About Demos

Demos is a greenhouse for new ideas which can improve the quality of our lives. As an independent think tank, we aim to create an open resource of knowledge and learning that operates beyond traditional party politics.

But we also understand that thinking by itself is not enough. Demos has helped to initiate a number of practical projects which are delivering real social benefit through the redesign of public services.

We connect researchers, thinkers and practitioners to an international network of people changing politics. Our ideas regularly influence government policy, but we also work with companies, NGOs, colleges and professional bodies. By working with Demos, our partners develop a sharper insight into the way ideas shape society. For Demos, the process is as important as the final product.

About Demos Athens

Demos Athens is a radical and independent think tank linking the wealth of information and the international network of our knowledge society. Our goal is to contribute to the global network of Demos, by producing innovative and practical solutions for the political, social and corporate world.

Our commitment is to establish what lies after the communications revolution and to bring the waves of change to Greece and the region.

Our ambition is to provide globally an impetus to the issues of the post-modernisation agenda and to provide pioneering thought for the debate that lies after the Third Way.

Demos Athens runs a series of research programmes that transform new and progressive ideas into applicable proposals.
16 Days

The role of the Olympic Truce in the toolkit for peace

Rachel Briggs
Helen McCarthy
Alexis Zorbas
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Rachel Briggs
Helen McCarthy
Alexis Zorbas
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Alexis is a founding member and the General Director of Demos Athens, the only think tank in Greece which specialises in political, social and organisational innovation.
Demos: an international think tank

Demos is an international and independent think tank looking for new ideas which can improve the quality of our lives.

We understand that the best ideas come through working internationally. That's why we work with partners around the world to find solutions to the problems they have in common, from public service reform to democratic renewal; look for effective ways to tackle transnational policy challenges, such as migration and security; and facilitate an international network for the spread of the latest thinking and best practice.

Demos's international partners include: the Open Society Institute; the City of Athens; the Government of Italy; Demos Athens; the International Olympic Truce Centre; the International Olympic Committee (IOC); the Education Foundation in Australia; the Victoria Curriculum and Assessment Authority in Australia; the Netherlands Ministry of Justice; the OECD; the British Council in Belgium and Finland; Sitra; the Canadian High Commission; the Electoral Commission; the Ashden Trust; and Pioneers for Change, as well as a number of FTSE 100 companies.

There are three main components to Demos's international work:

Demos works with partners around the world to find solutions to common challenges, drawing on expertise we have developed in the UK.

- In 2003 Demos established a sister organisation in Greece, Demos Athens. We are currently collaborating on work on peace-making and international comparative policy analysis.
- We are working with the Education Foundation in Australia to develop a ‘public value’ framework for evaluating the impact and effectiveness of education services, drawing on our work in the UK with the Department for Education and Skills and the National College for School Leadership.
We are working with the Victoria Curriculum and Assessment Authority in Australia to develop a framework of ‘essential learnings’ for 5–15 year old students.

**Demos looks for solutions to today’s complex transnational policy challenges.**

- Our 2003 report, *People Flow*, argued for a pan-European approach to managing migration. This has been followed by seminars, meetings, conferences and press briefings across Europe.
- We are working with ten leading multinationals on a series of seminars and lectures on the challenges for companies of managing the new range of global security threats, from terrorism to counterfeiting.
- Following the success of our 2003 Boho Index of creative cities in the UK, Demos contributed the foreword to Richard Florida’s European Creativity Index for cities across the EU in *Europe in the Creative Age*, a report published in 2004.

**Demos’s international network of thinkers and practitioners gives us access to the latest thinking and best practice from around the world.**

- In August 2004 we will hold a conference in Finland with the British Council and Sitra on multiculturalism, immigration and innovation.
- In 2003 we held a bi-lateral conference with the Canadian High Commission to bring together key policy-makers and thinkers from the two countries.
- In 2004 we held an international conference on the personalisation of public services to facilitate exchange of ideas between different countries.
- In autumn 2004 we will hold a seminar in Brussels on the role political campaigns played in influencing democratic participation in the 2004 European Parliamentary elections.

If you would like more information about Demos’s international work, please contact Rachel Briggs, Head of International Programmes (rachel.briggs@demos.co.uk; +44 (0) 845 458 5949).
Foreword
by George A. Papandreou

The tradition of the Olympic Truce was initiated in ancient Greece in 776 BC. On the occasion of the organisation of the first recorded Olympic Games, the ancient city-states decided to cease all warfare and endorse the Truce, thus spearheading the message of peace and fair play.

This publication is about a timeless value that is still relevant in our world. Examining its ancient origins and its close association to the Olympic Games and sport, it analyses the core values of the Truce and the context in which it was revived in the 1990s. 16 Days explores the changing nature of conflict and violence, seeking to explain why the ideals of the Olympic Movement and the relationship between sport and the Truce can today become a powerful lever for peace-building.

In our postmodern framework of international relations, states and governments are not the only actors influencing and shaping global developments. International organisations, non-governmental organisations, communities, citizens, athletes and global ideals can have a direct impact towards establishing a global culture of peace.

Within this context, the Olympic Truce is relevant, necessary and constructive. It utilises the all-embracing value of sport, it animates the educational essence of Olympism and it builds upon the global communications reach of the Olympic Games.

We must never forget that the Olympic Rings are the most...
recognised brand in the world. The Olympic Movement expresses
global values that transcends national borders, cultural barriers, and
social and economic divisions.

In a world where mutual understanding is a critical factor for
conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace-building, the
Olympic Truce can provide a useful toolkit for humanity.

The analysis put forward by Demos underlines the importance of
global networked cooperation and provides new ideas about how we
could all enhance the dissemination of Truce values. It showcases the
contemporary relevance of the ideal and the need for grassroots
action and opinion-makers’ engagement in favour of the Truce.

Our world needs the sixteen days’ break from violence, prejudice
and aggression. The Olympic Truce is a window of opportunity in a
world defined by new forms of conflict and insecurity. We need a
break to reflect on what unites us and to act, so as to bridge what
separates our nations and communities.

The Olympic values are timeless and global. They have the power
to inspire, to move, to influence the progress of humanity. The
historical examination of the Truce and Olympism in this publication
showcases the interrelation between the Olympic Games and the
progress of humanity.

In August, the Olympic Games will return to Greece, their
birthplace, more than a century after their revival in 1896. The
organisation of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games entails a potential
that is more than symbolic.

Humanity will come together in a crucial historical period where
revolutionary developments in all fields of human and international
interaction question our essential moral beliefs and values.

If we can have peace for sixteen days, then maybe, just maybe, we
can have it for ever.

George A. Papandreou is President of PASOK (the Greek Socialist
Party) and Leader of the Greek Opposition. He is vice-chairman of
the International Olympic Truce Foundation and the International
Olympic Truce Centre.
1. Introduction

On 20 February 1998, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, left his office building in New York and caught a plane to Baghdad. He had one objective on his mind: to broker a deal which would allow UN weapons inspectors back into Iraq and remove the threat of air strikes by the US and Britain. Over the next few days, the softly spoken diplomat thrashed out a settlement with Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and his deputy, Tariq Aziz, resulting in the return of the inspectors to Baghdad and the US and British forces holding back on the threatened military action. The accord was met with acclaim by the many supporters of a diplomatic solution, heralded as a major step in resolving the Iraq crisis peacefully and providing much needed breathing space for the sanction-fatigued country.

Far less prominent in subsequent analysis of the event was the appeal made to both sides by Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, also in February 1998. His country was hosting the Olympic Winter Games in Nagano that month, and Hashimoto was anxious there should be no military escalation of the Iraq situation while athletes competed in the Olympic spirit of shared humanity, peace and tolerance. So he invoked the Olympic Truce, the ancient peace accord which ruled that all warring parties lay down their arms for the duration of the Games – an accord which had ensured the peaceful conduct of the Games for a large part of its ancient history.
The history of the Olympic Games and the Olympic Truce go hand in hand. The Games, first held in 776 BC, were created in order to act as a Truce to bring a temporary halt to the fighting between ancient Greece’s warring city-states. Messengers were despatched to announce the Truce, which lasted for the duration of the Games, plus a few days either side to allow the safe passage of athletes and spectators to and from the Games.

The Games were revived in 1896, but the Truce remained dormant for almost a century. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) reinstated the Truce in 1992, and it has been invoked at every Olympic Games since. The IOC calls on the host nation to declare the Truce, and since 1993 the Truce has received formal endorsement from the UN, in the form of Resolution A/RES/48/11. The latest Resolution submitted by Greece on the occasion of the Athens 2004 Games was co-sponsored and subsequently adopted by 190 UN member states, making it the most widely supported resolution in the history of the organisation (see appendix 3).

Juan Antonio Samaranch, the IOC President who was responsible for this revival, commented of the Iraq affair: ‘The attack never came because, during the Games, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had time to go to Baghdad and convinced Iraqi leaders that Security Council resolutions should be respected. . . That is the idea of an Olympic Truce.’

Samaranch was speaking from the heart. Four years earlier, he had experienced the Truce in action while leading an IOC delegation to the war-torn city of Sarajevo during the Olympic Winter Games in Lillehammer. This high-profile visit not only focused the eyes of the world on the Balkan conflict, but also provided a break in the fighting, thus allowing humanitarian relief to be delivered to the besieged population of the city. And 2000 saw perhaps the most public display of the power of the Truce yet, when athletes from North and South Korea marched together under one flag at the Opening Ceremony of the Sydney Games, reflecting their hopes of a peaceful and unified peninsula before a global audience of 3.7 billion watching the Games across the world.¹
The Truce is not, of course, a panacea. Conflicts begin and end for complex and contested reasons; just as a single actor can rarely claim sole responsibility for war, peace is also a highly collaborative project. As recent events have demonstrated, the crisis in Iraq stretched on despite the best efforts of Kofi Annan, international diplomats and advocates of the Olympic Truce back in 1998. And measuring the impact of any particular intervention, from preventative diplomacy to peace enforcement by military means, is an inexact science.²

What these moments of breakthrough do illuminate is how several elements – an ancient accord, the modern Olympic Games, and diplomatic goodwill – can powerfully combine to make peace more likely. They remind us that behind the tough realities of international relations, an ideal can still move hearts and minds, and, in small ways, help to spur individuals to take action in the pursuit of peace. The Olympic Truce is one of a wide range of instruments of peace that can be used to help make progress more likely.

This, then, is a book about an ancient practice which has become a modern ideal. The Truce has already succeeded in capturing the imagination of statespeople and opinion-formers around the world. The United Nations General Assembly first pledged its support for the Truce in 1993. As Kofi Annan commented, ‘Olympic ideals are also United Nations ideals: tolerance, equality, fair play and, most of all, peace. Together, the Olympics and the United Nations can be a winning team. . . Just as athletes strive for world records, so must we strive for world peace.’³ In 2000 the Olympic Truce was included in the UN’s Millennium Declaration, and in the same year, the IOC, in partnership with the Greek government, established the International Olympic Truce Centre (IOTC) in Athens to work for the advancement of the Truce’s message of peace. The Truce has also attracted the support of an eclectic mix of familiar figures from the worlds of international politics, sport, media and the performing arts; this global pantheon includes Nelson Mandela, Bill Clinton, Ruud Lubbers, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Denis Glover and Roger Moore, just to name a few.
The challenge ahead

The Truce has already made an impact since its revival in 1992. A string of influential and powerful individuals have put their names behind the Truce and, as we have seen, the Truce has already proved to be a potentially effective tool for peace. This will be possible only if it can adjust to the changing context within which it must operate.

While the locus for conflict shifts away from sovereign nation states, our institutions of international governance are struggling to grasp the logic of the new order of global peace and security. Designed for a postwar era, an old generation of peace-making tools is straining under the pressures that this new order of conflict creates. The most familiar strategies, such as preventative diplomacy, the implementation of sanctions and traditional peacekeeping remains in the hands of statespeople, while conflicts rage on the ground, waged by actors who recognise neither the authority of their prime ministers and presidents, nor the legitimacy of international law. There is growing recognition that the ideological or economic motives driving the combatants lie outside the scope of traditional inter-governmental diplomacy, yet ‘governance’ or development-led approaches have a mixed record and too often lack a strategic focus on the true roots of conflict. And wider social and cultural changes — brought into sharp focus post-September 11 — question the legitimacy of these mega-structures, which some associate with Western hegemony.

Violence is embedded in all our societies and cultures. Effective conflict resolution therefore requires an understanding of the links and feedback loops between the political disputes of nation states at one end of the spectrum and seething unrest on inner-city streets, in playgrounds and even in the home at the other end. This ‘inside out’ approach to peace-making requires timely and appropriate action at all levels of what we call the ‘pyramid of conflict’ to tackle both the devastating manifestations of conflict and the underlying forces that fuel and perpetuate the culture of violence in all societies – North and South.
A role for the Olympic Truce

The Olympic Truce is well placed to operate at all these levels. It opens windows of opportunity for peace, drawing on its historical relationship with Olympic values and networks of influence, as well as the wider benefits of its links to sport – an activity which engages peoples from every part of the world. The universal nature of its message creates the potential for the Truce to act as a global ‘integrator’, balancing the multiple dependencies and complexities within the world, while understanding the primacy of sport as a conduit for peace.

The global reach of the Games and the moral authority of the Olympic ideals are powerful levers, winning the Truce high level support within diplomatic circles such as the UN General Assembly, and plugging it into one of the most far-reaching global communications networks in existence. In 2000, the Sydney Games were broadcast across 220 nations, making it the most televised Olympic Games in history and the most watched sporting event in the world. That the Games are such a diverse gathering of cultures, colours and creeds is a symbolic reminder of just how easy it can be to overcome difference when there is shared commitment and all-round goodwill.

At the same time, the myriad and dense networks of grassroots sports organisations stretching across the globe provide an infrastructure through which the Truce can build a ‘bottom up’ presence within local communities. The Olympic family is at the heart of this infrastructure, composed of large international institutions and international federations, continental associations, regional bodies such as UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) or CAF (Confédération Africaine de Football) and National Committees, and the numerous local clubs and associations that are part of grassroots communities which represent millions of active sportspersons and a fan base of billions of people.

There can be no Olympic Truce without the Olympic Games, and the Games are also one of the Truce’s greatest strengths. They provide a safe and prestigious space for mediation, as exemplified by the case
of the two Koreas at the Sydney Games. They have also provided a window to allow humanitarian relief into conflict zones, such as took place in Bosnia in 1994. And of course, their recurrence every two years ensures that the momentum behind the Truce is sustained and that a good ‘excuse’ for action presents itself to both warring parties and international actors on a regular basis.

Nonetheless, a legitimate role for the Truce in conflict resolution and international rapprochement can only be achieved once it has also established its status as an alternative tool of diplomacy and found ways to integrate its sporting tradition with its peace-making aspirations. This will involve recognising some of the tensions inherent in using sport as a route to peace – from growing concerns around the politicisation of sport to the commercialisation of the Olympic brand – as well as celebrating the rediscovery of the roots of the Games through the revival of their historical association with peace.

These discussions must take account of the intense rate of social, cultural, economic and political change, which forms the backdrop for the Truce’s work. The Olympic Truce and the Movement from which it stems should not be expected to stand still. In fact, we must embrace attempts by both to stay in tune with the world in which they exist, and for which they are working to find solutions. Ultimately, the Olympics – the Games, the Truce, the Movement – is an expression of its time. Expecting it to turn its back on the defining forces of the current era – commercialism, international politics, and mass communication – would be like asking it to fight for peace with both arms tied behind its back. The real dilemma is not whether or not it should use these forces, but how to put in place adequate systems of governance and oversight to ensure that those seeking to deploy the Truce do so in accordance with the values of the Olympic Movement and do not abuse or appropriate its global standing for self-interested purposes.

