

“Closing the gap between
the seminar room and the
wider public debate on
integration...”

MAPPING INTEGRATION

Edited by David Goodhart

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1 The story so far and why it matters

Trevor Phillips

In the autumn of 2013, two close friends took me and my wife to see a Bruce Springsteen concert. Neither of us had ever paid too much attention to the New Jersey rocker, but how could you say no? Of course, the show, at Wembley Stadium, surpassed our expectations. He played continuously for over three hours and it was fantastic. But it was three hours; so there was plenty of time to look around.

When we tired of marvelling at the Wembley arch, we looked at the crowd. As you might expect, this was a diverse audience, with people of all ages dancing up and down the stadium stairs. But in one respect at least, the 80,000 or so people at Wembley were similar to each other. So we amused ourselves by counting the number of people who were not white. Not one of us got past ten. And we counted me.

For many, this would be the epitome of segregation of the worst kind – the national stadium given over to an event whose racial mix would not have embarrassed a KKK rally. But no one thinks that Bruce is anything but a dyed in the wool liberal, with impeccable anti-racist credentials. Moreover, if I wanted to get back with my brethren, I only needed to wait a few hours to go to my local church on Sunday morning where out of a congregation of three hundred, the number of people who are not black can usually be counted on the fingers of one hand.

The fact is that we can all survive this kind of benign clustering. What we do with our own time, and who we do it with, should have no impact on public policy. Yet hardly a week goes by without some controversy about the tendency of one group or another – Muslims, Poles, Mormons – to do their own thing. Are they simply exercising legitimate freedoms? Or are they being unacceptably exclusive? Would we tolerate this behaviour from other groups?

These aren't mere debating points. They have huge potential impact. I have lost count of the number of times I have been urged to advocate the closure of all Catholic, Anglican and Jewish schools, partly as a reason to prevent Muslims setting up 'separatist' institutions with an Islamic ethos. And one of the more depressing revelations of recent times has been the discovery of the widespread use of segregated shifts in industrial sectors such as meat-packing and agro-business – no doubt raising productivity at the expense of social mixing.

Few topics inspire more heat and less light than integration. For a start, an overheard discussion between any three people will quickly reveal that between them they are talking about at least four different phenomena. One person may start by musing about social relations across the lines of ethnicity, culture, class, religion or age. Another will be thinking about the concentration or the dispersal of racial groupings in one district. A third will be wrestling with abstract questions of values and adherence to national identity.

Our first contributor may then switch to worrying about the distribution of ethnic groups across the social classes. Our second contributor might bounce back with some speculation about whether musical tastes are predictable from ethnic background or not. And our third might come down out of the clouds asking about the extent to which people of African, Jewish or Pakistani heritage born in Britain are now choosing anglicised Christian names for their offspring, and whether this represents a true proxy for integration.

Each will recount tales of encounters between groups of people from different backgrounds, usually told as narratives culminating in varying degrees of triumph or disaster. Debates about integration can be guaranteed to generate a veritable spider's web of cross-purposes. As a consequence, integration has the peculiar distinction of being one of those public policy questions which becomes less intelligible the more they are aired.

It also leads to intelligent folk making preposterous correlations. One of the most common assertions, repeated recently in the *Economist*, is that integration in the UK is in rude health. That may or not be true. But the usual indicator of the

validity of this statement – rates of intermarriage, or an increase in the number of mixed-race babies – just won't do for anyone who takes the question seriously.

Marginally increased rates of intermarriage may reflect nothing more significant than the fact that minorities are a larger proportion of the population. Or that some groups have moved into greater geographical proximity. Or just that the number of eccentrics (like me) who choose to spend their lives with people unlike their own families has nudged up a little.

Either way, what the happy-clappy integrationist usually ignores is the fact that the most frequent instance of intermarriage in Britain takes place between people of African Caribbean and White British heritage (once again, like me). Inconveniently for optimists, this is also the type of union most likely to produce children who will grow up with just one parent in their home. It takes some imagination to turn this into an indicator of healthy social relationships.

The topic deserves better than this. In fact, as a society, we all need better than this. The standing of, and relations between, different groupings is a vital aspect of the health of increasingly diverse societies. Indeed, the presence or absence of diversity in a society may in itself become a critical determinant of its economic and social success.

Japan's Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, has identified the nation's historic monoculturalism and masculinism as part of the explanation for its twenty-five year period of economic stagnation. His promotion of so-called 'womenomics' – an attempt to bring women into the labour market – has generated some popular resistance. Tentative suggestions that Japanese higher education might benefit from attracting international students have been treated as though Abe had proposed selling off the Chrysanthemum Throne to the highest bidder. No Japanese politician has yet had the nerve to suggest that the best solution to Japan's shrinking workforce – the oldest in the world – may not be sleek new robots, but lively, creative, young immigrants.

Both Abe and his critics are, however, in their own ways, right. Japan's long period of stagnation has shown that, without

social diversity, societies lack energy and inventiveness. Yet, its mirror image, in this respect, is the USA, where social diversity has both invested the nation with an extraordinary vibrancy, as well as proving to be the source of strife and division. Neither the Americans, nor the Japanese, two of the most successful nations in history, have yet found the key to reconciling diversity and social cohesion.

But the need to get this right has never been more pressing. In our own society, whatever anyone thinks about our current levels of immigration, it is incontestable that even our past immigration flows have presented us with a need to make sure that relations between different ethno-cultural groupings tend towards the harmonious rather than the indifferent or hostile.

But how do we know if they are better or worse overall, if we can't even agree what elements of the relationship matters?

The real concern about segregation is two-fold. First, is it likely to undermine social peace and solidarity? And second, will it deprive any group of opportunity, or reduce their life chances?

In this series of essays, our contributors offer some pointers. And while it's far too early in our work to draw too many conclusions, what they say challenges us to look afresh at the question of social diversity and its impact on our well-being. Take three examples:

Eric Kaufmann's (see Chapter 10) account of his recent study of population movement in and out of the capital tells us that whites have indeed escaped the inner city in numbers – but that they aren't being driven by the old-fashioned bigotry of bygone generations. So does this instance of 'white flight' pass the Springsteen test for benign clustering – or is it something that needs the intervention of public policy?

Rich Harris (see Chapter 2) wisely counsels against reducing the idea of integration to a simple snapshot of residential patterns, any of which can be interpreted to support very different hypotheses; his analysis tells us that what appear to be opposing interpretations of data can actually be entirely consistent with each other – in this case, it is entirely possible for minority groups to be less isolated (from each other) at exactly the same time as they become more separate (from the ethnic majority).

And Shamit Saggar (see Chapter 7) warns against imagining that the absence of social integration is mostly a matter for the less educated and poorer sections of society – a view which resonates with me. During my time at the CRE, the people who were most visibly aggrieved about racial discrimination were not unemployed young black men; they were senior doctors who felt they should have been consultants, experienced barristers who had been denied silk and lecturers who were passed over for professorial tenure – all people who felt they had done everything that white society asked them to do, yet were excluded from the normal rewards for their diligence.

Perhaps the most important thing that we can learn is that integration, as Simon Burgess (see Chapter 6) points out, is a process rather than a still picture. In my opinion, it is best thought of as a process of convergence between groups – in attainment, in behaviours and in cultures. Thinking of integration as this kind of convergence means that we can specify the direction of travel and measure its pace. It also holds open the possibility of being able to influence the course of the convergence.

Second, as many of our contributors suggest, the integration process does not inevitably end up stuck in one-way traffic. Both minorities and majorities will move – how much and how fast may differ, but everyone changes.

Third, there is no automatic presumption that all right-thinking people will see the process of integration as being in the interests of themselves or their families. You do not have to be a wild-eyed fanatic or an ethnic separatist to believe that some degree of clustering is good for you (as Michael Merry points out in Chapter 12).

