today.
2. Resources and Capabilities – accepting the NRR’s focus on ‘the range of emergencies’ and the recommendations it makes in responding to these, it is important that the necessary resources are made available. Simply, the next step must be to ensure that this comprehensive assessment is matched by new capabilities on the ground. Fail on this score and public expectations about the Government’s ability to provide security will likely be dealt a heavy blow.
3. The Risk Register and community resilience – also to be welcomed in the NRR is the emphasis that it places on the role of communities in building resilience. This chimes with a current Demos research project entitled Resilient Nation, which seeks to explore how communities respond to systemic breakdown.
There is still a feeling in the Register, however, echoing the Government’s Civil Contingencies legislation, that Whitehall has all the answers. In short, central Government seems intent on advising communities (providing information and instructions concerning immediate emergency response), rather than engaging with them more directly (that is, providing the necessary support for communities so that they can build longer-term preparedness and mitigation from the ground up). As one of the NRR’s recommendations suggests, ‘4.15: In the event of a pandemic, the Government will provide clear and considered messages to the public to advise them on other required action’. Basically, sit tight, central Government is on its way to help.
As our preliminary research has suggested, it is likely to be in engaging rather than simply informing those at the local level from Whitehall, that we can help to promote self-resilient communities. After all, this is surely the foundation on which resilience – whether at the local, national or international level – should be built.
Michael Harvey
michael.harvey@demos.co.uk