The next step
The ancient idea of the Olympic Truce remains as relevant today as it was in ancient Greece. At a time when the assertion of difference –
social, cultural, geographical and ethnic – is the dominant force, the Truce reminds us of the timeless nature of the challenges we face in weakening the grip of violence on our societies. Just as the nation state is losing its monopoly on the means of violence, so we must rethink its traditional monopoly on the means of peace. If the potential of the Olympic Truce as a tool for peace is to be fully realised it must reflect these changes in the way it is used. High-level support through institutions such as the UN is necessary and welcome. But it must find ways for its work to transcend national borders, helping actors on all levels of the pyramid – from top decision-makers down to ordinary citizens – to ‘achieve full ownership’ of the Truce, and make its ideal live in the context of the conflicts paralysing their communities and diminishing the quality of their lives.

16 Days

16 Days explores the potential of the Olympic Truce as a lever for peace by locating it within the changing landscape of conflict. It provides a forward-looking analysis of where and by what means champions of the Truce can convert this potential into lasting contributions towards peace. Chapter two opens with an overview of the ancient origins of the Truce and the Olympic Movement in ancient Greece. It analyses the Truce’s timeless values and the context within which it re-entered the international scene in the 1990s. Chapter three explores the ways in which conflict has changed since the end of the Cold War. It describes a world where tensions between non-state actors dominate. This has resulted in much more complex and fragmented security challenges that exert ever greater pressures on our institutions of local, national and global governance and the traditional tools of conflict prevention and resolution. Chapter four introduces the ‘pyramid of conflict’, a multilevel model which represents the ‘total’ nature of conflict in our world, stretching from traditional state-to-state conflict at the top of the pyramid, through insurgency, terrorism and organised crime down to the ‘culture’ of violence which exists within all societies and which feeds tensions up and down the pyramid.
16 Days

16 Days argues that the Olympic Truce has the potential to play two key roles. Firstly, its application over the past decade has demonstrated its capacity to deliver practical results on the ground – from the delivery of humanitarian relief to the facilitation of dialogue between bitter rivals. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, at a time of growing public cynicism and crises of confidence in political institutions, the Olympic Truce reminds us of the power of idealism, and has the capacity to inspire a new generation and its leaders to make small but constant steps towards peace. The Olympic Truce is a peace-inspiring tool for our age.
2. Olympism and peace

The Olympic story is lost between myth and recorded history. There are conflicting accounts of the birth of the first Olympic Games in 776BC; it is not entirely clear how long they survived; and there is a lack of clarity about why the Games resurfaced two and a half thousand years later, revived by a Frenchman at the end of the nineteenth century. And yet, they survive to this day, returning home to Athens in 2004, a rare source of continuity between the ancient and the modern worlds.

The world has experienced considerable change since the birth of the Games, with the pace of change since the end of the Cold War being particularly rapid. Regional and world events in this period have resulted in a re-ordering of global affairs – political, economic, technical, social and cultural. At a time when we should be celebrating progress and development, news bulletins and headlines across the world are dominated by evidence of the fallout of globalisation, often fuelled by growing tensions between different religions, cultures, societies and communities. The lessons that ancient history and our recent past can teach us should point to the role that Olympism and the Olympic Truce could play in helping to tackle some of the security challenges facing the world in the twenty-first century.
The birth of the ancient Olympic Games

Ancient Greece was made up of a group of city-states in an almost perpetual state of war, whose conflicts would eventually bring about the demise of Greek civilisation. The history surrounding the birth of the Olympic Games is patchy, but what we know from myth is that the ancient Greek King Iphitos asked the oracle of Delphi – the ‘think tank’ of ancient Greeks – for advice on how to end the wars that were plunging his kingdom and the broader Peloponnese area into chaos. The oracle advised him to organise an athletic contest in ancient Olympia, to occur every four years, and to proclaim a Truce for the duration of the Games. The first recorded Olympic Games were held in 776 BC. We know that the ancient Truce ensured the survival of the Games by guaranteeing the safe journey of athletes, judges, artists and spectators to and from Olympia and their peaceful participation in the games. The Olympic Games and the Olympic Truce were one and the same thing – it was impossible to have one without the other. In other words, the Games were designed with peace in mind, to act as a broker for differences between those at war with one another.

The Olympic Games became the only source of inter-state legality in a society characterised by a perpetual state of conflict, and there is evidence to suggest it was universally respected, with only a few notable exceptions over more than 1,200 years. The announcement of the Truce was made months ahead of the start of the Games. Messengers – or spondoforoi – gathered in Olympia to be briefed on their mission to spread the word throughout the city-states. By 884 BC, a treaty had been signed between the rulers of Elis, Spata and Pisa proclaiming Elis – the area surrounding Olympia – as sacred and invincible ground and decreed the cessation of hostilities for the duration of the Olympic Games.

There is documented evidence pointing towards the success of the Olympic Games in bringing together Greek city-states that were otherwise pitted against one another in bloody battles. There are numerous examples of the observance of the Truce during these Games. As Nicolaos Gialouris states, ‘A very indicative historical
example of the importance of the Ancient Olympic Games is the battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC. In one of the most important struggles of Ancient Hellenism, against the Persian Empire and while the 300 soldiers of Sparta were fighting outnumbered by the Persians, the rest of the Greeks were assembled in Ancient Olympia to celebrate the 75th Olympiad. The Olympic Games were so intertwined with the idea of peace that the most important treaties between the city-states were actually on public display in the area of the sacred Altis.

Of course, not everyone welcomed the opportunity for Truce. It was therefore strictly enforced by Olympic officials, who levied fines on anyone who broke the peace during the Games and the time allowed for safe passage. According to Thucydides, in 420 BC the Spartans were barred from the Games after launching an attack at the time of the Truce.

The birth of the modern Olympic Games
There is more information available about the revival of the Olympic Games at the end of the nineteenth century, but no single uncontested account survives. It is likely that the first modern Olympic Games in 1896 were the culmination of efforts throughout the nineteenth century. In 1833, the Greek poet Alexandros Soutsos floated the idea of reviving the Games in a poem. This inspired a wealthy Greek businessman, Evangelos Zappas, who suggested they start up again. Around the same time, in 1838 the municipality of Letrini, an area near to ancient Olympia, decided to revive the Games and hold them every four years. There is no other information, so historians do not believe these Games actually happened, but it is more evidence that the idea was circulating. When the first modern Olympic Games were held in 1896, they were not in fact the first Games of that century. National Olympic Games were held in Athens in 1859, 1870, 1875 and 1889.

The Modern Olympic Movement was born out of a fundamental belief in the progress of humanity and the ability of sport to contribute towards this aim. People like Baron De Coubertin –
credited as the father of the Modern Olympic Movement – were heavily influenced by the ideas and philosophy of the Enlightenment and believed that sport could produce a more rational state of affairs. The idea of noble competition does not differ much from the conceptualisations of Natural Law that the thinkers of the eighteenth century used in order to describe the natural state of humanity. The intellectual cornerstone of the Olympic philosophy was the idea that human beings are not driven by irrational and selfish desires and that through the dissemination of the values of sport to all areas of human activity we can improve the individual and collective condition. Later chapters expand on the positive values promoted by sport.

At the end of the nineteenth century, nationalist tendencies were strengthening their grip on many parts of the world. Those involved in the revival of the Games believed that internationalism could act as a balancing force at a time when nationalism was tearing societies apart, just as more local struggles had done in ancient Greece. As Coubertin himself remarked, ‘Olympism has not been revived in our modern civilisation in order to play a local or transient role. The mission that has been entrusted to it is universal and eternal. It is ambitious and it needs all the time and space.’\textsuperscript{10} The Modern Olympic Games became the first global sports movement; although sport of course existed in all national cultures, it was the Olympic Movement that first conceived of and organised a global sports event and corresponding network based on universal values.

The architects of the modern Games were also influenced by the reformist agenda of the late nineteenth century that sought social improvement through education. An important parameter that shaped the values and goals of the Olympic Movement in its first steps was the social anomie that resulted from the forces of the industrial revolution and the widening inequalities of the era. Sport with its essential commitment to the notion of equal participation provided an inspiration to the notion of social mobility and social equality. This was more radical than it might seem within the contemporary context. Sport as a leisure activity had always, of course, tended to be an exclusionary force, only available to the
affluent or lazy. To use sport instead as a tool to promote social mobility marked a radical shift in thinking.

This is an ambitious ideal that today’s Olympic Movement remains committed to. ‘For a long time after the 19th century’s revival, athletics were merely the occasional pastime of rich and semi-idle youth. Our committee has struggled more than anyone to make them the habitual recreation of young people of the lower middle class. They must now be made fully accessible to proletarian adolescence. Every sport for everyone, that is the new and by no means utopian aim which we must devote ourselves to achieve.’ The former President of the IOC, Juan Antonio Samaranch, reiterated, ‘The development of living and popular high-quality sport is, I repeat, the necessary precondition for the development of a potential elite . . . The IOC is doing its best to ensure that everyone has his chances in sport. That is the aim of Olympic Solidarity. It is not a question of imposing anything on anyone, but of offering the possibility of engaging in sporting activities appropriate to local conditions.’ In fact, the IOC considers sport to be a human right.

The revival of the Olympic Truce in the 1990s

The concept of the Olympic Truce was not part of the Modern Games until the early 1990s, revived by the IOC in 1992 after the end of the Cold War. The most significant development came when a formal partnership was established between the IOC and the UN. In 1993, the IOC launched an appeal for an Olympic Truce at the 1994 Games, which was endorsed by 184 Olympic committees and presented to the Secretary-General of the UN. The UN then passed its own resolution, A/RES/48/11, which supports the appeal for an Olympic Truce, recognising the contribution that this could make towards ‘advancing the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations’. The IOC calls upon the Games’ host nation to table this resolution to the UN General Assembly ahead of their Games. The resolution:

- Commends the International Olympic Committee, the International Sports Federations and the national
Olympic committees for their efforts to mobilise the youth of the world in the cause of peace;

- Urges member states to observe the Olympic Truce from the seventh day before the opening and the seventh day following the closing of each of the Olympic Games, in accordance with the appeal launched by the International Olympic Committee;

- Notes the idea of the Olympic Truce, as dedicated in ancient Greece to the spirit of fraternity and understanding between peoples, and urges member states to take the initiative to abide by the Truce, individually and collectively, and to pursue in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations the peaceful settlement of all international conflicts;

- Calls upon all member states to cooperate with the International Olympic Committee in its efforts to promote the Olympic Truce;

- Requests the Secretary-General to promote the observance of the Olympic Truce among member states, drawing the attention of world public opinion to the contribution such a truce would make to the promotion of international understanding and the maintenance of peace and goodwill, and to cooperate with the International Olympic Committee in the realisation of this objective.

Since 1993, the UN has passed a new resolution every two years, stating its commitment to the ideal of the Olympic Truce for each subsequent Summer and Winter Games. The most recent – passed in 2003 – is included as appendix 3.

The revival of the Olympic Truce in the early 1990s coincides with the fallout of the end of the Cold War. As the next chapter will explore in more detail, the past decade has been characterised by heightened instability across the world. The short twentieth century, where
superpower stand-off and balance of power created stability and certainty, suddenly ended and in its wake local and national tensions resurfaced. Once again, political events conspired to create a space and a role for the Olympic Movement, as they had done a century earlier and at the birth of the ancient Olympic Games.

The Olympic Truce has been successfully observed on a number of occasions since it was revived in 1992: it has contributed towards the creation of ceasefires in the conflict in Sudan and the halting of bombing over Iraq; it has enabled the delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia; and it has brought together North and South Korea in a show of unity at the opening ceremony of the Sydney Games. The box below contains more details about these case studies:

### Recent observances of the Olympic Truce

**1994** President Samaranch wrote to the heads of state in 1994 to encourage the observance of the Olympic Truce during the XVII Olympic Winter Games in Lillehammer, Norway. As a result:

- the Sudanese NOC succeeded in obtaining a ceasefire in the war between the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army and the government
- the armed conflict in Georgia with Abkhazia was suspended
- a General Assembly vote during the Games encouraged a ceasefire arrangement to permit the supply of humanitarian aid to populations in Bosnia. It has been estimated that this allowed 10,000 children to be inoculated in just one day.\(^\text{14}\)

In the 2000 Sydney Games, African leaders pledged a halt to all hostilities for two weeks. North and South Korea marched into the Sydney Olympic stadium together under the same flag.

A statement of World Personalities in Support of the Olympic Truce is being circulated and has already been signed by Nelson Mandela, Bill Clinton, the Pope, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, over 400 heads of state, government and foreign ministers, heads of international organisations and various other luminaries.\textsuperscript{15}

There is often confusion about what the Truce does and does not intend to achieve. It does not, for example, aim to turn 16 days of truce into generations of peace; as later chapters will show, the road to peace is long and difficult, with setbacks as well as advances. The Truce is just one part of this gradual process of change. It offers a window of opportunity within which small gains can be made – from practical benefits such as the delivery of humanitarian assistance or a temporary resumption of diplomacy to less tangible deliverables, such as the reaffirmation of what universal values should be and the growth of trust between old adversaries. Importantly, in a world where real politik rules, the Olympic Truce stands back and challenges individuals to imagine a life without conflict. It aims to shift the terms of the debate from ‘why peace?’ to ‘why not?’ and reminds us just how much can be achieved when we set our minds to it.
3. Conflict and reconciliation in the twenty-first century

The Truce made its reappearance at a time of great turbulence and upheaval in international relations, when many of the certainties of the short twentieth century had been exploded. Soon after September 11 2001, Tony Blair likened the World Trade Center attacks to a kaleidoscope being shaken up, with the pieces settling to create a new and entirely unfamiliar picture. In fact, the events of that day crystallised in the eyes of the world a number of complex political, social and economic processes which have been shifting the contours of global politics since the end of the Cold War. They exposed how growing interconnectedness has made even the richest and strongest military powers in the world vulnerable to non-state actors who have illustrated their ability to cause harm on a scale previously reserved for sovereign states. And they put into a global context the ‘new wars’ raging inside and spilling out from failed and failing states. Sustained by global networks of ideologies, people, money and arms, these conflict zones provide a favourable environment for terrorists, criminals and warlords, and defy conventional state-based approaches to conflict resolution.

The challenge now facing international actors is to grasp the logic of this new environment and avoid responding to it with the sort of vulnerability-led responses which breed fear – the very enemy of peace. This won’t be easy; it requires us to reinvent our institutions of global governance and rethink the sort of values which will lead to
sustainable routes to peace and security for all citizens in every part of the world. This is no small task, and leaders will need to draw on every available resource to tackle problems both at home and abroad. It is right then to consider the part that the Truce might play in nurturing this sort of creative thinking. But if it is to do that successfully, we must first understand better the forces which are shaping the nature of conflict, and with which proponents of the Truce must engage.

It is possible to identify four key, interrelated trends that have profound implications for the ways in which societies throughout the world – North and South – experience conflict and which challenge the current configuration of institutions, tools and protocols for tackling conflict and promoting peace. The locus of activity has shifted from states to sub-state actors, such as warlords, mercenaries, terrorists and community-level violence. This is the result of a number of changes: the development of international diplomatic channels has brought an end to the need for Western countries to settle their disputes on the battlefield; the fallout from the Cold War has left some parts of the world with failing or even failed states; the growing realisation of the inequities in the distribution of the benefits of globalisation has left many disillusioned; and there is a growing danger that such actors could pull off a David and Goliath spectacle if they were able to get their hands on weapons that could cause mass impact, such as the aeroplanes used in the September 11 attacks or even weapons of mass destruction. The way in which the Olympic Truce is used must reflect these new realities, and later chapters will explain in more detail what this means in practice.

A fragmented and fragmenting world
One of the most striking features of the shaken-up kaleidoscope is the fact that globalisation has had massively different impacts on different parts of the world. It is clear that not all societies are following the course of state secularisation, social individualisation and pluralisation of values, which some have argued is the great
promise of globalisation. Indeed, perceived inequities in the distribution of the benefits of globalisation have mobilised a large and diverse coalition of discontents in recent years. The failure of global institutions to minimise and manage these inequalities has helped to create or exacerbate political instabilities and tensions in many regions of the world.