For example, when my parents arrived in London in the early 1950s, they found that no-one would rent them any property other than a rat-infested Rachman slum. They managed to raise the money for a deposit on their first home through a ‘box’ – a simple form of credit union organised by West Indians, often based on their concentration in particular workplaces (they were common in the Post Office, where my father worked as a sorter).

Every member contributes a fixed amount – called ‘throwing box-hand’. All the weekly savings are drawn by each member of the club in turn. If you didn’t need your turn, you’d leave it in the box; so over time, an amount of capital could be built up. The scheme could only have existed within a close-knit community where people had the confidence that their hard-earned contributions will be protected – if only because anyone who cheated would be cast out of the tribe forever, quickly followed by their relatives.

So integration is by no means a simple process to describe, nor to manage. On the other hand it is not organic; it does not happen by accident. To make it work, we need to know more about when and where it matters and, where necessary, how to encourage constructive convergence. The project we call Mapping Integration has set as its target a better understanding of integration, its value, its risks and its benefits. And what we also hope to do is to find ways of quantifying the process by measuring the degrees of convergence of attainment, behaviours and culture over time.

This set of essays is the first step in our consideration of how to establish how far we’ve come, and how far we have still to go.

Trevor Phillips OBE is a former Chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission and Chair of the Mapping Integration project at Demos.

2 Evidence and trends: are we becoming more integrated, more segregated or both?

Rich Harris

As data from the 2011 Census for England and Wales began to emerge at the end of 2012 two somewhat conflicting stories emerged with them. Reports of white flight, white avoidance and ethnic cliffs were accompanied by counterclaims of decreased segregation, more mixed neighbourhoods and the integration of the population at the most intimate levels, (the number of people classifying themselves as of mixed or multiple ethnicity almost doubled in the ten years between 2001 and 2011, now forming 2.3 per cent of the population).¹

Debates about segregation remain emotive. The mayor of Newham announced recently plans to boost integration and prevent ‘apartheid’.² Meanwhile, a member of the Society of Black Lawyers claimed ‘we do not have segregation in any shape or form in the UK’.³ Additionally, debates about segregation and integration have dovetailed with those about immigration. The two are not unrelated—the tendency for new immigrants to live in communities with their ethno-cultural peers is well documented.⁴ However, one does not subsume the other. In London, where less than half the population classed themselves as White British, three-quarters of the population are British citizens.⁵

Residential trends

Between 2001 and 2011, the number of White British residents in England fell from 42 747 136 to 42 279 236, a 1.1 per cent decrease. That provides a benchmark to evaluate changes in individual local authorities, here confining the analysis to

England. Of 326 local authorities, 113 had a fall in their White British population of greater than 1.1 per cent. All 32 of the London boroughs plus the City of London are among these. For London as a whole, the average decrease in the White British population was 14 per cent from 2001 to 2011, of which the greatest decreases were in Newham (37 per cent), Barking and Dagenham (31 per cent), and Redbridge (30 per cent). Outside London, the greatest decreases were in Slough (30 per cent) and Luton (24 per cent).

In general, the greatest decreases were from places that had the highest proportions of the population not White British in 2001. The correlation between the percentage decrease and the proportion of the population not White British in 2001 is between 0.67 and 0.82 for the 113 local authorities. It is statistically significant, showing that decreases in the White British population tended to be greatest in areas where other groups already were well established.

As the White British have decreased in London and other parts of the country, the numbers of other ethnic groups have increased. In the same 113 local authorities with above the overall English rate of White British loss, the Indian population has increased by an average of 56 per cent (compared to a 36 per cent growth for all of England), the Pakistani population by 66 per cent (vs. 57 per cent), the Bangladeshi population by 111 per cent (vs. 59 per cent), the Black African population by 255 per cent (vs. 105 per cent) and the Black Caribbean population by 27 per cent (vs. 5 per cent).

The local authorities with the highest percentage of White British population are Allerdale (in Cumbria), and Redcar and Cleveland, both at 97.6 per cent (a decrease from 98.4 per cent and 97.9 per cent in 2001). For the Indian population, the authority with the highest percentage is Leicester (28.3 per cent, increased from 25.7 per cent); for Pakistanis, Bradford (20.4 per cent, increased from 14.5 per cent); for Bangladeshis, Tower Hamlets (32.0 per cent, decreased from 33.4 per cent); Black Africans, Southwark (16.4 per cent, increased from 16.1 per cent); and for Black Caribbeans, Lewisham (11.2 per cent, increased from 9.1 per cent).

Greater presence within an authority does not mean the ethnic group is rooted to it. In fact, 7.0 per cent of the total Indian population of England lived in Leicester in 2001; by 2011, its share was 6.7 per cent. In 2001, 8.3 per cent of Black Africans were in Southwark; in 2011, 4.8 per cent. In 2001, 5.4 per cent of all Black Caribbeans were in Lewisham; 5.2 per cent in 2011. The percentage of the total Pakistani population in Bradford was unchanged at 9.6 in 2001 and 2011.

Confusingly, a group can be both more concentrated within its traditional location centres (forming a greater percentage of those locations' total population) while at the same time becoming more geographically spread out (so that within the historic centres the share of the group's total number falls). Evidence this is happening is gleaned by looking at the Census small area data. These are the data for Output Areas (OAs), the smallest areas for which the data currently are published (but possibly not in the future if Government proposals to replace the Census come to pass with all that entails about the loss of information about the social and demographic make-up of the country).

What we can ask is what is the smallest proportion of all OAs that, when selected together, contain half of an ethnic group's total number? The larger the proportion, the more spread-out the group is geographically. The interest is in whether that proportion increased from 2001 to 2011.

For all but the White British group, the measure of geographical spread does indeed increase (see Table 1). A majority of Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Black Africans and Black Caribbeans are more geographically dispersed in 2011 than they were in 2001. However, the story is actually a little more complicated than that. When interpreting the changes, we need to take the size of the group into consideration since all but the White British group have grown in number over the period. Note, for example, that the measure of spread increases by 42.9 per cent for Pakistanis from 2001 to 2011. Yet, the group's population count grew by 57.4 per cent over the same period. The group has not expanded geographically at the same rate it has grown in number. The same is especially true of the Black

Table 1 **Geographical distribution across England, and the growth or decline in number, of the six largest ethnic groups in 2001 and 2011**

	Measure of geographical spread		% change	Population count		% change
	2001	2011		2001	2011	
Indians	0.031	0.042	+35.5	1028546	1395702	+35.7
Pakistanis	0.014	0.020	+42.9	706539	1112282	+57.4
Bangladeshis	0.009	0.014	+55.6	275394	436514	+58.5
Black Africans	0.030	0.051	+70.0	475938	977741	+105.4
Black Caribbeans	0.042	0.049	+16.7	561246	591016	+5.3
White British	0.400	0.379	-5.3	42747136	42279236	-1.1

African group. Only the Black Caribbeans have become more geographically dispersed than their growth in number would anticipate. In contrast, the White British have become more geographically concentrated.

More or less segregation?

Commentators have debated whether the UK is becoming more ethnically integrated or divided. However, the sorts of segregation measures used in academic research all point in the same direction: ethnic segregation – the separation of different ethnic groups into different neighbourhoods – is falling.⁶ Table 2 shows this with the most commonly used measure: the segregation or dissimilarity index. It is calculated for the six largest ethnic groups at three scales of analysis: London alone, London and all local authorities within 100 kilometres of it, and the whole of England. The index is interpreted on a scale ranging from 0 (no segregation) to 1 (complete separation of a group from all others).