The international relations expert, Robert Cooper, has attempted to make sense of this unequal world by identifying three ‘zones’, characterised in terms of safety, of danger and of chaos. Within this global triptych, the postindustrial advanced or *postmodern* states, notably the countries of the European Union, have established a climate of security based on mutual interference, openness and self-imposed restraints, in which multilateral institutions are valued above force for resolving disputes. In Cooper’s second *modern* zone, many states are still undergoing the processes of modernisation, building viable political institutions, reforming their economies and developing open civil societies. For many of these states, the social costs and cultural pressures of modernisation are heavy, and create bubbling tensions in permanent risk of erupting into conflict, either domestically or with neighbours. Countries in this zone include China, Russia, India, and perhaps surprisingly the United States, which has not yet developed the type of commitment to international law and multilateral frameworks to qualify for postmodern status. Finally, there is a sizeable core of poor, weak, preindustrial states, often the remnants of collapsed empires, in which force is routinely deployed by non-state actors in the vacuum created by weak or disabled political institutions. In this *premodern* zone, preventing state failure is difficult and costly, and yet profoundly in the interests not only of the citizens who suffer the devastating fallout of bad governance, but also of world peace. As the examples of Somalia, Afghanistan and increasingly postwar Iraq illustrate, weak, failed and collapsed states provide the climate of lawlessness in which warlords, drug barons and terrorists can thrive.

One does not necessarily have to accept the Cooper thesis in its entirety to recognise that conflict is taking very different forms in
different parts of the world. Armed conflict between strong, advanced democracies in Europe and North America has been made nigh on impossible due to the norms of cooperation enshrined by institutions such as the EU and NATO since the end of World War Two. In other regions, such as the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, security is based on the same sort of system of balance which existed in nineteenth-century Europe, and in which the outbreak of inter-state war is always a risk. In Cooper’s third ‘premodern’ zone, populated by states such as Angola, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, formerly Congo) among many others, violence is widespread and beyond the control of whatever state authorities might exist.

In the 1990s these troubled regions became the locus for what Mary Kaldor has called the ‘new wars’. These set themselves apart from previous types of warfare in a number of ways. Armed conflict becomes a decentralised and ‘privatised’ phenomenon, waged by warlords, mercenaries and volunteers, with violations of human rights a central methodology of warfare, in contrast to the strict international law that governs war. Many of these conflicts are taking place in societies with cultures that are little understood in the West, and are based, as Kaldor describes it, on political ideologies ‘which tend to consist of exclusivist claims to power and resources in the name of religion or ethnicity’. As the tragic events taking place throughout the last decade in Chechnya, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Kosovo – just to name a few – grimly illustrate, these extreme forms of cultural politics represent one of the greatest challenges to peace today and the fallout can be difficult to contain. While the focus must remain on the official or unofficial leaders, it is vital not to forget that violence and conflict are played out and reinforced in homes and communities by ordinary people, too. Finding ways to tackle the causes for the sustenance of conflict at the most local levels is an important challenge for leaders in the West if their interventions are to be effective.
Transnational ‘networked’ conflict

These ‘new wars’ often have the appearance of being highly localised, involving local actors mobilised by local rivalries or politics. They are often waged on the ground with little regard to political borders, as illustrated by the cases of the wars in and around Angola, DRC, Somalia and Afghanistan. And yet this spill-over effect reaches further than the immediate geographical region through the organising frameworks which support the conflict – namely, the networks of government players, warlords, mercenary groups and volunteers through which ideas, money and arms freely flow.

This network-based model provides the key to understanding how sub-state conflict is produced and re-produced, and the importance of global linkages in sustaining these disputes. Mary Kaldor argues that the local actors are part of ‘the globalised informal economy that depends on criminal and semi-legal activities’, which spreads through refugees, migrants and displaced persons, and is sustained by the demand for drugs, sex workers, and so forth in the developed world.

The development of these ‘sticky’ webs makes it difficult on a practical level to identify the individuals that should sit around the negotiation table together, making inclusive community-wide initiatives crucial to peaceful outcomes. The human mobility dimension is particularly significant here, and poses huge challenges for national policy-makers seeking total control over their borders. Migration flows are part of the overall growth in interconnections between different parts of the world, and the growing range of routes and means make these patterns ever more complex and diverse.

Under these conditions, states can no longer be relied on to act as ‘containers’, with the capacity to suppress dissent and plug the holes through which conflict flows into the wider world. The degree to which weak states are constrained in delivering political goods to their citizens – such as law and order, economic infrastructure and basic public services – varies significantly, and there is nothing inevitable about weakness degenerating into all-out collapse. Much
depends on the decisions made by the ruling powers, and the nature of external assistance. In the most serious cases, such as Somalia, Sierra Leone and Bosnia, it has become increasingly likely that powers from less chaotic parts of the world will intervene militarily, thus bringing the conflict on to the domestic policy agendas of Western governments.

The new humanitarianism or Islam versus the West?

Where political stand-off and satellite wars were the hallmark of the Cold War, the so-called ‘humanitarian war’ has characterised the 1990s. It has been driven by the desire of leaders in the West to intervene in the affairs of other countries in the name of humanitarian relief. Over the last decade, leaders such as former US President Bill Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have led armies into Somalia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone, citing not the national interest (or at least not directly), but a moral imperative to end the extreme suffering of civilians in conflict zones.

The US political scientist Joseph Nye argues that this has created a new climate of public opinion in the West, pointing out that the passing of ‘a warrior ethic’ in (post) modern democracies means that military action must now be underpinned by an ‘elaborate moral justification to ensure popular support’.22 The source of legitimacy for that justification, however, remains crucial, and is inevitably tied to the activities and decisions of the United Nations, as public unease around US President George W Bush and Blair’s decision to invade Iraq without UN mandate in March 2003 starkly illustrates.

This reminder of the difference between legitimacy and legality in the international arena illustrates the difficulty with which many leaders search for a coherent, values-based agenda for their actions abroad in the current climate. For example, the unease in the Iraq case rested on the US-led coalition’s attempt to mix the language of humanitarianism with the rhetoric of the ‘War on Terrorism’. This was compounded by the US’s history of apparent indifference towards the UN and the system of international law.

Many commentators warn that the Bush rhetoric since September
and the foreign policy that has accompanied it, endorses a politically dangerous view of civilisational blocs trapped in inevitable conflict with each other due to fundamental and profound differences in outlook, based on ethnic identity. This approach, popularised by Huntington in his 1996 *Clash of Civilisations* thesis, attempts to suggest that, compared with political ideology, ethnicity and race are inherently stronger identities because they depend on parentage which cannot be changed. In conflict situations, the theory continues, ethnic identities become hardened, with only one possible solution – permanent separation.

Some current trends, such as the strengthening hold of fundamentalist attitudes within many Muslim societies, the highly charged and bloody nature of ethnic conflict in central Asia, and the rise of the extreme far right in many countries in the West, might appear to provide support for this view. But it is important to recognise the extent to which such totalising theories provide a frame in which events are interpreted and understood on both sides, with details that do not fit being discarded. For example, there has been intense focus since September 11 on what has been reported as growing Islamic fundamentalism, especially in the Arab world. But this has often been exaggerated and much of the reporting has failed to acknowledge the fact that fundamentalism in any society remains a wholly minority activity. Furthermore, the notion of a homogeneous Islamic world is simply untenable. As a recent report on public diplomacy argues, ‘there is nothing “essential” and unchanging about “Islam” or the social relations of countries in the Middle East Region’, as the example of Turkey, with its secular constitution, membership of NATO and high proportion of Muslim inhabitants so aptly demonstrates.

As Benjamin Barber has suggested, the problem is perhaps better understood as a clash of perceptions of two extremes: fundamentalist religion and unfettered consumer capitalism. Anti-West feeling on the ‘Arab Street’ must be balanced by reference to the negative perceptions of Islam that pervade much public opinion in the West, and they both must be understood in the context of different cultural
responses to the politics of globalisation. The road to peace requires avoiding the temptation to reify those differences to the point that they become monolithic or immutable. As Nobel laureate Amartya Sen points out in a recent essay: ‘We may not be quite the same, but we are different from each other in very many different ways’.26

**Asymmetrical conflict**

These tensions are played out on an international stage in which the stakes have completely changed, where military might can no longer guarantee security. Martin van Creveld argued shortly after the collapse of Communism that the wars of the future would no longer be waged with conventional armies.27 His prophecy has been more than proved over the past decade, in which the Cold War model of two opposing belligerents armed to the teeth with hi-tech weaponry has lost its explanatory power. In its place we find a diverse range of alternatives, all of which point to the advent of an era of ‘asymmetrical’ warfare, whereby, as Herfried Münkler puts it, ‘greater material resources and a more advanced technological development alone will not automatically tip the scales between victory and defeat.’28

One telling sign that this era is with us is the case of Kosovo, where the Western powers insisted on displaying their full technological prowess in a conflict zone in which the real humanitarian pressures points were found in widely distributed, loosely coordinated campaigns of terror against civilians, enabled by low-tech, in some cases primitive, methodologies of warfare. There was evidence to suggest that NATO’s arm’s-length air campaign actually *exacerbated* rather than eased suffering on the ground. For some commentators, this illustrated the prior concern of the Western leaders involved with minimising, at all costs, the number of body-bags sent home. For example, Mary Kaldor has coined the phrase ‘Spectacle War’ to describe this kind of military strategy, designed to preserve the lives of Western soldiers over those they purport to be helping.29

The limitations of this approach are only too clear when one considers the complexities of the new methodologies of warfare. The
militia groups and warlords of weak and failing states mix cheap small arms, such as automatic rifles and anti-personnel landmines, with a few heavy weapons salvaged from the stockpiles of the Cold War in order to wreak havoc on civilian populations. In these theatres of war there are no recognised battlefields in which to contain the violence. Instead the conflict drags on interminably, making war all-pervasive and a way of life for those living in these societies.

Another feature of this asymmetrical era is the growing alarm in the West about ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (WMD) in the possession of so-called ‘rogue states’. These modernised or modernising countries are governed by strong rulers who have invested heavily, often at the expense of social welfare provision, in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, which present a potential risk to global security.

Another unique problem preoccupying many policy-makers and military strategists today is the threat to human life posed by global terrorism in the era of asymmetrical warfare. As counter-terrorism expert Roger Davies observes, ‘the fact that we can never be sure how terrorists will use the tools at their disposal or which direction they will take next presents us with significant challenges.’ For many, the most chilling aspect of the September 11 attacks was the extent of the destruction caused by the transformation of civilian vehicles – especially ones that are so central to the positive forces of global progress that we enjoy so much – into deadly weapons of mass impact. Open source material shows that the US, UK and Israel have all had their embassies targeted by large truck bombs since September 2001, the same weapons that were used successfully in Bali, Kenya, Tanzania and Istanbul. This pattern has continued in postwar Iraq, with multiple car and truck bomb attacks on police stations, coalition troops, and, perhaps most significantly, politically neutral organisations such as the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross. These attacks demonstrate the devastation and disruption that terrorists can cause through the use of simple conventional explosives. With regard to WMD, it is less likely that Al Qaida and its related networks have developed the capability to produce chemical,
biological or radiological weapons, but it is clear they have the aspiration and intent, as the recovery of a cyanide compound in the possession of alleged terrorists in Rome in 2000 and the discovery of the poison ricin in a London flat in January 2003 shown.\textsuperscript{31}

What particularly challenges governments and international institutions in tackling these threats is the willingness of the current breed of terrorists to turn their own bodies into weapons to further their cause, and to use them against civilians and politically or culturally symbolic targets. Eliza Manningham-Buller, Director-General of the UK Security Service, has gone on record on a number of occasions in recent months saying that it is now a case of ‘when’ rather than ‘if’ the UK will experience its first suicide attack.\textsuperscript{32} Governments across the world are facing up to the same grim reality. The figure of the suicide bomber or the suicide hijacked aircraft pilot, on many levels, lies outside the common frame of reference for rich, Western democracies. As Münkler observes: ‘The strategists of terror have recognised that “post-heroic” societies, with their lifestyle and self-assurance, are particularly vulnerable to attack by individuals with values of martyrdom.’\textsuperscript{33} Suicide bombers are perhaps the most frightening reminder of the fact that violence and conflict start in the minds of men and can only be stopped there, too.

The crisis in governance
What can we conclude from this picture? Clearly, conflict is complex and difficult to categorise in any straightforward way. The forces driving conflict and the way it is played out are changing, challenging the traditional processes of conflict resolution, conflict prevention and peace-building. The opening sections of this chapter have demonstrated how conflict can no longer be understood to be taking place primarily at an inter-state level, between armies with comparable military capacities, as has been the traditional paradigm throughout the modern period. And yet the UN, the key institution created after World War Two with a mandate to ensure global security and peace, remains an inter-governmental body at core, as do the majority of our instruments of global governance, such as NATO and
the EU. Most were born of an age in which state sovereignty was supreme and ‘war’ and ‘peace’ were understood as legal categories, marked by the declaration of hostilities and the conclusion of a peace treaty between nation states. In the same way, the core principles of international humanitarian law are still based on agreements between states, and only apply in armed conflicts.

Clearly these principles no longer reflect the world we are in, and there is a pressing demand for institutional creativity in the face of new and current threats to peace. As Cooper remarks: ‘In the past it was enough for a nation to look after itself. Today that is no longer sufficient. In an age of globalisation no country is an island.’ Its record over the past decade has prompted many to question the efficacy of the UN in its current form as a force for good global governance. For example, David Rieff argues that the UN’s desire to claim a moral authority has been undermined by its commitment to political neutrality in conflict situations involving major humanitarian suffering, such as in Somalia in 1993 and Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. Rieff goes on to argue that there is something inherently problematic in the idea of an institution with a mission to serve the cause of humanity which is at the same time constitutionally bound by the mandates agreed by its member states.

The new wars of the 1990s also exposed the difficulties involved in enforcing international humanitarian law in the absence of state structures, not only in terms of holding warlords and other sub-state actors to account, but also in ensuring that the intervening Western powers are bound by the same rules. Economic institutions are also implicated in this crisis of governance. Many critics of globalisation point the finger squarely at the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and to a lesser extent the World Bank in sowing the seeds of political instability through attaching ill thought through conditions to financial loans and development aid. This problem extends to other major players in this field, such as the EU, which has come under some criticism for failing to join up its strategy regarding development assistance to its ongoing conflict prevention and resolution efforts. Humanitarian aid in particular, unless carefully
managed, risks falling into the wrong hands and serving the cause of the warring parties, especially when money is directed through the government and its agencies in the recipient country, rather than through independent non-governmental organisations (NGOs). ‘This necessarily involves some risk that the assistance can inadvertently entrench rather than reduce social inequities or power imbalances and so have a negative effect on conflict prevention goals.’

How then, should supporters of the Olympic Truce develop a conceptual framework of conflict and conflict resolution which reflects these complexities, and locate a role for the Truce within it? What possible scope could there be for a message of 16 days of cease-fire to make our world a safer and more peaceful place? These trends highlight the need for more flexible mechanisms that can operate outside and across, as well as within, official state structures. Against this backdrop, there is much potential for the role of the Olympic Truce as an instrument that can move nimbly between the multiple levels of activity.
4. Cultures of violence and cultures of peace

What emerges clearly from the analysis of the preceding chapter are the limitations of an approach to conflict resolution and peace-building that understands war primarily as an affair between states to be settled between the heads of those states. While high-level diplomacy still has a vital role to play, it cannot influence in any straightforward way the networks of non-state actors, money and goods that sustain conflict, nor the ideologies or cultural perceptions that feed animosity, hatred and fear. Mediation of various kinds has been high on the political agenda in the turbulent environment unleashed by the ending of the Cold War. Yet third party efforts to bring disputants together either to prevent or resolve hostilities have generated mixed results and some controversy, as the Dayton Agreement involving Bosnia and Serbia and the ongoing role of the US in the Middle-East Peace Process both illustrate.