Looking at Table 2, we discern three things. First, levels of ethnic separation remain strong in 2011, especially for the Bangladeshi group. However, and secondly, the index of

Table 2 **Levels of segregation by ethnic group in London, London and surrounding local authorities, and England as a whole**

	Greater London			London + 100 km			England		
	2001	2011		2001	2011		2001	2011	
Indians	0.522	0.511	-0.011	0.606	0.560	-0.046	0.685	0.634	-0.051
Pakistanis	0.573	0.553	-0.020	0.719	0.677	-0.042	0.789	0.755	-0.034
Bangladeshis	0.711	0.661	-0.050	0.804	0.732	-0.072	0.875	0.798	-0.077
Black Africans	0.464	0.426	-0.038	0.667	0.576	-0.091	0.772	0.663	-0.109
Black Caribbeans	0.456	0.425	-0.031	0.644	0.599	-0.045	0.715	0.674	-0.041
White British	0.374	0.384	+0.010	0.527	0.528	+0.001	0.563	0.564	+0.001

segregation has fallen at all scales for all but the White British group. Thirdly, the levels of separation in London are lower than for it plus surrounding local authorities, and for England as a whole. London is a multicultural city.


If the figures are clear – residential segregation is, on average, falling – why the debate? The clue is the rise in segregation value for the White British. The increase is slight but relates to the residential choices of the largest number of people.

Two maps will illustrate the contrasting sides of the debate. The first (Figure 1) shows where the White British population has increased or decreased in number in London and surrounding authorities. Areas shaded white have more White British living in them in 2011 than they did in 2001. Those shaded grey have less, with darker shading indicating a greater percentage loss. The pattern is stark: the urban centres have lost White British population while the rural areas have gained.

Figure 2 provides an alternative view. It shows where the number of non-White British to White British population has increased or decreased between the censuses. For example, a value of two means that the non- to White British population has doubled. Any value above one means the location is becoming more ethnically mixed. A value less than one means it is becoming more White British – a situation that is true of only one local authority, Forest Heath in Suffolk.

We reach the following conclusions. The White British

Figure 1 **Increases and decreases in the White British population in London and surrounding local authorities from 2001 to 2011**




population has declined in the urban centres, centres that have and continue to contain the greatest presence of other ethnic groups. The places where the White British have increased are those where the other ethnic groups have, historically, been under-represented. However, those places, too, are becoming more ethnically mixed. The net result is a geographical contraction of the White British population but also increasingly diverse neighbourhoods.

A note on schools

A proper understanding of integration within society cannot rest with an analysis of residential geographies. Segregation or

Figure 2 **Increases in number of non-White British to White British population (values greater than one) or decreases (values less than one) from 2001 to 2011**



otherwise occurs across the duration of a person's life course, of which an early stage is the school they attend. Table 3 forms part of on-going research at the Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol (see Chapter 6). It shows segregation values by ethnic group for year 11 pupils in 2013 at the three scales of analysis. The columns headed 'actual' are the true values. The columns headed 'hypo.' are the hypothetical values obtained if each pupil attended their nearest school. In nearly all cases, to attend the nearest school would be to reduce the levels of ethnic separation but not for Black Caribbeans in London and its surrounds (a likely consequence of the preference of this group for faith schools).

Table 3 **Levels of segregation in secondary schools compared to pupils attending their nearest school and compared to neighbourhoods**

	Greater London schools			London + 100 km schools			England schools		
	OAs		2011	OAs		2011	OAs		2011
	actual	hypo		actual	hypo		actual	hypo	
Indians	0.550	0.508	0.511	0.549	0.517	0.560	0.662	0.647	0.634
Pakistanis	0.569	0.517	0.553	0.604	0.572	0.677	0.743	0.740	0.755
Bangladeshis	0.664	0.634	0.661	0.666	0.635	0.732	0.738	0.724	0.798
Black Africans	0.336	0.318	0.426	0.418	0.411	0.576	0.660	0.645	0.663
Black Caribbeans	0.400	0.406	0.425	0.487	0.493	0.599	0.706	0.700	0.674
White British	0.477	0.458	0.384	0.546	0.539	0.528	0.565	0.557	0.564

For comparison, the segregation values for Output Areas in 2011 are repeated from Table 1. In most cases, the residential separations are greater than the school-based ones, although not for the White British, nor for the Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in London's schools, and not for the Indians or Black Caribbeans for England as a whole. However, the comparison is not exact. The Census population includes all age groups, not just a single cohort of the school-aged. There are also 57 times more OAs than there are schools – the greater diversity in schools is largely inevitable.

Conclusions

The complexity of demographic trends means that different tales can be told using the same sources of data. We can, for instance, focus on the stark reduction of the White British population from particular parts of England or we could argue that other ethnic groups are becoming more geographically dispersed with neighbourhoods becoming more mixed as a consequence.

The evidence is that England was less ethnically segregated in 2011 than it was in 2001 but the reasons for and the consequences of the White British loss in some urban centres, especially London, requires further study. Moreover, numeric decreases in segregation indices need not map to greater

integration in any socially meaningful sense (though it might). I leave it to others to discuss what is meant by integration, whether it is happening on the ground, the barriers to it being so and what we can learn from those places and institutions that have tackled the issues.

Rich Harris is a Reader in Quantitative Geography at the University of Bristol.

Notes

- 1 For example, one-in-eight of households (excluding one-person households) contain more than one ethnic group. Source: Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity briefing document. http://www.ethnicity.ac.uk/census/869_CCSR_Bulletin_More_segregation_or_more_mixing_v7NW.pdf
- 2 See 'Naturalising Newham - radical plan to boost integration', C Nye, BBC News, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24146572>; and 'Newham mayor defends community integration plan on BBC Newsnight', Newham Recorder, available at http://www.newhamrecorder.co.uk/news/newham_mayor_defends_community_integration_plan_on_bbc_newsnight_1_2768586
- 3 'Viewpoints: What should be done about integration?', BBC News, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24147027>
- 4 See, for example, http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/documents/CCSR_Newsletter_Autumn_2013/Lymperopoulou_Issue10.pdf
- 5 'The truth about London's "white flight"', S Katwala, New Statesman, available at: <http://www.newstatesman.com/staggers/2013/02/truth-about-londons-white-flight>
- 6 See, for example, 'Has neighbourhood ethnic segregation decreased?', ESRC Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity (CoDE), available at: http://www.ethnicity.ac.uk/census/885_CCSR_Neighbourhood_Bulletin_v7.pdf

3 Attitudes of majority and minority

Bobby Duffy

Discussions about integration in Britain cannot avoid a focus on what we think, and how we feel, about each other, and the extent to which we believe we have common norms and a sense of mutual interest. This in turn is reflected in the emphasis on ‘*lived experience*’ and ‘*everyday integration*’ in most recent discussions of integration.

But things get slippery when we try to measure these. This shouldn’t be a huge surprise – even apparently objective factors on integration, such as whether communities are more or less physically segregated, lead to fierce debates of definition and interpretation.

And it’s worse with subjective measures. There are firstly straightforward measurement problems: it is very difficult to get at ‘*lived experience*’ in structured surveys. This is much more the realm of qualitative or observational research – but these have limitations in representativeness and generalisability. This is one of the reasons why the study of integration is cursed by anecdote and personal experience: the testimony of individuals or single communities may be compelling, but tell us little about how the whole of the country is feeling. And on the other hand, survey responses give us a very shallow understanding of what people really think on this issue.

There are also significant conceptual issues – we’re not sure what we’re looking for, particularly as this is new territory for us in Britain with our multiculturalist history and official ‘*laissez-faire*’ approach to integration. As one of the most useful recent reviews notes:

Crucially, the central principle has shifted towards a loosely framed public acceptance that migrants themselves must change outlooks and behaviours

*in order to 'fit in'. In many other western democracies this may not be novel, let alone challenging. In Britain today it represents a substantive move away from the past.*¹

There are at least three dimensions to measuring attitudinal integration in practice, each related but distinct. Firstly, there is research on 'values convergence' or 'normative integration', which has a much more extensive and longstanding track record in continental Europe. These studies tend to focus on how 'modern' or 'liberal' attitudes are among immigrant or minority communities and compare them with the majority, tracking whether they get closer over time.²

This is different from a second common area of questioning, which asks directly for our views of multiculturalism, and whether people *prefer* diversity or uniformity of values and attitudes.