Stronger interventions have a similarly uneven record. These can involve the implementation of sanctions, preventative deployment of military personnel before a dispute has escalated, or peace enforcement once that escalation has taken place, but there is little consensus among experts as to a reliable set of principles for ‘what works’ in conflict prevention and resolution in the post-1989 world. Today, every conflict presents its own messy histories and complicated genealogies of tension, hostility and hatred. Each has complex causes and deep roots, which means we must address the
manifestations of violence across society if we are going to strengthen cultures of peace.

What has become clear is that ‘road maps’ to peace might take in the immediate surrounding landscape yet miss the deeper roots of violence. These roots are found in the fundamental tensions of human beings living together – tensions that bubble under and up through the social processes which shape the norms by which we live. In many cases these processes can create whole ‘cultures’ of violence that become manifest to a greater or lesser extent from community to community. Kaldor points to the jihad culture taught in religious schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan or among the Tamils of Sri Lanka, ‘where young children are taught to be martyrs and where killing is understood as an offering to God’. A report produced by the International Crisis Group questions the extent to which European policy-makers understand this dimension of development, pointing to ‘the lack of attention in EU policies to the role of a culture of violence as a source of conflict. Thus, at the same time as the EU gives money to build schools in Kosovo, it appears to take no effective action about the school curriculum that is oriented towards promoting ethnic privilege and glorification of violence’. The socialisation of children plays a particularly significant role in ensuring the transmission of these cultural norms and the expectation of leading violent lives. The UN estimates that some 300,000 children (aged 8–14) worldwide are in the permanent ranks of a warring party.

But these cultures are not limited to chaotic states. It is all too easy to believe in the West that these problems are matters for foreign or international development policy alone. And yet no society is insulated from violence in all its forms. The sectarian struggles in Northern Ireland, the terrorist threat posed by ETA in Spain and – until recently – the N17 group in Greece are just three examples of unresolved conflicts home-grown within the EU. Furthermore, Kaldor argues that aspects of the ‘new wars’ are more than evident in the structures and activities of right-wing militias and inner-city gangs that create terror on the streets of some of the richest cities in the world. And it should not be forgotten that, until 10 September
2001, the most devastating act of terrorism to hit the United States was perpetrated by a US citizen, Timothy McVeigh.42

It is difficult to explain familiar phenomena such as racially incited attacks or playground bullying in any way other than by the same processes of socialisation and the internalisation of values which underpin more intense conflicts that rage in some parts of the less developed world today. Countries such as the US and Britain might have strong states capable of guaranteeing citizens high levels of personal security for the most part. Yet even they have not achieved the ideal of peaceful, tolerant, harmonious societies untroubled by the hatreds, prejudices and pervasive ignorance that generate conflict. While intervening to bring about ceasefires in bloody battles might be a guarantee of column inches, tackling those less intense forces might be a source of longer-lasting generational shifts.

The pyramid of conflict
This analysis would imply then a multilevel ‘superstructure’ of violence, recognising the many forms in which violence manifests itself in societies and the dynamic links between them. This might be represented by what we would call a ‘pyramid of conflict’, in which the most high-profile, intensive conflict situations occupy the narrow space at the top, with sub-state and local level conflict in the wider band beneath, and socially embedded cultures of violence providing the broad base of the pyramid (see figure 4.1).

It is worth describing briefly each of these ‘levels’ of conflict in greater detail:

Inter-state war: The pyramid’s tip represents the small number of inter-state conflicts that become an intense focus for the international community and the world’s media. They usually involve the participation of a coalition of Western states with access to highly advanced weaponry. The actual military phase of the conflict is relatively short in duration, although the peace is much more difficult to win.

Examples: the first Gulf War, NATO’s war in Kosovo, 2003 Iraq war.
High-risk tensions: These are troubled societies or communities in which conflict is ever present at a low-burning intensity, and more violent forms are a constant risk. The shortcomings of political leadership and democratic processes help to explain the ever-present threat of terrorism, riots or other forms of violent behaviour in many of these societies. Activity falls short of full-scale war.

Examples: Northern Ireland, Russia, Israel, Palestine, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Uganda.

Sub-state/civil conflicts: These conflicts are just as bloody, if not more so, involving non-state actors and complex networks of support. Often they have been raging for many years, and state
authorities are powerless to impose the rule of law and order. The international community recognises these problems and might act militarily on humanitarian grounds. However, in some cases the culturally alien nature of these societies keeps the conflicts off the front pages of newspapers in the West.

Examples: Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, DRC, Angola.

**The culture of violence:** This exists in all societies to varying degrees, and describes the fundamental and unavoidable tensions of human coexistence. Cultures of violence are embedded by socialisation processes which encourage children and young people to internalise exclusivist identities that project a worldview of ‘us’ and ‘them’. They are bolstered by cultural norms which suggest that violence is a legitimate means for resolving differences. These processes and norms then manifest themselves in multiple ways, from playground taunts and pub brawls to domestic violence and racial, sexual or other forms of harassment. In most cases these tensions can be contained or eased by strong state structures, but they can still significantly reduce quality of life for many individuals, families and communities.

The pyramid provides an effective visual tool for demonstrating the many levels at which conflict takes hold. But this pyramid is neither two-dimensional nor static. Societies can move from a state of stability to instability with relative ease, due to an unpredictable event or trigger, such as Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in Israel, or the murder of Rodney King in downtown Los Angeles. Or they can slide from all-out inter-state war to low-level yet hugely destabilising violence, as is the case in many postconflict zones, such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Often events in different parts of Cooper’s tri-zonal world order create shockwaves which reverberate more widely and often in unpredictable ways – for example, the September 11 attacks deepened anti-West feelings in some parts of the Arab world, but at the same time forced the US to address seriously the issue of Palestinian independence. In such a fast-moving and complex
political climate, each society’s location within the pyramid of conflict is in constant flux.

**The Olympic Truce**

In its simplest form, the Truce’s message is one of peace at all the levels contained in the pyramid of conflict. The existing tools for peace are often categorised in terms of direct or ‘light’ actions on the one hand, and structural or ‘deep’ measures on the other. The advantage of the Truce is that it can operate on all these levels. As the next chapter will explore further, the status of the wider Olympic Movement gives the Truce leverage with world leaders at the very top of the pyramid. The global reach of the Games means the Truce’s message can be transmitted to more than half the world’s population every two years, and the grassroots presence of sporting networks and practices across the world brings to life the role that sport can play in building cohesive communities on a daily basis. This means that the Truce can influence simultaneously public opinion, national leaders and sub-state actors. While warlords and terrorists do not send teams of athletes to the Games, they too have constituencies of supporters to attend to, and it is at this level that the Truce can make a difference. As John Paul Lederach, Professor of International Peace at Notre Dame University, argues: ‘What is happening in the community is as important as talks between key leaders. If you have peace agreements but no infrastructure of peace that includes the community, you often get collapses in agreements.’

In this way, the aims of the Truce movement have something in common with the vision of a ‘Culture of Peace’ first set out by UNESCO in the mid-1990s (see box opposite). This argues that the roots of a peaceful world start with the individual: ‘Peace cannot be imported from outside; it is an intimate part of ourselves and must thrive through our deeds and our attitudes.’ This is why education work, of the sort in which the IOC and the IOTC are already heavily involved, is of such significance. Individuals’ earliest experiences shape the values by which they live their lives. In many cases these values promote peace, but too often they teach violence.
The Culture of Peace as defined by UNESCO (1995):

- A culture of social interaction and sharing based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, tolerance and solidarity
- A culture that rejects violence, endeavours to prevent conflicts by tackling their roots and to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation
- A culture which guarantees everyone the full exercise of all rights and the means to participate fully in the endogenous development of their society.
5. Opportunities for peace-building

Truces have been used throughout history to tackle conflicts and disagreements. They offer time out during which the choice between war and peace can be brought into sharp focus; and they provide a window of opportunity within which both sides can sit down, talk through their grievances and look for points around which progress can be made. The Olympic Truce offers these gains, but it is its association with Olympism, the Olympic Games and the wider activities of the Olympic Movement respectively that give it added strength. The universality of its message and the values of this Movement allow its work to transcend national boundaries; the Movement’s international networks provide a physical infrastructure through which it can work; the spectacle of the Games gives the Truce an enviable global reach; and the ancient roots of Olympism provide the continuity that is essential in working towards long-term and sustainable peace across the world.

The power of inspiration

The most important force exerted by the Olympic Truce is its power to inspire, which enables it to unlock the potential of the global platform offered by the Olympic Games and the myriad of sports networks around the world. It brings a simple message – peace, if only for 16 days. The path from conflict to peace is a long and difficult one. While preventive and parallel diplomacy, civil society
actions, peacekeeping, peace-making and peace-building are all part of the solution, the Olympic Truce is a peace-inspiring tool that can provide bursts of energy and leaps of faith at key points. While the Truce cannot hope to turn 16 days into an immediate, lasting peace (and, indeed, this is not a stated aim of the Olympic Movement), it can help to raise expectations about what is possible, shifting the tone of the debate from ‘why peace?’ to ‘why not?’.

Detailed knowledge of the political, cultural and historical context for any particular conflict is of course vital during negotiations. Diplomats the world over will testify that a sloppy turn of phrase at the end of a long day can be enough to dismantle an entire peace process. But this level of detail can also hinder rather than help progress, leading to prolonged, involved disputes around the precise scope and timing of possible interventions.

While each conflict is rooted in its own unique context, commonalities can be found between conflicts, even those that on the surface seem most remote. The simplicity of the Olympic Truce forces us to focus on the universal elements of all conflicts: they are underpinned by a culture of violence and the absence of a strong infrastructure of peace. Providing this perspective to combatants and those living daily under conditions of violence, allowing them to step back from the particularities of their own situation, can make it easier for them to see the starkness of the choice before them: conflict or peace?

**The power of idealism**

Idealism has become a dirty word in some circles. Our structures of global, national, regional and local governance were conceived in a previous era and are straining to cope with a much larger range and complexity of problems. This is particularly true at the international level where large bureaucracies such as the UN, the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization, the World Bank and the IMF are grappling with everything from carbon emissions and the liberalisation of global markets to international terrorism, HIV/AIDS and the challenges of development. As a result of these complexities,
decision-making has become characterised by intense compromise, as conflicting interests vehemently defend their corners and it is as much as can be done simply to ensure that momentum goes forwards instead of backwards. As a result, some of these institutions and the individuals that inhabit them have come to embody a lowest common denominator approach rather than reflecting shared aspirations for a better, fairer and safer world. Dr Vladimir Petrovsky, the Director of the European Office of the UN, has said, ‘the top priority today is to reinvigorate in full scope traditional methods of diplomacy – the search for compromise solutions. The all or nothing mentality no longer works.’

Idealism is not shorthand for blind naivety. Some of the greatest successes are achieved through bold and ambitious leadership. The Jubilee 2000 petition urged national governments simply to ‘drop the debt’. It called for the West to give the world’s poorest countries a fresh start for the new century by writing off their huge and unmanageable debts. Intense public interest and support followed, which led to the formation of Jubilee movements in over 50 countries and the petition was signed by a staggering 24 million people around the world. The British Chancellor, Gordon Brown, acknowledged the importance of this movement, saying it had had ‘a tremendous impact on public opinion around the world’. These grassroots efforts were rewarded in 1999 when a number of Western governments agreed on proposals to combat Third World debt. The issue is now a mainstream policy issue for governments around the world.

Weary under the strain of delivery and growing demands for results, governments may be tempted to focus on immediate deliverables which bring slow and piecemeal change rather than long-term aspirations. It is precisely this tendency, though, that contributes to growing cynicism among the public, who believe their leaders have abandoned their ideals on the path to the top. Politics and politicians need values now more than ever before and the Olympic Truce is an example of how aspiration and action can come together. As Kofi Annan has said of the Olympic Truce’s call for those at war to observe

52 Demos
this brief truce, ‘This may sound unrealistic. But as any athlete will tell you, nothing happens without a dream.’ It is the political dreamers, from Martin Luther King to Nelson Mandela, who have not only inspired their generations but have also brought real change for the better that will outlive them both.

Progress is one of the core Olympic values. The Olympic Games themselves serve as a regular reminder of what can be achieved with determination and conviction. The finest athletes meet to push back the boundaries and exceed the achievements of those who have gone before them. There is still nothing more coveted in the sporting world than to be the holder of an Olympic gold medal. In recent years, the Games have been a sign of progress off the track, too. Olympic villages platform some of the newest and most exciting forms of town planning and technology; staging the Games requires massive investments in transport and other infrastructures whose legacy lives on for local residents; and in many cases the Games have acted as a catalyst for regional regeneration. It is not surprising therefore that there is such fierce competition to host the Games, even among some of the most advanced cities and nations in the world, such as London, Paris and Moscow. In all of the last four Games and the forthcoming Games in Athens regeneration of some kind was stated as a purpose for the bid.

Comparing evidence from the different host cities is problematic, making it difficult to judge the relative benefits each gained and the extent of the value added, but the numbers speak for themselves. It is estimated that the Sydney Games added US$4.3 billion to the Australian economy; the US$16.6 billion of investment generated by the Games in Barcelona was sufficient to delay (though not prevent) the city’s economy from suffering the impact of the economic downturn that swept Europe in the early 1990s; some have argued that the Seoul Games acted as a catalyst in promoting Korea as one of the leading Asian Tiger economies; and it is thought that the Atlanta Games resulted in US$5.8 billion additional revenue from tourism.

Similarly, it is anticipated that the 2004 Games in Athens will bring benefits for the city. Aside from any economic, workforce or tourism
benefits, the Games have brought about the rehabilitation of almost 300 hectares (ha) of disused quarries, 250 ha of old garbage sites, 600 ha of former army camps, the establishment of park recreation and environmental education areas covering 250 ha of urban space, the unification and enhancement of major archaeological sites, and the remodelling of residential districts in the centre and outskirts of the city.\textsuperscript{49}

**The global platform**

The reach of the Olympic Truce is greatly enhanced by its association with the world’s largest global media event – the Olympic Games. The Games have come a long way since 1984. The Los Angeles Games used mass media on an unprecedented scale, enabling 2.5 billion people in 156 countries to tune in. During the Sydney Games in 2000, it was estimated that 3.7 billion people watched in 220 countries and territories – well over half of the world’s population, giving the Olympic Truce a truly global platform from which to project its aims and achievements.

The Live Aid concert in the summer of 1985 gave an indication of what can be achieved with this type of stage, bringing in an estimated 1.4 billion television viewers in over 170 countries. This concert almost single-handedly changed the way a whole generation of world leaders and ordinary people thought about aid and development, and created a renewed awareness of the plight of those living in the world’s poorest countries. Like Jubilee 2000, the message was simple and universal and, projected on to one of the largest stages the world has ever seen, it was impossible to ignore. An issue that had until that point been pursued by NGOs and charities on the margins became a mainstream policy concern for governments all around the world.

**Out of sight, out of mind?**

One of the dangers in today’s media-driven world is that messages disappear even more quickly than they appear on the radar. The success of Live Aid is in no small part due to the pre-existing network of NGOs that were able to carry on the campaign once the lights had
gone out over Wembley. And the Jubilee 2000 campaign quickly established a global network that could feed and renew their goals. The Olympic Movement has a similar ready-made network, from the international to the most local levels, as we will explore in more detail below. And the Truce’s link to the Olympic Games thrusts it into the spotlight every time the Games come to town.