And this is related, but different again, from our sense of 'social cohesion', which is more focused on the extent to which people think their communities are working well.

Looking at each in turn paints a varied picture of both majority and minority views.

Values convergence – but not completely

On a number of measures of values, there is a clear tendency towards convergence, where recently-arrived minorities move towards the majority view over time.

So, for example, when we compare trust in institutions like the local council and Parliament between groups, the native population have much *lower* levels of trust than immigrant populations.³ So for example, just 30 per cent of the native born population with native parents say they trust Parliament, in contrast with 70 per cent of recent immigrants from outside Europe.

But this difference shrinks over time, and longer-standing non-European immigrants (who have been here more than seven years) are much less trusting: 53 per cent say they trust Parliament. The picture is similar for European immigrants:

recent European arrivals start closer to native Brits (57 per cent say they trust Parliament) and end up closer still (just 42 per cent of those who've been here 7 or more years trust Parliament).

Of course, this also illustrates one of the perversities of using values convergence as a measure of 'success': do we want minorities to converge on the more disillusioned outlook of the majority?

There is also some convergence on views of freedom of speech – but again also maintained difference. Two-thirds of the majority native-born/native-parent population agree that people should be free to say what they believe even if it offends others. European immigrants arrive with an even greater sense of the importance of this, with 77 per cent agreeing – but over time move towards the majority (with 66 per cent agreeing after seven years). But immigrants from outside Europe start with lower levels of agreement and this doesn't shift – only around half believe in this conception of free speech, regardless of how long they've been in Britain.

And there are other instances where values stay different. In particular, as we might expect, there are big differences on maintaining ethnic traditions: just 16 per cent of the native population agree that this is important, which is similar to levels seen among European immigrants (20 per cent). However, 43 per cent of non-European recent immigrants agree, and this only goes down to 34 per cent for longer-term immigrants. In particular, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Indians and Black Africans who were born abroad are more likely to have different views, and keep these for longer.

So while minority and majority values do converge, many stay different. But we need to remember that the population is riven with values splits on many other characteristics. To pick just one, there are massive differences in generational values on subjects that are often picked out as signals of religious and cultural minorities' difference. For example, 37 per cent of the pre-1945 generation still believe that sexual relations between two adults of the same sex are 'always wrong', which is over twice the level of every other generation (15 per cent).

Doubting multiculturalism

Measuring attitudes to ‘multiculturalism’ more directly is treacherous, as the term itself is nebulous. There also appears to be a distinction in views between multiculturalism as a *policy* (where views are very negative) and the multicultural nature of our *society* (where opinion is more balanced).

For example, even by 2008, seven in ten of the total population (including a majority of minority populations) thought that ‘multiculturalism’, which was defined in this question as the protection or promotion of minority cultures, wasn’t working and causing more separation. But in contrast, in more recent polling, 54 per cent say that it’s a strength of Britain that it’s a more multicultural society than it used to be (36 per cent disagree). But all of these questions need to be treated with caution, as terms and timeframes are typically undefined.⁴

Much more useful then are questions that try to get to ideas behind multiculturalism, without using the terms – and here there is a clear trend of increasing doubt.

For example, we have seen a weakening of agreement that we should respect the wishes of minority communities over recent years. There was still a clear majority who agreed with this in 2008, but it was down to 64 per cent from 85 per cent in 1999. Similarly, agreement that it’s a good thing that foreigners keep their lifestyles when they come to Britain declined from 36 per cent to 22 per cent over the same period – and there was a doubling of the proportion who *strongly* disagreed with this.

Each of these studies is too small to compare majority and minority views in great depth – but the pattern is consistent: minorities are more supportive of keeping native cultures than the majority population, but often not markedly so.

This is seen in our 2012 polling for British Future, in a question that asks how the children of immigrants should prioritise the culture of their parents’ country of origin compared with British culture. The most popular response among the population as a whole is that the cultures should be combined (51 per cent), with the next most being they should prioritise British culture (37 per cent): only 2 per cent say they should prioritise the culture from their parents’ country of origin. The views of minority groups do differ: those born outside the UK

and from minority ethnic groups are around half as likely to say British culture should be prioritised. But there is no real appetite for prioritisation of foreign cultures either: only around 5 per cent across these groups say that the parents' culture should take priority.

So overall we don't want everyone to be the same, but are increasingly likely to want greater integration – although we also find these difficult questions to answer. For example, when asked to pick what's closest to our views, 41 per cent say we should share a common culture and set of values in Britain, while just 26 per cent say we should celebrate the rich diversity of cultures and values between different groups in Britain – but 30 per cent put themselves somewhere in between.

But is social cohesion holding up?

Given these doubts about multiculturalism, and that the values of minorities do not completely integrate with the majority, we may expect to have seen declines in measures of social cohesion as the minority population has grown – but we don't.

Large, robust surveys show levels of belonging to neighbourhoods, local areas and Britain have all increased in recent years. For example, our sense of belonging to our neighbourhoods increased from 70 per cent to 78 per cent between 2003 and 2011 and belonging to Britain increased from 85 per cent to 89 per cent over the same period. There are differences between minority and majority groups, with those of Asian ethnic origin slightly more likely to say they feel they belong, while Black groups are slightly lower – but there are no huge differences in levels or in trends. Analysis shows that minority views on this are dynamic, as with other values: recent immigrants are less likely to feel they belong, but longer-term immigrants actually have a greater sense of belonging than native residents.

And it's the same with perceptions of whether people from different backgrounds get on well together and whether people respect ethnic differences. Both of these measures see high levels of agreement, and each have been on the up, with, for example,

86 per cent agreeing that different backgrounds get on well together in 2011, and just about all ethnic groups showing an increase.

However, these positive patterns appear to contrast strongly with questions that encourage a direct comparison with the past, and particularly where they link directly to immigration. For example, seven in ten say they are concerned that Britain is becoming increasingly divided because of immigration (the highest level seen among the seven European countries in the study). This probably tells us more about attitudes to immigration than cohesion as such: a solid two-thirds have said there are too many immigrants or we're in 'danger of being swamped' by other cultures all the way back to the 1970s.

But the pace of change is a very real concern for a large minority of the majority population. In the 2000s, we saw a doubling in the proportion who said that their neighbourhood 'doesn't feel like Britain any more' because of immigration, from 12 per cent to 25 per cent. And more recently, in Lord Ashcroft's polling on immigration, 36 per cent say their area has changed for the worse because of immigration. If nothing else, this shows the measurement challenges of understanding our views of integration: question context has a huge effect.

A more meaningful picture of majority concern is therefore probably seen in the shifting patterns of perceptions of discrimination. Firstly, there have been some remarkable improvements in perceptions of discrimination among minorities – just 15 per cent of minority ethnic groups felt they would be discriminated against by the criminal justice system by 2011, less than half the level (36 per cent) a decade earlier. In contrast, there are stubbornly static views of discrimination among white groups on housing allocation: in fact, these have increased slightly to 20 per cent of white people feeling they'd be discriminated against on housing because of their ethnicity in 2011, up from 15 per cent in 2001. In contrast, perceptions of discrimination on housing have halved among minority ethnic groups to 6 per cent over the same period.

Our shaky sense of ourselves

This mixed and contingent attitudinal picture on integration perhaps reflects our shaky sense of identity and what we're expecting minorities to integrate into. The largest single answer to survey questions that ask what we understand by the 'British way of life' is 'don't know'. And when prompted with a list of what makes us proud, it tends to be objective factors like our history and the NHS. Our values are an odd mix of civic behaviours (respect for the law) and character traits (sense of humour). The eclectic opening ceremony at the London Olympics could have been based on a checklist from survey responses.

But one common feature throughout most of these questions on how we define ourselves is the emphasis we place on our tolerance of difference. This, combined with relatively strong pride in our identity but weak understanding of its basis, helps explain some of the contradictions and nuances in our views. Our attitudes to integration, majority and minority alike, are a very British compromise.

Bobby Duffy is the Managing Director of the Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute.

Notes

- 1 Sagggar, S and Sommerville, W, 2012, *Building a British Model of Integration in an era of Immigration: Policy Lessons for Government*, Migration Policy Institute.
- 2 For further discussion see: Hagendoorn, L et al, 2003, *Integrating immigrants in the Netherlands, cultural vs socio-economic integration*. Ashgate: Ersanilli, E, 2012, *Model(ling) Citizens? Integration policies and value integration of Turkish immigrants and their descendants in Germany, France and the Netherlands*. Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, 10(1).
- 3 Sagggar, S et al, 2012, *The impacts of migration on social cohesion and integration*. Final report to the Migration Advisory Committee.

- 4 These and other survey data on the cultural impact of immigration can be found in: Duffy, B. and Frere-Smith, T, 2014, *Perceptions and Reality: Public Attitudes to Immigration*. Chapter 3. Ipsos MORI.

4 Making it happen 1: contact

Miles Hewstone and Katharina Schmid

'See that man over there?

Yes.

Well, I hate him.

But you don't know him.

That's why I hate him.'

The social psychologist Gordon Allport used this parable in his classic volume, *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954), to illustrate the role that ignorance can play in prejudice towards members of other social groups, and to argue why 'intergroup contact' involving members of different and often opposed groups was a powerful weapon against that prejudice.¹

Contrary to some claims, we do not appear to be 'sleepwalking to segregation', at least as measured by most geographers' analyses of what is happening in our major cities. Yet, even if ethnic minorities are spreading out more evenly across Britain, rather than being isolated in enclaves, this may sometimes reflect mere desegregation, but stop short of true integration. The difference is crucial.

In an influential article published in 2007, Harvard political scientist Robert D. Putnam argued that ethnic diversity has negative consequences for trust.² He suggested that diversity poses a threat, to which people respond by 'hunkering down'. He reported in a large US survey that people living in diverse neighbourhoods not only trusted members of other ethnic groups less, but also trusted members of their own group less, compared with people living in less diverse areas. But Putnam's research focused only on the proportions of different ethnic groups in an area. This can be considered a measure of mere 'opportunity for contact', but not whether actual contact takes place, how often and, most important, what the quality of that

contact is. He also did not measure the threat that he argued was posed by diversity.

We recently conducted research aimed at challenging Putnam's pessimistic conclusions.³ Compared with prior research in this contentious area there were three special aspects of our research design. First, we purposefully sampled respondents from a wide variety of neighbourhoods, ranging from low to high on diversity, and low to high on deprivation (because deprivation, which often overlaps with diversity, is itself a primary driver of lower levels of trust). Second, we considered three different measures of trust (trust in members of one's ethnic ingroup; trust in ethnic outgroup members; and trust in neighbours), and controlled for attitudes towards members of ethnic outgroups. Third, we included measures of positive *contact*, that is, instances of face-to-face interaction across ethnic group lines. Our survey covered a wide range of English neighbourhoods (with 868 White British majority respondents from 218 neighbourhoods, and a targeted oversampling of 798 ethnic minority respondents from 196 neighbourhoods) and was carried out by Ipsos MORI.

Our results supported our contention that Putnam's original conclusions had been too negative, and that contact provided the missing link. We did reveal some negative effects of diversity, similar to those noted by Putnam and others, but only when we did not consider people's contact experiences.⁴ For White British majority respondents diversity had negative direct effects on trust of ethnic minorities and neighbours. Thus living in more ethnically diverse neighbourhoods was directly associated with lower trust of ethnic outgroup members and lower neighbourhood trust, but not with either trust for ingroup members or attitudes towards members of ethnic outgroups. There were, however, no parallel negative effects among the ethnic minority sample; thus for ethnic minority respondents a higher probability of encountering a White British person in the neighbourhood did not exert any direct effects on trust or attitudes.

Next, we looked at whether diversity exerted any indirect effects via contact and threat. For both groups, we found that

diversity was consistently associated with *more* contact, and contact with *lower* threat. This then resulted in diversity being indirectly, and positively, associated with greater trust for members of one's ingroup, members of ethnic outgroups, and neighbours. When we then considered the *overall* effects of diversity we did not, by and large, witness negative effects of diversity. Our results thus suggest that the positive indirect effects via contact cancelled out any initial negative direct effects of diversity on trust.

This impact of contact came as no surprise. A meta-analysis of over 500 studies on intergroup contact (published by Thomas F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp in 2006) revealed beyond doubt that positively-toned contact is negatively related to prejudice, an effect that occurs across different social groups (including groups based on ethnicity, disability, and sexual orientation), settings (neighbourhoods, schools, and work places) and a raft of outcomes.⁵ More refined research has also shown *how* contact works – by reducing anxiety, promoting empathy, and improving knowledge – and *when* – when we see outgroup partners as true representatives of their groups, rather than ‘exceptions’.

Two further developments have shown that the potential of contact is even greater than we originally thought. First, notwithstanding the evidence that direct, face-to-face contact works, it is limited by our opportunities for contact. This is where *extended contact* comes in – we are influenced by knowing or observing that fellow members of our ingroup have outgroup friends. Research has consistently shown that, controlling for levels of direct or face-to-face contact, people who know, or observe, fellow ingroup members with outgroup friends have lower levels of prejudice. This effect can be explained, in part, by changing our perceived norms about what kinds of behaviour (e.g. mixing) are socially approved by valued others.⁶

A second development concerns so-called ‘secondary transfer’ effects of contact. Perhaps the most impressive evidence that contact matters comes from recent studies showing that contact with one outgroup reduces prejudice towards other outgroups. We have shown, for example, that for Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, contact with the other

community is associated with reduced prejudice towards racial minorities measured one year later.⁷

And in a unique cross-sectional sample of the general population drawn from eight European countries (with 7042 respondents), we demonstrated the relationship between intergroup contact with immigrants, and attitudes towards not only immigrants, but also two quite unrelated outgroups (Jews and homosexuals).⁸ This form of generalisation shows that contact can be a very efficient and powerful means of improving intergroup relations in increasingly diverse and cosmopolitan societies.

Steven Vertovec has coined the term ‘super-diversity’ to refer to areas such as Newham and Haringey in London, which are home to people from hundreds of different ethnic backgrounds.⁹ In such settings contact would be of limited value if it merely transferred from meeting members of one ethnic outgroup to attitudes towards only that outgroup. Instead, it generalises *across* groups. Contact helps people to become better cosmopolitans.

‘Why can’t we live together?’ asked Timmy Thomas in a famous song. The answer is that we can and do; and where we do, positive contact is the essential glue of integration.

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Notes

- 1 Allport, G W, *The nature of prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954.

- 2 Putnam, R E, Pluribus unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century. The 2006 Jonathan Skytte prize lecture. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 30, 137–174, 2007.
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- 4 Alesina, A and La Ferrara, E, Who trusts others? *Journal of Public Economics*, 85, 207–234, 2002.
- 5 Pettigrew, T F and Tropp, L T, A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 90: 751–783, 2006.
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- 8 Schmid, K, Hewstone, M, Küpper, B, Zick, A and Wagner, U, Secondary transfer effects of intergroup contact: a cross-national comparison in Europe, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 75, 28–51, 2012.
- 9 Vertovec, S, Super-diversity and its implications. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 29, 1024–1054, 2007.

5 Making it happen 2: institutions

Jon Yates

It is clear that Britain is becoming an increasingly diverse country. However, much is missed in that short statement. Firstly, ethnicity is a large part of this story (according to Migration Observatory, Britain is set to become the second most ethnically diverse country in the OECD by 2050) but it is only one part. It is as much about age diversity; an ageing population and high birth rate mean that forty years from now half of our population will be either a teen or a pensioner.