The Olympic Games: a window of opportunities

The Olympic Games opens a window of opportunity for progress in promoting peace and tackling the culture of violence that fuels conflict at all levels of the pyramid of conflict. They provide an ‘excuse’ for things to happen that would seem untenable at any other juncture: individuals from opposite sides of the barbed wire compete and socialise peacefully side by side; the status and profile of the Games allow statesmen to step towards reconciliation without seeming to lose face; and the observance of the 16 days of Truce can provide welcome respite in conflict zones and allow the delivery of humanitarian aid and assistance. As Kofi Annan has explained, ‘While limited in duration and scope, the Olympic Truce can offer a neutral point of consensus, a window of time to open dialogue, a pause to provide relief for the suffering of the population.’

The site of the Games acts as a reminder of how easily individuals can overcome their grievances and work towards positive outcomes if they have a shared purpose. The Greek Games in 2004 will bring together 10,500 athletes from 201 countries in a sign of peaceful coexistence. It will involve sportsmen and women of every creed, colour, religion and ethnicity, competing and socialising under the same roof for 16 days. During the Games, athletes, coaches and team members live together, eat together and mix together in the Olympic Village in a way that would not, for some, be possible back home. At a time of increasing global fragmentation, the Games remind us that it is the creative interplay of difference that is most successful in bridging social and cultural gaps.

These achievements during the Games have the potential to reverberate beyond the stadium. As they travel home, it should be
hoped that athletes and team members will take with them the lessons they have learned and will act as ambassadors for peace in their own countries and communities. It is perhaps ironic that countries at war often field teams to compete on the sports field, while men and women back home are fighting and dying on the battlefield, but their attendance should be encouraged as it could have such positive side effects. In 1996, Bosnia sent a ten-member team to compete in the Atlanta Games when conflict continued to rage at home; Pakistan sent a team to the 1972 Munich Olympics only six months after the bloody campaign against East Pakistan resulted in the birth of Bangladesh; and Sierra Leone sent a 21-strong track and field squad to the Atlanta Games and a three-member team to Sydney in 2000.

It is impossible to separate the Olympic Games themselves from the wider cultural and political context. If it is to be effective, the Truce must also find ways of being present and active outside the Olympic Stadium, too. It must be operationalised in such a way as to instil the values on which it is based in the hearts and minds of the athletes and their fellow countrymen, as well as in the corridors of power in the IOC or the UN.

The Olympic Games provide a safe space for mediation. As James DD Smith has argued, one of the biggest hurdles to progress is a lack of political will and fear on both sides that any thawing of relations will cause them to lose face. The Games are not only a neutral venue, but their status is attractive for statesmen and women afraid of appearing weak. The case of North and South Korea highlights this potential. The two old adversaries competed separately in 2000, with individual uniforms, flags and anthems. But as a sign of warmth and to cement the diplomatic successes that had been made behind the scenes, their athletes walked into Sydney’s Olympic stadium under the same banner. This was more than tokenism. South Korean ministers had raised the Olympics issue with their counterparts during talks in Pyongyang, and the leaders of the two Koreas had received letters from the IOC President, Juan Antonio Samaranch, ahead of these talks. Samaranch captured the mood.
when he claimed that it was, ‘a very important gesture to show to all the world the will of the two Koreas to be united as soon as possible.’

The Olympic Truce can offer a window to allow intervention within the areas of conflict. Conflicts and violence cause untold human and economic losses, and even small respites should not be overlooked. For example, a UN General Assembly vote during the XVII Olympic Winter Games in Lillehammer, Norway, encouraged a ceasefire arrangement to permit the supply of humanitarian aid to populations in Bosnia.

Truces can, in some circumstances, merely prolong or exacerbate the impact of conflicts. UNICEF, recently mapping out a framework of commitment to war-affected children, has said that while truces should be encouraged, there is also a need to recognise that they might draw out conflict by facilitating the rearming and regrouping of combatants. Truces can also ‘freeze’ the lines of conflict; ceasefires are no more than temporary but bitter ‘stand-offs’. Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan, makes the point that truces are rarely made because one party admits that it has wronged the other. Rather, it is usually the result of a stand-off, or defeat. But there are plenty of examples of the successful deployment of truces: positive feedback has been generated in recent years in the Basque country when the nationalists struck up a political and diplomatic framework with the non-nationalists in the late 1990s, in Sri Lanka since the ceasefire was declared between the government forces and the Tamil Tigers in 2002, and in Liberia in 2003.

In short, a truce is not a panacea. The Olympic Movement needs to judge carefully the conflicts it prioritises, and work in close partnership with the UN and member states to ensure its work does not have unintended consequences. As an abstract tool, the Truce is neutral, and must be activated and contextualised by human choices if it is to have a positive effect, possibly in combination with a number of other, more familiar conflict prevention and/or resolution tools. It might even be useful for the IOC to develop a ‘checklist’ of
questions for those wishing to use the Truce. A model that it might refer to is Talentino’s ‘success evaluating questions’.\textsuperscript{53} He poses two sets of questions: one relating to short-term successes and one to long-term ones:

**Short-term success:**

1. Have the adversaries engaged in negotiations, truce talks, or any head-to-head meetings?
2. Has an effort been made to reduce violence and prevent its re-escalation?

**Long-term success:**

3. Have conflict-generating structures been identified and is there a plan to alter conflict dynamics?
4. Has the salience of group identity been decreased in the political and economic realms?

**An international force for change**

Sceptics would argue that the potential of the Olympic Truce is restricted by its association with the Olympic Movement, which is dogged by accusations of being captive to the world of power politics and commercialism. In 1936 Hitler used the Berlin Games to propagate racism; there were fears that the cancelling of the Games during the two world wars would lead to their demise; and the Cold War saw the politics of East-versus-West played out in the Olympic stadium. In recent years, the massive injection of money from advertisers has generated concern about the ability of the Games to hold on to its values.

While these examples cannot be denied, there are just as many cases showing that the Games have provided a platform from which to project strong positive and progressive values. Ultimately, the Games reflect the reality of what is happening in the world. While the Olympic Movement can and should seek to be a positive force for
change, it cannot be held to account for the complex problems whose solutions are beyond the gift of any single organisation. What is important is that the Movement seeks to do as much as it can to be part of a positive solution, and there are plenty of examples that show this is already the case.

While Hitler used the Berlin Games to project his own views, it took nothing more than a long jump in a theatre of noble competition to shatter power politics and fanaticism. Jesse Owens’ outstanding athletic achievements poured scorn on racism and bigotry, and the act of his German competitor, Lutz Long, who helped his fellow athlete to reach the gold medal in full view of Hitler was a symbolic gesture. While the future of the Games was brought into question during the two world wars, they are now one of the few points of continuity during a century dominated by fracture and conflict. And while successive boycotts throughout the Cold War generated the view in some camps that the Games had become little more than another opportunity for airing political disagreements, this only made it even more potent when both sides crossed the divide to take part in Moscow in 1980 and the Los Angeles Games in 1984.

The Olympic Movement has also been dogged by accusations of over-commercialisation. Between 1984 and 2008 the IOC will have concluded broadcast agreements worth more than US$10 billion, and will generate almost US$1.5 billion at the Athens Games in 2004 alone. Some would argue this commercialisation compromises the Olympic Movement’s ability to meet its self-proclaimed aims. However, commercialisation is not an intrinsically negative force on sport, as Sunder Katwala and others have powerfully argued. What is important is that sports bodies have adequate and transparent governance systems in place to protect the values of sport. Ironically, commercialism could actually help to strengthen the independence of the Movement; independent financial security could help it to resist national and international political pressures.

A financially independent Olympic Movement is able to extend its social role and to implement more freely initiatives of social and
humanitarian essence. Norway has been described as a ‘peace superpower’ because of the ability of Norwegian diplomats to punch above their weight in international disputes, such as the Middle East, Sri Lanka, Haiti, Colombia and the Sudan. Deputy foreign minister Vidar Helgesen argues that his nation’s secret is that ‘we are not a major superpower and have few vested interests.’ If the IOC continues on its path of transparency and financial accountability, the Olympic Movement too might become the next great ‘peace superpower’ of our time.

Ultimately, it has been the Olympic Movement’s ability to move with the times and respond to its changing political, social, cultural and economic contexts that has enabled it to survive against a backdrop of constant change. The Movement has continually sought out new forms of influence and inspiration, from the Gods of ancient Athens to the enlightenment philosophers of the nineteenth century and the fin de siècle commentators at the end of the Cold War. At the start of the twenty-first century commercialisation is one of the most dominant world forces. As long as the Movement can maintain a firm grip on its underlying principles and values, there is no intrinsic reason why it should turn its back on the opportunities that commercialisation offers that could, as outlined above, actually help it to meet its goals.

The Olympic Truce re-emerges at a time when the ‘international community’ is emerging as the key site for progressive change. The idea of ‘international community’, symbolised by a commitment to social values that transcend national interests and cooperation over isolationism, sits easily with Olympic ideals. And this was as true at the birth of the Movement as it is today. The Olympic Truce could be seen as being one of the first recorded ‘international’ treaties in history that was based on a common set of values and a shared sense of what is legal. It could be argued that, in a symbolic sense, the Olympic Truce was the first act of ‘international’ law, since it created a system of rights and responsibilities for the ancient city-states and a body assigned to the task of overseeing the application of this law. It therefore helped to sow the seeds of an international community – an
ancient ‘league of nations’ – where members signed up to openness in their cultural and economic cooperation at the Games.

The IOC is not just active in promoting peace. It also, for example, lobbies at the international level to encourage environmental protection. For example, it sent a representative to the Rio World Environment Summit to demonstrate the link between Olympism and ecologism, gender promotion, humanitarian programmes and sport for peace.

To be effective at inspiring peace at all levels of the pyramid of conflict, the Olympic Truce must find ways of engaging with non-state, as well as state, actors. There is now a complex global web of NGOs, and just as our institutions of global governance rethink the way they operate to involve these groups, so too must the Olympic Movement. It has already formed a number of such partnerships, which have helped it to develop a visibility on the ground. Many NGOs and other transnational organisations lament the loss of the era of UN ‘mega-conferences’, which provided an important infrastructure for the development of global civil society throughout the 1990s. Now, NGO gatherings are more often associated with violence and opposition, for example protests at the IMF/World Bank meetings in Seattle and Washington in recent years. It is important that a venue can be identified that offers a positive backdrop against which NGOs can conduct their discussions. The IOC should consider whether the Olympic Games might be able to fulfil this role.

**Working for solutions on the ground**

The Olympic Movement is an active participant at the grassroots level, which is important in ensuring that the Olympic Truce has the potential to operate at all levels of the pyramid of conflict. For instance, the IOC cooperates with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in a series of projects in refugee camps and resettlement areas in various countries. The aim is to offer structured sport and recreational activities for those children whose lives have been affected by war. A typical grassroots level initiative is that taking place at the Kakuma refugee camp in North West Kenya. Refugees of some
ten nationalities live in peaceful communities there. They have all embraced the IOC sports project, helping to build playing fields and organising communal sports activities. Of course the impact these developments have had on the community in Kakuma goes far beyond the sporting plane: the scheme has effectively integrated the 40 or so ethnic groups living in the camp.

National Olympic Committees have also played a role. In 1992, The Lillehammer Olympic Organizing Committee conceived ‘Olympic Aid’ (now ‘Right To Play’) in preparation for the 1994 Olympic Winter Games in Norway. Its aim was to show support during the Games for people in war-torn countries and areas of distress. A partnership was formed between the Red Cross, Save the Children, Norwegian Refugee Council, Norwegian People’s Council, the Norwegian Church Fund and Olympic Aid to raise funds for and awareness of the specific initiatives each of these organisations were implementing.
6. The power of sport

The Olympic Truce has a strategically important alliance with sport. While the Truce and its relationship with the Olympic Movement provide much needed inspiration broadcast from a stage of unparalleled magnitude, two dangers remain: firstly that interest wanes as the athletes leave the stadium, and secondly that the spectacle of the Games becomes a barrier that prevents the individual spectator from understanding the relevance and application of the Truce for them. Sport is a constant force in most people’s lives – either as a participant, spectator or unwilling observer. Sport has a rich network that inhabits all levels of the pyramid of conflict, and so can offer a potential architecture for peace. If the Olympic Movement is able to harness this potential, the Olympic Truce could come alive on street corners and in playgrounds the world over.

The universal appeal of sport enables it to move with ease between the political and the personal. Proof of the influence of sport is found in the fact that politicians regularly use it as a domestic political tool. Individuals use sport to make political statements, too. But perhaps most importantly, the values that sport teaches participants and spectators alike – of fair play, accepting mediation, respect for rules and self-discipline, for example – help to tackle the factors that contribute to the perpetuation of the culture of violence that underpins the pyramid of conflict and which causes disharmony and tension at all levels, from downtown Los Angeles to the battlefields of Sierra Leone.
Sports networks
Organised sport revolves around a rich network of organisations and associations that have been created for largely administrative or fraternal purposes. These networks could be utilised by the IOC and the broader Olympic Movement to communicate the aims of the Olympic Truce, thereby helping to sustain its work. As we have seen, the relative frequency of the Games is useful in raising the profile of the Truce, but the success of the Truce depends on continued and daily work.

The IOC, as we have seen, is active between the Games; it has its own infrastructure: 201 National Olympic Committees and a series of International Sports Federations overseeing individual sports disciplines reporting to it, and these in turn link into a tree of organisations through to the community level. Partnership with sports organisations on a wider basis could help to boost the impact of the Truce.

Figure 6.1 opposite gives an indication of the complexity of the international sporting network, and the range of organisations that could help to promote the Olympic Truce on an ongoing basis from the international to the local level.

The soft power of sport
Sport also has what Joseph Nye would call soft power, or the ability to ‘influence events through persuasion and attraction rather than by military or financial coercion’. September 11 was a stark reminder of the cultural gulf that has opened up between East and West. Governments – mainly in the West – have woken up to the need to operate beyond their state counterparts and appeal directly to the ‘hearts and minds’ of overseas populations. Public diplomacy – attempts by governments to understand, inform, influence and build relationships with foreign publics in order to achieve policy goals – and other tools for soft power now sit alongside traditional diplomatic efforts. Sport, like branches of the arts and culture, is an established public diplomacy tool and remains one of the few
Figure 6.1 The institutional setting of the world of sport

activities that can bridge cultural, political and social gaps and schisms.

Politicians have been quick to utilise the power of sport to influence the ‘mood of the nation’. Indeed, popular mythology puts the 1970 general election defeat for the British Labour Party down to the fact that England lost a quarter-final World Cup match against West Germany. While this is cultural legend, there is no denying the fact that Wilson had a reservation about the date of the election because England’s match was scheduled to take place just before.\(^{57}\) It is not surprising, then, that competition between President Chirac and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin to prove their support for the French side *les Bleus* almost eclipsed battles that were taking place on the pitch during the 1998 football World Cup in France.\(^{58}\)

Sport is a leveller that can bridge even unlikely gaps. From the English and German soldiers who convened a game of football on Christmas Day in no man’s land during the First World War to more contemporary cases, such as the game between the allies and the locals in Sarajevo after the Bosnian conflict and Nelson Mandela awarding the rugby world cup to the winning South African team in 1995, examples can be found from right around the world. As Pakistani tennis player Aisam ul-Haq Qureshi commented of his pairing with Israeli Amir Hadad at the US Open in 2002, ‘I don’t believe to bring religion or politics to tennis [sic]. Everyone gets together, people from all religions, backgrounds. That’s the best part of being a sportsman.’