It is also about income diversity; globalisation of labour and the increasing ability of computers to replace low-income jobs are likely to further increase the gap between rich and poor. Secondly, just as significant as the increase in diversity, has been the decline in institutions that bring together and mix people of different ages, income and background. At a time of increasing diversity, it is institutions that offer us the best way to ensure a more integrated society.

Firstly, it is important we define some terms. Integration is too often seen as a question about those on the margins – a question of how we reach out to the least engaged, the smallest minority, the recent migrant. In fact, in a richly diverse country, integration is now a question for the mainstream, about the mainstream. It is a question about the set of contacts and friendships that all citizens have and the gaps that exist in these networks between rich and poor, black and white, old and young. It is a question for each city, each village, each street, each family.

In policy terms, it is now no longer a question relevant only to the Home Office or Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG). It is a question for the Department for Education (DfE) – who presently oversees an education system where half of all children on free school meals are educated

together in just 20 per cent of the schools – hardly a recipe for building the networks that will help these young people find work.

It is a question for the Treasury and Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) whose work to increase employment is significantly challenged by a dis-integrated society where most unemployed people have friends who are mostly out of work. It is also a question for the Department of Health; efforts to address elderly well-being are mostly about reducing isolation. But when half of our elderly say that their main companion is the television this is not a failure of the health service, it is a failure of integration – it is a failure of intergenerational friendships.

What then are institutions and what role do they play? Most simply, institutions are places where people from different sections of society come together regularly and build trust. For many of us we may think of the kind of community meeting points which became so prominent in the Victorian era: not only schools and churches, but also trade unions, working men's clubs, the Women's Institute, the Scouts and Guides. At their peak these groups brought together large segments of the population on a regular basis. Trade unions mixed citizens by age and income up and down the country. Local churches brought whole communities of all ages and incomes together.

But even if institutions can physically bring people together, how do they build a more integrated society? A more integrated society is one where we trust each other more, no matter what our background. Research has shown us that one of the main drivers of trust of those from different age-groups, ethnicities or income brackets is whether you have had a positive experience meeting someone from this group. A positive experience with someone from another group makes you more trusting not only of the one individual you have met but in fact the group they are from as a whole.

Whether it's our capacity for empathy, or our tendency towards generalisations, positive experiences with one member of a group increase our opinion of that group in general – even if we define that group as broadly as just 'foreigners' or 'old people'. Research has even shown that having positive contact

with people from a different background not only increases your trust of that specific group, it actually increases your trust of other groups generally; in other words if a Pole meets a Hungarian and has a positive experience, they are more likely to trust a German.

This is where institutions are critical. When they work, institutions create spaces where contact takes place. The bad news is that not all contact is positive. To build a more integrated society we need to build institutions that don't just bring people together but do so in 'the right way'. So what is 'the right way'?

Let me suggest three key criteria. Firstly, individuals must feel on an equal footing – where they feel neither superior nor inferior to others they meet. This approach can be contrasted with 'the wrong kind' of contact that we might find in prisons – where guards and prisoners may be experiencing contact across diverse groups but it is far from on an equal footing. Secondly, individuals should feel they are part of a common project – excellent community or youth work often starts and succeeds on this principle. Contrast this with poorly run residential homes – where residents feel they are the project rather than being part of it.

Thirdly, institutions must be seen as accessible to multiple groups. A lack of integration often occurs because institutions are seen as exclusive. Whether schools, churches, or sports clubs, an institution fails as a vehicle for integration if it is seen as 'not really for the likes of you'. This reveals a guiding principle of sorts: an ideal institution must be marketable and attractive to multiple segments of a population.

What is promising is that we know that it is possible to develop new institutions that meet these three criteria: equality, common purpose and diversity. The charity I co-founded – The Challenge – was set up for this very purpose.

Our first institution – the National Citizen Service – has mixed over 50,000 young people of all incomes and ethnicities over the last three years. 17 per cent of our participants are on free school meals, 8 per cent from private schools; 65 per cent are from an ethnic minority, 35 per cent are white; all participants are 15-17 years old and most take on projects with people who are

much younger or much older. It has achieved this mix by ensuring all groups can afford to take part, all groups are considered when the marketing plan is devised and all activities are designed with a mix of participants in mind. The result? Participants' levels of trust of others rise by the end of the two-month programme and remain higher one year on.

Achieving this same inclusivity in existing institutions is critical. This may require creativity: flexible opening hours, better disabled and elderly access, bursaries or scholarships and in a small number of cases quotas or financial incentives. Above us – it requires a good marketing plan based on a proper understanding of why different groups will want to join the institution.

Another challenge will come in making sure our institutions are scalable – both in demand and supply. On the supply side, we must design new institutions with scale in mind – are we building a brand that will last, are we building a long-term funding model, are we designing something that will work in different parts of the country? This means accepting that we need to be prepared to think top-down about community development as well as from the grassroots. On the demand side, we need to ensure that we design institutions that people genuinely want to join. We cannot assume that 'if we build it, they will come'.

One great example of building around people's desires is the GoodGym – a local sports club that offers young professionals a chance to ensure they do exercise by arranging a running route that ends at the house of an elderly citizen who is expecting their visit. Organised centrally and designed around a genuine consumer need – this is integration designed for scale. Another example of building for long-term sustainability is Headstart – a social action programme that incentivises young people to volunteer by guaranteeing them an interview for a part-time job. Corporates find that young people who complete the volunteering are more job-ready than their standard candidate – which reduces their cost of recruitment and in turn helps fund the institution's growth.

The debate on the need for more integration is broadly over. The key debate today is not if but how. How do we build a more integrated society? – by age, income and ethnicity. This is the same debate our ancestors – the Victorians – faced. As their country was transformed by a surging birth-rate, growing inequality and fast urbanisation they faced a society in danger of social fracture. Their response was to build a series of institutions where people of all ages, backgrounds and incomes came together, were treated with a degree of equality and took part in a common purpose. It is time for us to do the same.

Jon Yates is co-founder and Strategy Director of The Challenge.

6 Making it happen 3: schools

Simon Burgess

Schools in England are ethnically segregated, shown by an ongoing research programme at Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO) at the University of Bristol.¹ We have shown that the degree of segregation varies by ethnicity and by location, and we have illustrated that schools do not dilute the residential segregation of the neighbourhood, but rather tend to strengthen it. (The latest patterns in school segregation are discussed by Rich Harris of CMPO in another piece in this collection.)

It seems likely that the ethnic composition of a school will affect its pupils' views, though a robust causal study to show this would be hard to implement. If one pupil only ever meets pupils of her own ethnicity then it is very difficult to form an open-minded attitude to other groups, and very easy to believe stories about them which may or may not be true.

This is wonderfully illustrated by the following quote from a school twinning programme. A primary school head teacher in Huddersfield ran a school in which 92 per cent of pupils were of Pakistani heritage. She said: 'Some of our children live their lives without meeting someone from another culture until they go to high school or even the workplace. They can grow up with such a lot of misconceptions and prejudices.' Illustrating the myths that can arise and survive in an environment where you simply never meet people from other groups, she added: 'Our pupils think it's amazing that they [white kids] like pizza too.'² Everyone eats pizza, every child eats pizza; for a group of pupils to believe that pupils of a different ethnicity do not eat pizza is essentially to say they have nothing in common at all.

What can be done?³ The first step to an answer is to see that segregation is a process; it's not just a characteristic at a point in time, it has a history. And to attempt to influence school

segregation, it helps to understand that process. One of the most widely used approaches is the model of Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling.⁴ This dealt with residential segregation but the same principles apply to school sorting.