**Bridging the political and the personal**

Peaceful societies are not created overnight, but are advanced towards slowly through taking many small steps that make peaceful outcomes more likely. Sports-based initiatives are so important because they are able to bridge the political and the personal. Conflict starts and finishes in the minds of individuals and the only hope of a lasting, sustainable peace lies in unpicking the culture of violence that exists at all levels in our societies. The values that underpin sport – discipline, accepting mediation, positive competition, fair play and
equality – help individuals to develop the types of skills that remove the desire for conflict and find peaceful means of resolving their disagreements. The box below summarises the skills and values that sport can teach.\textsuperscript{59}

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<td>Value of effort</td>
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These values are echoed by the Olympic Charter: ‘Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy found in effort, the educational value of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles.’\textsuperscript{60}

As the UN Special Adviser on Sport for Development and Peace has argued:

\textit{Sport through play and fun teaches young people essential values such as respect for opponents, for rules and for referees’ decisions. Sport also teaches the temporary nature of victory, the need for regular training to reach the top and that defeat can be overcome. Team sports also teach integration and the need for confidence between team members, and reliability. However, sport also teaches that it doesn’t take much to enjoy the benefits}
of physical activity. These qualities are essential to citizens in all societies and situations of life. They may make a difference in favour of a peaceful world.\textsuperscript{61}

Discovering tools which enable \textit{de-freezing processes} in conflict zones all over the world is the challenge that faces us today. The task might seem immense – from development and democratisation across troubled regions, to building the sort of global institutions which can act with legitimacy. It might be that the most appropriate measure of success is not the resolution of absolute peace, but relative gains in terms of individuals’ quality of life. This is particularly the case in chaotic states where the traditional diplomatic channels have even less chance than usual of making a difference. As Cooper observes, ‘in the pre-modern world victory is not a relevant objective . . . they will be goals of relatives and not absolutes: more lives saved, lower levels of violence among the local populations.’\textsuperscript{62} Relative gains of this sort provide opportunities to kick-start periods of transition, as took place in the case of the Cold War during the 1970s and 1980s. As Mient Jan Faber argues, the ‘de-freezing’ process which began with \textit{detente} moved a state of confrontation on the brink of war through successive stages in which relations stabilised and finally normalised through peaceful means.\textsuperscript{63} The Olympic Truce, through a strengthened partnership with sport, can be an important part of this solution.

\textbf{Sport for peace and development initiatives}

It is therefore not surprising that sport is frequently used as a way of helping to tackle conflict across many different layers of the pyramid of conflict, most notably in breaking down the forces that maintain a culture of violence. The United Nations Inter-Agency Taskforce for Sport for Development and Peace has created an inventory of sports initiatives that work to promote peace and development. Over 120 initiatives have been identified so far, with examples from almost every country, and both developed and developing worlds. These include ‘Right to Play’, an NGO working towards improving the lives
of the most disadvantaged children and their communities through sport for development; ‘Kick’, an initiative for cooperation between Berlin’s police, social workers and sports organisations to benefit juvenile delinquents aged 12–20 from eight problematic and low-income neighbourhoods; and ‘Futbol Futur’ in Argentina, a programme which uses sports such as football, netball and basketball to address crime, delinquency and drugs. Table 6.1 below gives many more examples:

**Table 6.1 Sports initiatives for peace and development**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of initiative/project funders</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Social/economic/educational impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO project funded by the Danish aid agency</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Promotes sport at several learning centres throughout the country and supports physical education and sports events as part of the education curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-Habitat funded</td>
<td>Jonava, Lithuania</td>
<td>Assisted in the creation of recreational zones to provide areas for all people to use free of charge, addressing equality and social inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian NGO, Unione Italiana Sport per Tutti and International Labour Organisation (ILO) sponsored</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Along with the Albanian government, these agencies are providing sport as a means to help young people cope with the negative side effects of the transition to a market economy. Through a network of youth centres, young people are given their own space and an opportunity to socialise and to participate in sport and recreational activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of initiative/project funders</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Social/economic/educational impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edusport Outreach</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Uses netball, basketball, athletics, aerobics, dance and volleyball programmes to train young people in coaching their peers and to teach life skills to over 10,000 street children, orphans and at-risk youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International sponsored</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the US National Basketball Association and a number of other partners</td>
<td>With young teens from the former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>The camp focused on leadership building, conflict resolution and the importance of living a healthy lifestyle without drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional football tournaments sponsored by government agencies, UNICEF, businesses and NGOs</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>More than 46,000 children from more than 2,000 schools have participated in these tournaments. The matches are designed to encourage a healthy lifestyle for young people, promoting the message that ‘smoking, drinking and taking drugs can’t compare with the extraordinary high of kicking a winning goal’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A detention centre for young people in trouble with the law, supported by UNICEF</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>After academic classes, they play football, learn judo and practise gymnastics, helping them to channel frustrations and learn new ways to deal with anger</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The wider values and mechanisms of sport offer many opportunities for the Olympic Movement to enhance the scope and impact of the Olympic Truce. The reach of sport makes it a more constant presence in our lives, which would help to keep the Olympic Flame burning between Olympic Games. Also, the myriad of sports networks offers rich potential for sustaining work from the political to the personal level. The next chapter will discuss some of the practical ways in which this potential can be fully utilised.

Table 6.1 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of initiative/ project funders</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Social/economic/ educational impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth Sport Development Program, a division of Commonwealth Games Canada, partners with provincial health units to deliver biweekly aerobics programmes, open to all women in urban and rural communities and reaching an estimated 200,000 participants</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Included are discussions on women’s rights, parental guidance, basic health, family planning, pre- and postnatal care, HIV/AIDS education and counselling services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Volunteers, working with the UN Development Programme and ILO, combined karate with vocational training programmes for the physically disabled</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Helps improve the motor skills of the participants, as well as their general mobility and confidence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Taking the Olympic Truce forward

Since its re-emergence on to the global scene just over ten years ago the Olympic Truce has played a role in tackling conflict and the drivers of violence at all levels of the pyramid of conflict: in 1994 10,000 children were inoculated in Sarajevo; in 1998 the Truce was invoked to halt allied bombing of Iraq; in 2000 high-risk tense relations between North and South Korea were warmed when the two sides walked together in the opening ceremony for the Sydney Games; in 2004 the Olympic Flame will pass through several areas that have recently experienced conflict for the first time and will carry the message of the Truce the world over; and the educational work of the IOTC and the grassroots sports initiatives sponsored by the Olympic Movement help to embed positive Olympic values within communities on the ground.

The potential of the Truce is greatly enhanced by two factors: its home at the Olympic Games and its association with sport. The Games provide the Truce with the world’s largest stage from which to project its message, a safe and prestigious forum for mediation and reconciliation, and a regular window within which to focus efforts and resources – in other words, a good excuse to push for progress and a forum steeped in the values essential to peace-building and conflict resolution. And sport offers a bridge between the political and the personal spheres and comes with a ready-made network of organisations, clubs and institutions
that embed it into the heart of almost every community around the world.

16 Days has shown that changes in the nature of conflict since the end of the Cold War have limited the ability of traditional state-led approaches to deliver comprehensive and lasting solutions. Nation states do not have leverage over sub-state actors, such as warlords, mercenaries and terrorists. And nation states cannot on their own tackle the cultures of violence that are so important in creating the tensions that are present in all societies, but that in some circumstances lead to more intense forms of conflict, such as that experienced in recent years in Sierra Leone, Bosnia or Kashmir, just to name a few.

This analysis – that the causes of conflict are highly distributed – suggests that the practical and moral responsibility for peace-building should also be distributed if efforts are to be successful. As has been suggested elsewhere in this report, this means that the work of the Olympic Truce should encompass a wide range of actors – the Olympic Movement, international bodies such as the UN, national governments and their political leaders, sportsmen and women, the non-governmental community, the media and communications industry, sports networks and Olympic Games host cities. In what follows, we make a number of suggestions about how each of these groups could use the Olympic Truce to promote peace, both at home and overseas.

Two challenges remain, though. Firstly, models of distributed responsibility are critical to the success of the Olympic Truce. Highly centralised control mechanisms would likely discourage actors from taking ownership of the Truce and, as has been learned from regulatory efforts across a wide range of policy areas, such models can stifle creativity and innovation and therefore impede performance. But given the timeframes within which progress is made in tackling conflict, the success of the Truce depends on the development of an effective governance system that can maintain momentum over time and space. More thinking is needed on the type of configuration that will best serve this purpose.
Secondly, and more fundamentally, this report has shown that the success of all conflict resolution and peace-building initiatives relies on being able to make changes at the most personal level, influencing the decisions and behaviour of individuals, from normal citizens to international statesmen and women. This is the starting point for turning a culture of violence into a culture of peace. As we reconfigure the conflict-prevention and peace-building architectures to allow us to navigate this transition under the new realities of conflict, we must also ensure that individuals understand what this means for their relationship with and involvement in conflict. And given the collaborate nature of conflict prevention, this understanding can only be built through conversation and discussion between the different actors about their relative roles and the ways in which they relate to one another.

In 2004 the Olympic Games return to their ancient home. It seems appropriate that Athens should host the launch of this discussion. We therefore recommend that the Greek government, in collaboration with the IOC, launches an international debate about the future of conflict and the role of the Olympic Truce at the Athens Games, asking each group to define what they think their role should be. This analysis, and the recommendations we make, could usefully form the basis to kick-start this discussion. In part, this process has already started through the creation of the IOTC by the Greek government and the IOC. The Athens Games provide an opportunity to engage with a much wider range of actors under the gaze of billions of viewers, watching the discussions in real time from their armchairs.

The Olympic Truce can only fulfil its potential if individuals and organisations outside the Olympic Movement breathe life into it. This book has pointed to a range of areas that represent immense opportunity for champions of the Truce, based on its past record, its essential qualities, and the resources of the Olympic Movement which support it.

To summarise, these areas of opportunity include:

- Developing further the Truce’s **power to inspire**, in an age
of international politics in which scepticism, fatalism and limited expectations are the *modus operandi*.

- Skilfully exploiting for the purposes of the Truce the *global reach* of the Olympic Games, through its massive communications infrastructure spanning the world.

- Understanding and making more visible the contribution made by the Olympic Movement to create a rich *global civil society and cosmopolitan international community*.

- Using the Truce during the 16 days of the Olympic Games to create *windows of opportunity* which give international actors and warring parties time and space to address their differences peacefully. This should include a central role for host cities.

- Locating the Truce firmly in the context of the IOC’s *involvement in peace-making initiatives*, and the wider *role of sport as a catalyst for peace at all levels*, through its global infrastructure of networks.

The extent to which it will be possible to capitalise on these opportunities will be dependent on there being widespread knowledge and understanding of the aims of the Truce from world leaders to their citizens; there must be clear understanding of the potential uses for the Truce, including information about instances when it has been used successfully. There must also be forums and networks capable of mobilising individuals, organisations and communities to act in the name of the Truce.

This analysis points to three key ‘fronts’ to which champions of the Truce – whether international diplomats, heads of state, athletes, NGO workers or ordinary citizens – can take the ‘battle’ for peace: on the Olympic playing field itself; at home in their own countries and communities; and away, in their relations with their neighbours. In what follows, we set out how the Truce can be used and make practical recommendations about how its impact could be enhanced.
On the playing field

As we have seen in the case of North and South Korea at Sydney 2000, the Olympic Games provides a platform for bold statements under the spotlight of the world. While the Truce might not have been the critical factor in bringing the two Koreas together, the occasion of the Games certainly provided a compelling incentive to choose peace, and the hard work of the IOC made their dramatic declaration of unity during the Opening Ceremony possible. But it is not just about grand gestures. Often the most poignant examples of relationship-building and reconciliation come in simple acts: athletes congratulating each other after a race or sharing a meal in the Olympic Village, and spectators from warring countries enjoying sporting achievements side by side in the stadium.

We would recommend that:

- Given the global focus on the Games and their multinational and multicultural make-up, the IOC should make maximising peace-building opportunities between participants and visitors to the Games a top priority. This could involve convening peace conferences or seminars at the venue, social activities for athletes from warring countries or facilitating other events for spectators and visitors elsewhere in the host city.
- We envisage that symbolic peace-building activities could be included as a ‘demonstration event’ at the 2008 games, and be incorporated into the official programme of events in subsequent games. This might even involve practical peace-building sessions to train individuals in mediation techniques.
- There is no reason why this activity should be restricted to sports-related organisations. In fact, as we have seen, for the Truce to be effective it must find ways of forging links with a wide variety of NGOs. In the same way that NGOs, charities and think tanks convene discussions in the...
fringes of political party conferences, so similar organisations should be encouraged to do likewise at the Olympic Games. This would obviously have implications for the type of facilities that would need to be available on site, and would need to be factored into future planning, but would enable the Games to act as a showcase for what is possible when differences are put to one side for 16 days.

- The symbolic power of the Olympic Games should be fully leveraged. The Games are a strong and well-known brand, but the value they add to the Truce could be enhanced by making the link more explicit and by raising the profile of the Truce within the Games. Familiar symbols and rituals associated with both Olympic values and with peace could be combined in new ways to create an explicit link in the minds of participants and spectators between Olympism and peace.

- This could involve asking world leaders to ‘carry a torch for peace’, or to erect a ‘truce clock’ to count the number of lives that would have been saved over the past century had all fighting ceased for the duration of the Games. Hosts could display information about the Truce in and around the stadium, and could provide lasting reference points for the tourists and business visitors that tend to gravitate towards former Olympic cities after the Games leave town.

- The IOC illustrates its commitment to the Games acting as an example of peace-building in practice by making this activity a core requirement for bid cities in their application to host the Games. As we have seen, the Games have become a showcase for the latest technological, environmental and design innovations. In time, it is hoped that this same energy might be channelled into peace-building, with bid cities ‘competing for peace’ and in so doing helping to develop the toolkit for peace.
Host cities should also consider ways in which they could use their position to lever action by others by, for example, putting pressure on their own governments to invoke the Truce at the Games in a way that will deliver maximum value.

At home

The Truce is a tool for inspiring a culture of peace everywhere. As our pyramid of conflict demonstrates, even those nation states with strong political institutions, the rule of law and stable economies are not immune from conflict and violence. In these countries, politicians and policy-makers, national and local, are already using sport to combat crime and violence and to promote community development and peaceful intercultural exchange. The global reach of the Olympic brand and the Truce’s powerful message of peace, when linked to grassroots sports networks and community-based sports projects, provide huge opportunities to bring greater attention to this field of work, in terms of attracting interest from both policy-makers and participants.

We would recommend that:

- Policy-makers take into greater consideration sport-based approaches to domestic problems when developing strategies to combat conflict. It is often difficult to measure the value added from such initiatives, and results can take some time to be realised. In the current targets culture this can make this ‘slow release’ type of initiative less popular. We would urge policy-makers to work to develop a clearer understanding of the evidence for how grassroots sports programmes can help to achieve wider goals and then give these types of initiatives an explicit place within their sports policies.

- As the Truce’s contribution to this, the Olympic Truce ‘badge’ could be offered as a way of linking up as many projects as possible already ongoing in the field of sport
for peace across the world, creating a channel for the transfer of best practice between countries. The IOTC should coordinate this work and seek to become a key resource for practitioners working in this field. The IOC should also consider how it could use its leverage with the global media to communicate information about these initiatives during the Games, for example through requiring those companies with broadcasting rights to air clips on them. It might also consider creating a modest Olympic Truce levy on its television rights, with the funds being directed into sports for peace projects.

- The communication industry itself has a role to play in helping to communicate the changing realities of conflict and peace-building. It could, for example, commission documentaries and programmes of public educational benefit to coincide with the Games.

- Wherever possible, political leaders, at all levels, appeal to warring parties to observe the Truce during the Games, drawing on all available sources of leverage, and be supported by the international community. Questions remain, of course, around when and where leverage will be most effectively applied. It is important, for example, that the Truce is not simply reserved for the most high-profile or politically significant conflicts, but serves the full range of needs. This tension must be recognised, and appropriate governance structures put in place to prevent such an outcome.

- Political leaders should also look for ways to observe the Truce themselves. This might include identifying humanitarian relief missions, ceasing bombing campaigns, or agreeing to avoid making party political arguments during the period of the Games. This may cause domestic political discomfort in some instances, but we urge political leaders to communicate the reasons for the Truce to their citizens. Countries must also...
commit to record detailed information about the observations of the Truce in which they are involved. This would help to build a clearer picture of the most effective uses of the Truce.