Briefly, the model traces out the implications of a rule whereby everyone moves to another location (neighbourhood, school) if they are unhappy with the racial composition of their current location. The contribution of the research is to show that even fairly liberal neighbourhood preferences can rapidly lead to a completely segregated outcome. The basic approach is very simple and lends itself very nicely to simulation: there are many public websites where you can set up a model society with specific preferences and watch neighbourhood segregation arise.⁵

One of the key results is a disconnect between individual preferences and social outcomes: just a small degree of preference for living among one's own 'type' can generate a completely segregated outcome; an outcome more segregated than any one person would individually want. In the jargon of economics, there are externalities in this process: my action in moving school changes the composition of schools and thereby affects the decisions of others in those schools. This is why the social outcome may not reflect individual preferences.

Given ten years of pupil data in England, we can watch the process of ethnic change in school intakes happen (this is ongoing work at CMPO). London is particularly interesting with new groups continually refreshing the population. But in some places the process of segregation has largely been completed. Oldham has one of the highest levels of school segregation in England; in our original work, it had the highest of all. It was also a site of riots in 2001 between ethnic groups.⁶

The town is beginning a bold project to break out of this segregation by offering a brand new ethnically-mixed school to parents. This may be the only way to change things: once in a segregated equilibrium, no one individual can change the situation through her own action, and some form of collective response is needed.

Waterhead Academy is a secondary school sponsored by Oldham College, and has an ethnically mixed intake (45 per cent of the pupils are of Pakistani heritage, and nearly 40 per cent are White British).⁷ The hope is that there are parents who would prefer a mixed school if one were offered, and that the school will thrive and have an impact on other schools in the town. It began on split sites in 2010 and moved into a single new site in 2012. Alun Francis, the Principal of Oldham College, told me that the plan was to focus on the pupils, the things they had in common, providing a good school experience and trying to allay the anxieties of the parents. While the Ofsted visit in March 2013 noted that exam performance required improvement, it highlighted good behaviour from the pupils, and respect and openness around faith issues. While these are obviously early days, Francis told me he was cautiously optimistic.

Of course, being in the same school building is just a start. Friendship groups are obviously important, and the development of a place where pupils from different ethnic groups can simply hang out together in a relaxed way when the supervising presence of teachers is absent. But it is a start and possibly the only way that a segregated equilibrium can be escaped: the eyes of many other communities will undoubtedly be on Waterhead Academy.

At least the pupils are now eating pizza together.

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Notes

- 1 The first paper was *Ethnic Segregation in England's Schools*, Burgess and Wilson, 2003, CMPO Working Paper no 86, <http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/workingpapers/wp86.pdf>. Since then, the programme has produced a substantial number of research papers and conferences.
- 2 Reported in *Times Educational Supplement* 27/06/08

- 3 A prior question which I do not have space to address here is: should anything be done?
- 4 Schelling, Thomas C, 1971, 'Dynamic Models of Segregation', vol. 1, pp. 143 – 186
- 5 See for example, 'Schelling's segregation model', MIT, available at <http://web.mit.edu/rajsingh/www/lab/alife/schelling.html> or 'The Schelling Segregation Model', available at <http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/demos/schelling/schellhp.htm>
- 6 'Special report: Oldham Riots - 10 years on', Manchester Evening News, available at: <http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/special-report-oldham-riots---861337>
- 7 See <http://www.waterheadacademy.co.uk/>

7 Tough at the top: the glass ceiling problem

Shamit Saggar

Most of the attention concerning immigrant integration is devoted to problems at the bottom of society. This is understandable given that Britain's post-war immigrants have had, for the most part, poorer educational and employment profiles than natives. But it means that problems of equality and opportunity at the top of the tree sometimes get overlooked.

This essay looks at the problems associated with ethnic penalties in the professions, and other high reward/status sectors, and the extent to which these are due to persistent discrimination or to other factors. (And we should bear in mind that one problem here is lack of reliable data.) I will also look at things from the perspective of one runaway successful group, Indians, to assess what has gone well for them and what still holds back further gains.

Ethnic penalties

A decade ago, the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit produced a groundbreaking report, 'Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market', which pointed to an ethnic penalty suffered by Black, Pakistani and Bangladeshi men in particular, in some instances leaving them with unemployment risks twice or thrice their white peers—alongside unexplained earnings shortfalls of between £100–150 per week. Although this was not direct evidence of discrimination, it was, Tony Blair suggested, a heavy hint.

But among Indian men a different picture emerged. Although this group boasted parity of earnings (and similar odds of being out of work) with their white counterparts, it overlooked the fact that they were, on average, rather better educated, skilled and experienced. The analysis showed that they should have been doing between 5-15 per cent better on earnings alone.

This unexpected finding was not lost on the PM. It was clear that some minorities were getting less than their due. The report pointed to waiters in Indian restaurants holding PhDs and so on. There was potential here for people from successful minorities to grow frustrated and disillusioned.

At about the same time, Colin Powell, the visiting black US Secretary of State, was described as exactly the kind of success at the top that Britain conspicuously lacked. And a former Canadian High Commissioner to London boasted that, after the passage of one generation, the returns to all migrants in Canada's labour market were free of ethnic penalties.

Sir David Bell, a former boss of Ofsted, once spoke enthusiastically about the fact that girls overall outpaced boys in the compulsory schooling system. But he then paused to share his fear that their gender premium was the minimum that would be needed to offset the effects of sex discrimination in employment. Their success, in other words, was a 'bittersweet' one and parallels the pressures facing successful minorities.

On the other side of the ledger there is now solid evidence of several large minorities matching or doing better, on average, in educational and employment outcomes than the white majority. This is the big empirical finding that few experts foresaw a generation ago. One reason for the failure to spot this trend is that, partly for political reasons, the analysts of race always lumped together post-war immigrants and their children under the 'ethnic minority' banner believing they shared more in common with other minorities than they ever would with the majority white community. That is now a dated picture.

Adjusting for generation and educational starting points, it is only in the past 15–20 years that some minorities have had the opportunity to challenge for the very top jobs on any scale. So how well are they doing, and what are the 'glass ceiling' problems that are emerging?

Ingredients of success at the top

In the case of migrants and minorities, the main drivers of success continue to be very similar to those of natives. Schooling,

support networks and career management skills are all vital to access high reward and high status sectors. But, beneath this layer sits another set of factors that disproportionately shape choice and opportunity—geography, gender and generation, the three Gs.

In the case of geography some minorities originally settled in parts of the country that have weathered regional economic adjustments better than others. The Pakistani community is concentrated in northern, industrial England, and has been disproportionately exposed to poor labour demand as a result. Indians, by contrast, have benefited from a London/south-east effect that has not only cushioned long-term change but also placed them in close proximity to the capital's outperforming sectors.

But while place matters, even somewhere like London contains significant variations. Access to transport is a circumstantial factor affecting London ethnic groups, white and non-white, so the exact path of tube line extensions and cross-city new routes is a pivotal, yet hidden, aspect of who is best placed to get ahead.

But geographic effects are also felt in other ways, including the relative segregation of groups in different parts of the country. Other parts of this volume are devoted to this question but it is worth stressing that, regardless of the ethnic plurality of the neighbourhoods favoured by minorities, the bigger test lies in first, their willingness and ability to access the widest set of job opportunities, and second, their capabilities in navigating careers once they have achieved initial opportunities. There is scant evidence to suggest that residential segregation as such alters this equation greatly.

However, the opposite phenomenon needs greater investigation, namely when minorities are as mobile as others in moving to take up new opportunities in, say, the job magnets represented by the M4, M40, M3, M5, M23 and M11 motorway corridors. Their mobility certainly adds to their strength and resilience in the labour market. What is not known are how economic opportunities then lead, indirectly, to a greater likelihood of new personal identities and emotional outlooks.

Eric Kaufmann's timely essay in this volume notes that these minorities are only too aware of this, choosing, where they can, to enter new areas that are less ethnically diverse than where they came from but equally not snow-white cul-de-sacs.

On gender, it goes without saying that higher levels of female economic activity are a major factor in helping minorities avoid poverty and access better opportunities. It is one feature of the Pakistani community that has changed only modestly and it hampers its ability to get ahead economically. Once more, Indians report exceptionally high rates of female employment driving significantly better outcomes.