Away
As the UN’s repeated endorsements prove, international support for the Truce has helped to raise its visibility and credibility as a tool for inspiring peace. Signing up to the Truce does not bind signatories or their states into legal commitments. However, it must be understood as an act which admits supporters of the Truce into a meaningful community, bound by self-regulated norms and standards, which in themselves help to reinforce the mutual trust needed to pursue peace. The Truce is nothing unless it is operationalised and given meaning in the hands of those who would deploy it for the ends of peace. It is also important that connections are made between events in the Olympic stadium and tensions on the ground, and it is for this reason that we welcome the fact that the Olympic Torch will, for the first time in 2004, travel through conflict zones on its way to the Games.

We would recommend:

- The creation of a high-level network of diplomatic supporters of the Truce. This network could convene each time the UN resolution is signed, and engage in discussions on current conflicts, and plan joint peace initiatives for the next Olympic Games.
- That the IOTC and the IOC, in partnership with the UN, host these meetings. The IOTC should maintain a comprehensive database of high-level supporters of the Truce, and issue reminders to those supporters to promote the Truce in all their international visits and negotiations and all high-profile public addresses.
- The creation of a non-state, non-diplomatic ‘friends of the Olympic Truce’ network. As we have seen, the changing nature of conflict means that peace is not in the
sole gift of national governments or our institutions of global governance – a much broader coalition must be engaged. And to be sure of making progress in replacing the culture of violence with a culture of peace, this work must involve ordinary citizens from right around the world. The Jubilee Debt campaign is a potential model of best practice, which revolved around self-organising local groups that helped both to disseminate information about the aims of the campaign and recruited members; they were also engaged in local level lobbying.

- Olympic athletes, especially medal winners, should look for ways to spread information about the Olympic Truce, both on a global scale and importantly by taking the message home with them. As we have seen, sportsmen and women can exert ‘soft’ power and influence and could be useful ambassadors for the Truce in a sustained way.

We are at a crossroads. We are at last beginning to grapple with the fallout of the Cold War as the new ‘kaleidoscope’ of world order starts to settle. So much has changed in the rationale for conflict, the identity of its combatants and their armoury. But there has been little noticeable shift in the way we ‘fight the peace’. The Olympic Truce has yet again made a timely re-emergence and offers us a new approach to creating the type of global culture of peace that is the route to long-term stability. Its journey has only just begun, and the jury is still out. But the signs are promising. However, like all solutions, success depends on wide-scale awareness, popular support and real action on the ground. If the Olympic Truce can harness all three it has the potential to be a new peace-inspiring tool for our times.
Appendix 1
The Olympic Truce

WHEREAS:
The idea of the Olympic Truce (‘Ekechereia’) dates back to an ancient Hellenic tradition. In keeping with this tradition all hostilities would cease during the Olympic Games. The Olympic Truce was fully respected for twelve centuries of Olympic Games in antiquity.

In 1992, the International Olympic Committee urged the international community to observe this tradition anew, calling for all hostilities to cease during the Olympic Games, and beyond. Since then, numerous initiatives to promote understanding and solidarity through sport in communities around the world have been developed with the cooperation of National Olympic Committees. In July 2000, the International Olympic Committee and the Government of Greece established the International Olympic Truce Center. This Center seeks to further promote the observance of the Olympic Truce.

The United Nations General Assembly, with the strong support of all of our countries, has five times called for member states to observe the Olympic Truce, individually and collectively, most recently in its Millennium Declaration in September 2000, with the signatures of over 160 Heads of State and Government.

Today, the Olympic Truce has become an expression of Mankind’s desire to build a world based on the rules of fair competition, humanity, reconciliation, and tolerance. Moreover, the Olympic Truce epitomises a bridge from the old and wise tradition to the most
compelling purpose of today’s world – the maintenance of international peace and the promotion of multicultural dialogue, cooperation, and understanding.

The period of the Olympic Games, and beyond, should provide an opportunity for such a dialogue and the search for durable solutions for the restoration of peace in all areas of conflict, where the first victims are the children, the youth, women, and the aged.

Humanity’s quest is for a world free of hatred, terrorism, and war, where ideals of peace, goodwill and mutual respect form the basis of relations among peoples and countries. The goal may still remain elusive, but if the Olympic Truce can help us to bring about even a brief respite from conflict and strife, it will send a powerful message of hope to the international community.

WHEREFORE, WE, THE UNDERSIGNED:

1. Urge world leaders, Governments, and International Organisations, to give peace a chance and to agree to join efforts to use the Olympic Truce as an instrument to promote peace and reconciliation in areas of conflict and strife;

2. Pledge to exercise our best efforts to ensure that the Olympic Truce appeal is observed in our countries and in our region during the upcoming Olympic Games as a way of promoting goodwill and encouraging the peaceful settlement of conflicts in full conformity with the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; and

3. Pledge to support and disseminate, individually and collectively, the symbolic call for Olympic Truce throughout all future Olympic Games and beyond, and to exercise our best efforts within our communities, countries, and relevant international organisations to achieve its recognition and observance.

Initially signed by Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey on 8 November 2001.
Appendix 2
Signatories of the Olympic Truce

World personalities who, as of November 2003, are signatories of the Olympic Truce. They are mentioned in their official capacity at the time of the signing, and are listed in alphabetical order.

Heads of State
1. V. Adamkus President, Republic of Lithuania
2. B. Al-Assad President, Syrian Arab Republic
3. W. J. Clinton Former President, United States
4. D. Covic Tripartite Presidency, Bosnia and Herzegovina
5. V. Vike-Freiberga President, Republic of Latvia
6. S. M. Khatami President, Islamic Republic of Iran
7. V. Kostunica President, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
8. A. Kwasniewski President, Republic of Poland
9. Letsie III King, Kingdom of Lesotho
10. L. I. Lula Da Silva President, Federative Republic of Brazil
11. N. Mandela Former President, Republic of South Africa
12. R. Meidani President, Republic of Albania
13. S. Mesic President, Republic of Croatia
14. N. Nazarbayev President, Republic of Kazakhstan
15. T. Papadopoulos President, Republic of Cyprus
16. B. Paravac Tripartite Presidency, Bosnia and Herzegovina
17. G. Parvanov President, Republic of Bulgaria
18. J. Sampaio President, Portuguese Republic
Appendix 2: Signatories of the Olympic Truce

Heads of Government

19  C. Stephanopoulos President, Hellenic Republic
20  S. Tihic Tripartite Presidency, Bosnia and Herzegovina
21  A. Toledo President, Republic of Peru
22  B. Trajkovski President, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Ministers for Foreign Affairs

34  M. Soledad Alvear Foreign Affairs Minister, Chile
35  C. Amorin Foreign Affairs Minister, Brazil
36  M. E. B. de Avila Foreign Affairs Minister, El Salvador
37  A. Belkhadem Foreign Affairs Minister, Algeria
38  M. Benaissa Foreign Affairs Minister, Morocco
39  I. Berzins Foreign Affairs Minister, Latvia
40  R. Bielsa Foreign Affairs Minister, Argentina
41  N. Caldera Foreign Affairs Minister, Nicaragua
42  S. Casule Foreign Affairs Minister, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
43  I. Cem Foreign Affairs Minister, Turkey
44  W. Cimoszewicz Foreign Affairs Minister, Poland
A. M. Da Cruz Foreign Affairs Minister, Portugal
A. Dade Foreign Affairs Minister, Albania
J. Deiss Foreign Affairs Minister, Switzerland
J. Fischer Foreign Affairs Minister, Germany
F. Frattini Foreign Affairs Minister, Italy
J. Gama Foreign Affairs Minister, Portugal
M. Geoana Foreign Affairs Minister, Romania
P. Goff Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister, New Zealand
B. Graham Foreign Affairs Minister, Canada
V. Guliyev Foreign Affairs Minister, Azerbaijan
E. Gutierrez Foreign Affairs Minister, Guatemala
A. Gul Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister, Turkey
T.H. Ilves Foreign Affairs Minister, Estonia
S. R. Insanally Foreign Affairs Minister, Guyana
I. Ivanov Foreign Affairs Minister, Russian Federation
J. Kavan Foreign Affairs Minister, Czech Republic
S. Kerim Former Foreign Affairs Minister, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
K. Kharrazi Foreign Affairs Minister, Iran
A. Khatib Foreign Affairs Minister, Jordan
E. Kukan Foreign Affairs Minister, Slovakia
A. Lindh Foreign Affairs Minister, Sweden
Z. Li Foreign Affairs Minister, China
A. Maher Foreign Affairs Minister, Egypt
J. Martonyi Foreign Affairs Minister, Hungary
R. Chaderton Matos Foreign Affairs Minister, Venezuela
I. Mitreva Former Foreign Affairs Minister, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
V. Oskanian Foreign Affairs Minister, Armenia
G. A. Papandreou Foreign Affairs Minister, Greece
S. Passy Foreign Affairs Minister, Bulgaria
S. Peres Foreign Affairs Minister, Israel
T. Picula Foreign Affairs Minister, Croatia
J. Pique Foreign Affairs Minister, Spain
**Appendix 2: Signatories of the Olympic Truce**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position and Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>J. A. M. Ruffinelli</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Minister, Paraguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>C. A. Saavedra</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Minister, Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>A. Sattar</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Minister, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>A. Saud al Faysal</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Minister, Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>N. Shaath</td>
<td>Minister of Planning and Int. Coop., Palestinian Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>A. M. Shalqam</td>
<td>Secretary of People’s General Committee for Foreign Affairs Liaison and International Cooperation, Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>J. Straw</td>
<td>Foreign Secretary, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>G. Svilanovic</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Minister, Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>J. Tang</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Minister, China</td>
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<td>86</td>
<td>A. Valionis</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Minister, Lithuania</td>
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<td>87</td>
<td>H. Védrine</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Minister, France</td>
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<td>88</td>
<td>N. P. Vega</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Minister, Ecuador</td>
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<td>89</td>
<td>D. de Villepin</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>A. Wagner</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Minister, Peru</td>
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<td>91</td>
<td>B. Ferrero-Waldner</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Minister, Austria</td>
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<td>92</td>
<td>H. Ben Yahia</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Minister, Tunisia</td>
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<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Y. Yakis</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Minister, Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>A. Zlenko</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Minister, Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>N. C. Dlamini-Zuma</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Minister, South Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Speakers and Members of Parliaments, Ministers, high officials of international organisations, other personalities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>J. B. M. Amaral</td>
<td>Vice-President of Portuguese Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>V. Andric</td>
<td>Federal Secretary for Sports and Youth of the FRY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>V. Andriukaitis</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman of the Seimas Parliament, Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>K. Annan</td>
<td>Secretary-General, United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>I. Babayev</td>
<td>Deputy Minister of Youth, Sports and Tourism, Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>V. Barkowski</td>
<td>Designer and Founder, Mia Zia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>M. Barnier</td>
<td>Member of the European Commission</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
103  V. *Barsegyan* Secretary of State for Culture, Youth Affairs and Sports, Armenia
104  L. E. D. *Bautista* Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the United Mexican States
105  C. *Bellamy* Executive Director, UNICEF
106  S. *Bellanger* President and CEO, Ass’n French Chambers of Commerce
107  V. *Blinkeviciute* Minister of Social Security and Labour, Lithuania
108  C. *Boras* Assistant Federal Secretary of State for Youth of the FRY
109  A. *Burg* President, Knesset, Israel
110  D. *Christofias* President of Parliament, Republic of Cyprus
111  L. *Cok* Minister of Education Science and Sport, Slovenia
112  C. *Constantinou Amb.* Dean, J. H. Whitehead School of Diplomacy, Seton Hall
113  G. *Dimitrakopoulos* Vice-President, European Parliament
114  A. *Diouf* Secretary-General of the International Organisation of Francophony and former President of the Republic of Senegal
115  R. *Demotte* Minister of Culture, Finance, Youth and Sports, French Community, Belgium
116  A. *Dossal* Executive Director, UNFIP
117  K. *Dervis* State Minister, Turkey
118  Lord A. *Dubs* Labour Party Chair, House of Lords
119  H. *Durt* Int’l College for Advanced Buddhist Studies Tokyo
120  A. *Ertegun* Co-Chairman and CEO, The Atlantic Group, USA
121  H. *Fischer* Speaker of Parliament, Austria
122  Z. *Gaiparashvili* Chairman of State Department of Youth Affairs of Georgia
123  J. *Garriaud-Mayla* Co-founder, Union Internationale des Citoyens Européens
124  B. *Boutros-Ghali* Secretary-General of the International Organisation of Francophony and former Secretary-General of the United Nations; member IOTC board
Appendix 2: Signatories of the Olympic Truce

125 G. Gingaras Minister of Youth and Sports, Romania
126 L. Hallengren Minister for Youth, Deputy Minister for Education, Sweden
127 D. Hanganu Architect
128 O. Ivanovic Member of the Serbian National Council, Kosovo/FRY
129 J. Kellenberger President of the International Committee of the Red Cross
130 R. Khan Journalist, CNN
131 M. R. Khatami First Vice-Speaker, Islamic Consultative Assembly, Iran
132 Dr D. Klimo Founder and President, D. Klimo GmbH
133 N. Konstandaras Editor-in-Chief, International Herald Tribune-Kathimerini
134 T. Kostadinova Deputy Minister of Youth and Sport, Bulgaria
135 P. Lamy EU Commissioner for Trade
136 R. Lubbers UN High Commissioner for Refugees
137 Martin Luther King III
138 N. Massalha Vice-President, Knesset, Israel
139 A. Mesterhazy State Secretary, Ministry of Children Youth and Sports, Hungary
140 A. Moerzinger Political Director, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Uruguay
141 A. Moussa Secretary-General, Arab League
142 A. Ogi UN Under-Secretary-General
143 D. Papademetriou Co-founder and co-director, Migration Policy Institute, USA
144 S. Papadopoulos Vice-Chairman, SG Gowen Securities Corp., USA
145 D. A. Quinonez Vice-Minister of External Relations, Honduras
146 E. Rama Mayor of Tirana, Albania
147 M. Rand Minister for Education, Estonia
148 V. Reding Member of the European Commission
16 days

149  I. Rugova  President, Democratic League of Kosovo/FRY
150  S. Rylko  Holy See
151  J. Schlesinger  International Journalist
152  W. Schwimmer  Secretary-General of the Council of Europe
153  Al. Shambos  Minister of Justice and Public Order, Cyprus
154  G. Sipahioglu  President, SIPA Press, France
155  J. Solana  EU’s Secretary-General/High Representative
156  A. Soler  Director, Cadbury Schweppes, Canada
157  I. Stancicoff  Director, Cresta Marketing; former Foreign Minister, Bulgaria
158  Prince D. Sturdza  Co-founder, D’esse AG of Switzerland
159  A. Tato  Minister for Culture, Albania
160  Z. Tesanovic  Minister for Sports and Youth, Republica Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina
161  M. Tilki  Chairwoman, Federation of Irish Societies, UK
162  C. Toepfer  Executive Director, UNEP
163  C. D. Trevino  Secretary-General for Social Affairs, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Spain
164  Dr G. Ugeux  Senior Managing Director, New York Stock Exchange
165  O. Anders With  State Secretary of the Royal Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, Norway
166  A. Vallarino  Vice-President of the Republic of Panama
167  E. Venizelos  Minister for Culture, Greece
168  D. Vidovic  Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, Croatia
169  Dr M. Vyhnálek  Founder, Lacrum Tasmanian Dairy Farm, Australia
170  A. Xhaferi  President DPA, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
171  S. Zanoun  Speaker, Palestinian National Council
172  Otto Zich  Chairman, Sony Europe

Religious leaders and other personalities

173  His Beatitude Anastasios  Archbishop of Tirana and All Albania
Appendix 2: Signatories of the Olympic Truce

174  His Eminence Anastasios Metropolitan of Ilioupolis and Theira
175  His Beatitude Aram Catholicos Patriarch of Cilicia (Armenian)
176  His Eminence Cardinal Francis Arinze President of the Pontifical Council for Inter-religious Dialogue, Vatican
177  His All-Holiness Bartholomew Ecumenical Patriarch
178  His Beatitude the Archbishop of Athens and all Greece Christodoulos
179  His Grace Bishop Julius Cicek, Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch
180  His Eminence Demetrios Archbishop of America (Primate of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America)
181  His Beatitude Eirinaios Patriarch of Jerusalem
182  Mons. Walter M. Ebejer Diocesan Bishop of Uniao da Vitoria, Brazil
183  His Grace Bishop Emmanuel of Rigion
184  Chancellor Andreas Gilerdy Serbian Patriarchate
185  Mgr Aldo Giordano General Secretary of Roman Catholic Council of Europe Assemblies
186  His Beatitude Ignatius IV Patriarch of Antioch and All East
187  His Beatitude Ilias II Catholicos Patriarch of All Georgia
188  Archimandrite Venediktos Ioannou Representative of the Ecumenical Patriarchate at the World Council of Churches
189  His Grace Bishop Irinej of Batska, Serbia
190  Mr Michael Jaharis Vice-Chairman of the Archdiocesan Council, New York
191  His Eminence Jeremy Metropolitan of Switzerland, President of the Conference of European Churches
192  His Holiness the Pope John-Paul II
193  His Holiness Patriarch of All Armenians Karekin II
194  His Eminence Cardinal Walter Kasper President of the Pontifical Council for Christian Unity
195  Antonios Kireopoulo Conference of Religions about Peace (USA)
196 K. Klements Secretary-General of the Conference of European Churches
197 Deacon Elpidoforos Labriniadis Ecumenical Patriarchate
198 Mahmoud Al-Mufti on behalf of Prince Hassan of Jordan
199 His Eminence Makarios Metropolitan of Kenya
200 Archbishop Paul Matar representing the Church of Maronites
201 His Eminence Meliton Metropolitan of Philadelphia
202 His Beatitude Mesrob II Patriarch of the Armenians of Constantinople
203 G. Bizos Counsellor to President N. Mandela
204 Professor Niyazi Oktem representing the President of Religious Affairs of Turkey
205 His Grace Bishop Vincezo Paglia Italy
206 His Beatitude Pavle Patriarch of the Serbs
207 His Beatitude Petros VII Pope and Patriarch of Alexandria and All Africa
208 Vlassios Phidas Professor
209 His Grace Bishop Eberhardt Renz President of the World Council of Churches
210 Professor Andrea Riccardi President of the Roman Catholic Community of San Egidio
211 R. Rohrandt Vice-President of the Conference of European Churches
212 Davos Salom Jewish Community of Serbia
213 Aca Singer Jewish Community of Serbia
214 Rabbi Arthur Sneier New York
215 The Most Rev. (Senior) Georgios Tsetsis
216 Cemal Ussak Turkish representative of the Intercultural Dialogue Platform
217 Gary Vachicouras Centre of Ecumenical Patriarchate of Geneva
218 His Grace Vasilios Bishop of Trimythounta
Appendix 2: Signatories of the Olympic Truce

Personalities from the Arts and Letters

219  H. Ahrweiler-Glykatzi President of the European University
220  V. Amritral Actor
221  T. Angelopoulos Film Director
222  A. Baltsa Opera Singer
223  H. Bellafonte Actor
224  R. Berger General Director, Vienna Volksoper
225  J. Cl. Brealy Artist
226  M. Cacoyannis Film Director
227  Chryssa Sculptor
228  J. Dassin Film Director, President M. Merkouri Foundation
229  K. Dimoula Poet, Member of the Academy of Athens
230  O. Dukakis Actress
231  D. Fotopoulos Stage Designer
232  I. Galante Soprano
233  K. Gavras Film Director
234  J. Gianopoulos Co-Chairman, 20th Century Fox
235  V. Globokar Composer, Trombone Player
236  D. Glover Actor
237  E. Karaindrou Composer
238  C. Katsaris Concert Pianist
239  L. Kavakos Concert Violinist
240  J. Kounellis Painter
241  N. Mahfouz Nobel Laureate
242  K. Mattila Soprano
243  T. Mikroutsikos Composer, former Minister of Culture
244  R. Moore Actor
245  N. Mouskouri Singer, UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador
246  A. Myrat Conductor
247  D. Papaioannou Director Choreographer
248  I. Papas Actress
249  V. Papathanassiou Composer
250  L. Renoud Artist
251  M. Rubackyté Concert Pianist and Professor
16 days

252 J. Saramago Nobel Laureate
253 D. Sgouros Concert Pianist
254 I. Stuart Sculptor
255 Takis Sculptor
256 M. Theodorakis Composer
257 P. Ustinov Actor
258 F. Yurchikhin Cosmonaut
259 S. Xarhakos Composer
260 V. Zelakeviciute Documentary Film-maker

Olympic family
261 T. Ajan IOC
262 Y. Akashi President, Japanese Centre for Preventive Diplomacy; IOTC
263 Albert de Monaco IOC
264 S. Ali IOC
265 G. Angelopoulos President, Athens 2004; IOTC
266 R. Baar IOC
267 T. Bach IOC
268 P. Baudry UNESCO Goodwill Ambassador; IOTC
269 F. Bello IOC
270 Borbón, l’Infante Doña Pilar de IOC
271 V. Borzov IOC
272 E. van Breda Vriesman IOC
273 S. Bubka IOC
274 R. Carrión IOC
275 V. Castellani President, Turin 2006; IOTC
276 V. Cernusak IOC
277 P. Chamunda IOC
278 U. Chang IOC
279 O. Cinquanta IOC
280 J. D. Coates IOC
281 P. Coles IOC
282 N. Comaneci Olympian
283 Constantine IOC
### Appendix 2: Signatories of the Olympic Truce

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P. Craven</td>
<td>IOC; IOTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Crooks</td>
<td>IOC</td>
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<tr>
<td>R. Ctvrtilk</td>
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<td>M. Di Centa</td>
<td>IOC</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. Drut</td>
<td>IOC; IOTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>F. Elizalde</td>
<td>IOC</td>
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<tr>
<td>M. Estiarte</td>
<td>IOC</td>
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<td>R. Fasel</td>
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<td>N. Filaretos</td>
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<tr>
<td>T. Fok</td>
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<td>A. Geesink</td>
<td>IOC</td>
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<td>A. Gilady</td>
<td>IOC</td>
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<tr>
<td>M. Glen-Haig</td>
<td>IOC</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. Gola</td>
<td>President, CISM; IOTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>R. Gonzalez Lopez</td>
<td>IOC</td>
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<td>R. K. Gosper</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. M. Halim</td>
<td>IOC</td>
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<td>M. Hashemi Taba</td>
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<td>J. Havelange</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Hay</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. Heiberg</td>
<td>IOC</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. Heinze</td>
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<td>P. Henderson</td>
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<td>N. Holst-Sorensen</td>
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<td>C. Igaya</td>
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<tr>
<td>F. Isava-Fonseca</td>
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<tr>
<td>W. Kaltschmitt Lujan</td>
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<tr>
<td>K. Keino</td>
<td>IOC</td>
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<tr>
<td>T. Khoury</td>
<td>IOC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
16 days

319  J-C Killy IOC; IOTC
320  U. Y. Kim IOC
321  A. Kumar IOC
322  J. Kurri IOC
323  M. Larfaoui IOC
324  K. Lazarides IOC
325  Nora de Liechtenstein IOC
326  Lindberg IOC
327  A. Ljungqvist IOC
328  le Grand-Duc de Luxembourg IOC
329  J. C. Maglione IOC
330  S Magvan IOC
331  A. Matthia IOC
332  F. Mendoza Carrasquilla IOC
333  S. Moudallal IOC
334  N. Moutawakel IOC
335  R. N. Muñoz Peña IOC
336  M. Mzali IOC
337  F. Narmon IOC
338  Y. Ndiaye IOC
339  S. M. Ng IOC
340  L. Nikolaou IOC
341  C. Nuzman IOC
342  F. Nyangweso IOC
343  S. Okano IOC
344  S. O’Neil IOC
345  le Prince d’Orange IOC
346  D. Oswald IOC
347  L. Palenfo IOC
348  Y. S. Park IOC
349  M. Pescante IOC
350  A. Popov IOC
351  R. Pound IOC
352  S. Ramsamy IOC
353  C. Reedie IOC

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Appendix 2: Signatories of the Olympic Truce

354 J. Rogge President IOC; IOTC
355 R. Ruhee IOC
356 M. Sabet IOC
357 J. A. Samaranchn Hon. President for Life, IOC; IOTC
358 J. A. Samaranchn Jr. IOC
359 M. Sánchez Rivas IOC
360 P. Schmitt IOC
361 P. von Schoeller IOC
362 A. Sealy IOC
363 R. Singh IOC
364 I. Slavkov IOC
365 A. Sondral IOC
366 B. Stankovic IOC
367 T. Stoltenberg IOTC
368 I. Szewinska IOC
369 P. Tallberg IOC
370 S. Tazpischev IOC
371 E. Terpstra Olympian; IOTC
372 W. Troeger IOC
373 M. Vázquez Raña IOC; IOTC
374 O. Vázquez Raña IOC
375 L. Wallner IOC
376 P. Wiberg IOC
377 T. Wilson IOC
378 C.-K. Wu IOC
379 Z. Yu IOC

Athletic clubs (through Presidents, Coaches and/or Team Captains)

380 Fenerbahce Football Club, Turkey
381 Galatasaray Football Club, Turkey
382 Olympiakos Football Club, Greece
383 Panathinaikos Football Club, Greece
384 PyeongChang 2010 Games bid city
   (RM Gong, Chairman; HS Kwon, Mayor)
385 **Salzburg Games bid city**  
(D. Schaden, Mayor; E. Winkler, DG)

386 **Vancouver 2010 Games bid city**  
(L. Campbell, Mayor; J. Poole, Chair)

This list is also available online at:  
Appendix 3
UN resolution on the Olympic Truce

United Nations

General Assembly
Distr.: Limited
31 October 2003
Original: English

Fifty-eighth session
Agenda item 23 (a)
Sport for peace and development: building a peaceful
and better world through sport and the Olympic ideal

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,
 Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire,
 Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Koweit, Kyrgyzstan, Lao
People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of
Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino,
 Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro,
 Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands,
 Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden,
 Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago,
 Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,
 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of
Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela,
 Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe: draft resolution
Building a peaceful and better world through sport and the Olympic ideal

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 56/75 of 11 December 2001, in which it decided to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled “Building a peaceful and better world through sport and the Olympic Ideal” and its decision to consider this item every two years in advance of each Summer and Winter Olympic Games,

Recalling also its resolution 48/11 of 25 October 1993, which, inter alia, revived the ancient Greek tradition of okecheiria ("Olympic Truce"), calling for a truce during the Games that would encourage a peaceful environment and ensuring the safe passage and participation of athletes and others at the Games and, thereby, mobilizing the youth of the world to the cause of peace,

Taking into account the inclusion in the United Nations Millennium Declaration\(^1\) of an appeal for the observance of the Olympic Truce now and in the future, and to support the International Olympic Committee in its efforts to promote peace and human understanding through sport and the Olympic ideal,

Noting that the Games of the XXVIII Olympiad will take place at Athens, in Greece, where the Olympic Games were born in ancient times and revived in 1896, and where the tradition of the Olympic Truce was first established,

Welcoming the initiative of the Secretary-General to establish the Task Force on Sport for Development and Peace,

Recognizing the important role of sport in the implementation of the internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the United Nations Millennium Declaration,

Recognizing also the valuable contribution that the appeal launched by the International Olympic Committee for an Olympic Truce, with which the National Olympic Committees of the Member States are associated, could make towards advancing the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Noting with satisfaction the flying of the United Nations flag at all competition sites of the Olympic Games, and the joint endeavours of the International Olympic Committee and the United Nations system in fields such as poverty alleviation, human and economic development, humanitarian assistance, education, health promotion, gender equality, environment protection and human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) prevention,

Welcoming the establishment by the International Olympic Committee, of an International Olympic Truce Foundation and an International Olympic Truce Centre to promote further the ideals of peace and understanding through sport, on whose Board the President in office of the General Assembly sits and the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization are represented,

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\(^1\) See resolution 55/2.

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Appendix 3: UN resolution on the Olympic Truce

Welcoming the individual support of world personalities for the promotion of the Olympic Truce,

1. Urges Member States to observe, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, the Olympic Truce, individually and collectively, during the Games of the XXVIII Olympiad, to be held at Athens from 13 to 29 August 2004;

2. Welcomes the decision of the International Olympic Committee to mobilize all international sports organizations and the National Olympic Committees of the Member States to undertake concrete actions at the local, national, regional and world levels to promote and strengthen a culture of peace based on the spirit of the Olympic Truce;

3. Calls upon all Member States to cooperate with the International Olympic Committee in its efforts to use the Olympic Truce as an instrument to promote peace, dialogue and reconciliation in areas of conflict during and beyond the Olympic Games period;

4. Welcomes the increased implementation of projects for development through sport and encourages Member States and all concerned agencies and programmes of the United Nations system to strengthen their work in this field, in cooperation with the International Olympic Committee;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to promote the observance of the Olympic Truce among Member States and support to human development initiatives through sport, and to cooperate with the International Olympic Committee in the realization of these objectives;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled “Building a peaceful and better world through sport and the Olympic Ideal” and to consider this item before the XX Olympic Winter Games.
Notes

1 In 1988 the IOC was prepared to bend one of its own rules to allow some of the events at the Seoul Olympic Games to take place in North Korea, outside the host city’s country. This was significant in positioning the IOC as a facilitating force in discussions between North and South Korea.

2 See the discussion of conflict prevention methodologies in P Wallensteen and F Moller, 'Conflict prevention: methodology for knowing the unknown', Uppsala Peace Research Papers, Uppsala, 2003. See also: www.pcr.uu.se/.


4 See, for example, the report of the International Crisis Group, EU Crisis Response Capability: institutions and processes for conflict prevention and management (Brussels: ICG Issues Report no 2, 26 June 2001).


7 N Gialouris, The Olympic Games in Ancient Greece (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1982).


9 Ibid.


15 For a list of individuals who have signed this statement, please refer to appendix 2.
21 Ibid., p 23.
32 N Hopkins and S Goldenberg, ‘MI5 says dirty bomb attack is “inevitable”’, Guardian, 18 June 2003; available at: www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,12780,979696,00.html=rss.
34 R Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, p 83.
37 See report of the ICG, ‘EU Crisis Response Capability’.

104 Demos
Notes

39 See University of Uppsala, Department of Peace and Conflict Research: current project on conflict prevention methodology; P Wallensteen and F Moller, ‘Conflict prevention’; see also: www.pcr.uu.se/.
40 M Kaldor, ’The power of terror’, p 23.
44 Quoted by A La Guardia in ‘Blessed are the peacemakers (and probably Norwegian)’, New Statesman (December 2003): 18–20.
48 These cities are among those cities that have entered the running to host the 2012 Olympic Games.
50 United Nations, ‘Secretary-General says Olympic Truce can offer window of time to open dialogue and pause to relieve suffering’, Press Release SG/SM/7797, 08/05/2001.
52 Cited in S Wilson, ‘Koreas to march at Sydney together’, 10 September 2000 available at www.flagspot.net/flags/kr@oly2k.html.
53 Cited in P Wallensteen and F Moller, ‘Conflict prevention’.
54 See: www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/facts/revenue/index_uk.asp.
55 S Katwala, Democratising Global Sport (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2000).
56 Cited by A La Guardia in ‘Blessed are the peacemakers (and probably Norwegian)’.