And the advancement of minorities is often very sector-specific. Like America, the biggest headway in Britain has been made in the public sector. Almost a decade ago, Michael Portillo, the former Tory minister, acknowledged that his party had been too harsh in attacking some of the public sector's equal opportunities processes. Equally, the last ten years have seen academia start to deliver a substantial breakthrough for certain minorities, first as undergraduate and postgraduate students and latterly as junior and senior faculty.

The legal and medical professions have remained important bellwethers in gauging progress. The solicitors' progression is striking: out of 130,000 practice certificate holders, 12.6 per cent were from black and minority ethnic backgrounds in 2012, with South Asians making up more than half this figure. The pipeline is even more striking: BMEs made up almost 40 per cent of student trainees in 2012.

Glass ceilings and reputational concerns

In looking at how well or poorly groups are doing 'at the top', it is important to consider the gatekeeper, tipping point and critical mass effects of higher education and changes among the traditional professions. But it is tempting to overdo this and crowd out the more structural factors that have played a big part in why certain groups have outshone.

The balance between the structural and the cultural is a delicate one. 'Model minorities' have come in for special

attention by some observers who stress the centrality of individual and group aspirational values and pro-educational dispositions. Accordingly, East African Asians tend to be admired for their cultural attributes while the more objective assets that they brought with them including English as the lingua franca, previous urbanisation and white-collar employment, tend to be downplayed.

Regardless of how they have found their way to the top professions, how are they doing once there? Medicine and the law offer somewhat contrasting pictures. Medicine's professional self-governing structures have sometimes struggled to keep pace with the demand for training places among aspirational minorities increasingly geared towards highly prized medical sub-disciplines such as cardiology and neurology. The image of medicine also suffers from the notorious case of one London medical school, St George's that operated a quota to limit minorities' access to places. That case is indirectly linked to current controversies over the disproportionate over-representation of minority doctors among the GMC's misconduct and disciplinary affairs committees.

In the law a turbulent past has now given way to a generally more positive professional culture in which gender diversity has helped clear the way for minorities. As we have seen, there are very high current levels of minority recruitment into the profession and an arms-length sector watchdog, the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), which has enshrined diversity outcomes within its new regulatory framework.¹ Set against this, there remains patchy success outcomes in terms of minority recruitment to top City law firms and partner status.

But the biggest cloud cannot be ignored: a five-year, ongoing dispute centred on claims that the sector's own regulator not only disproportionately picks up allegations of poor practice and misconduct among minority lawyers but that it has internalised negative stereotypes in the judgements of its investigatory staff.

A large number of ethnic minority lawyers still work in small and thus less profitable high street practices. Their exposure to the fragile end of the sector means that the regulator

disproportionately scrutinises them when it comes to poor service standards and/or issues of conduct. That same regulator now requires all solicitor firms to produce annual submissions on their diversity profile, creating a fresh driver of change through transparency. We can expect close interrogation of these data in the future alongside ongoing scrutiny of judicial appointments where progress has been slow.

‘People like us’

While the evidence is far from definitive about who is at or on their way to the top, it is clear that considerable change is under way. The question relates to my opening point, namely, should these successful minorities be doing even better than they are? And what is the role of culture in shaping choice, orientation and decisions?

There has been a steady colonisation of fee-paying education by Indians. In some parts of the community there is an awareness of the importance of soft skills, employment awareness, internships, volunteering, flexibility and overall active career management. These traits are virtually hardwired into the bulk of middle class Indians and many others like them. And factors such as geography, transport, female attainment, and so on serve to reinforce advantage.

It may be that Indians first, and others in due course, are absorbing the lessons of how to get on in the changing economy. Once breakthroughs in highly prized sectors and strata are achieved, tipping points can follow. Others coming up the ranks see ‘people like us’. Appointing and favouring those like us may be a useful way of breaking glass ceilings.

Mapping integration at the top

In conclusion: we need to pay attention not just to what happens to immigrants and minorities, group by group, but also from one sector to another and on the way up. Thus, in parts of the high reward, high status private sector, there have been sizeable pockets of success at the top that roughly compares with the

impressive scale of change in senior management ranks in the public sector. And we also now have insights about how these outcomes have been secured, as well as a relevant few tips from when things have gone awry.

There are many factors contributing to professional, white-collar success but certain ‘insider’ advantages still tend to reside disproportionately with middle class whites. Those who have interned with national think-tanks, newspapers and PR firms are advantaged as compared with those who have not.

In the long run the top matters as much as the bottom or middle, not least because of what it says about the openness of these ranks to immigrant offspring. Britain is a country that, somewhat absent-mindedly, subscribes to a liberal core value, namely that the tools of achievement and progression should be equally available to everyone. Any evidence that ethnic or migrant background reduces opportunity is, and must remain, a serious matter and priority to be tackled. In past decades many immigrants put up with poor treatment in the sincere belief that unfairness would not stand in the way of their children. That is the implicit bargain struck with first generation migrants and it has yet to be honoured in full, for all.

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Notes

- 1 Declaration: the author is a current board member of the SRA.

8 Race and the tragedy of British education

Katharine Birbalsingh

The traditional model of teaching where the teacher stands at the front of the classroom and imparts knowledge, with desks in rows, pupils facing forward, has been under attack since the days of Rousseau and increasingly in the last 50 years. Teachers and laymen alike often believe that we are still educating our children in this system. But we are not. Progressive teaching methods have become the norm.

In most classrooms, the teacher is a ‘facilitator of learning,’ moving among grouped desks, helping children to stay on task with a set project while they ‘discover’ their learning. Rarely does the teacher stand at the front and teach. The idea behind this is that having children co-manage their own learning should inspire children to be more creative, drawing out, à la Rousseau, something from inside the child.

Progressive teaching methods sound seductive. But when one observes their reality in the classroom, it is hard to defend them. Put simply, it is hard for a child to be creative when he has little in his head to be creative with. Traditionalists or knowledge advocates believe it is by giving the child knowledge and allowing him to manipulate that knowledge that he will become creative and learn how to think.

The subjects that have been most influenced by progressive, or child-centred teaching methods as it is often referred to, are English, history and geography. Progressive teaching methods ensure History is too often taught as unconnected stand-alone events or people in order to teach pupils certain skills, like being able to infer or justify one’s point of view. Lessons tend to have a moral tale at the end. Children are asked how they would feel if they had to live through various

times in history, and the content of what is being taught is of less importance. This is meant to teach children empathy. But it is hard to empathise with something one knows little about. Knowledge, surely, must come first.

But Britain seems to have embraced this idea of teaching skills over knowledge more than any other country, apart from the USA. Interestingly, both the UK and the USA perform poorly in global comparisons, according to international PISA tests in reading, maths and science. The UK is in 26th place in the world, while the USA is 36th. The one exception to the general demise of teaching in the USA is the state of Massachusetts, where they teach a knowledge curriculum inspired by E.D. Hirsch – a prominent critic of progressive education.

It is often argued that funding levels for education or the quality of the intake of children are central to educational outcomes. They are obviously relevant factors. But is it only about funding and intake? By Pisa's world standards, Estonia is in 11th place, Poland 14th and Slovenia 21st, all with a greater number of far poorer children, all with education budgets that are tiny in comparison to the near-£90 billion the UK spends per year on its education system. So perhaps it is something else. One common characteristic among countries that do well by international standards is that they tend to teach traditionally. Knowledge is at their core.

Why does Britain insist on using teaching methods that just don't work? And why would teachers, who have seen how these methods fail in their classrooms, be so reluctant to let them go?

There is clearly a whole jumble of reasons to consider but many of them stem from the particular form of Britain's liberal pedagogical revolution in the 1960s and 1970s. This revolution challenged what was then seen as a hierarchical and authoritarian form of teaching and thinking in the name of equality and creativity. The liberal reformers stressed not only that all human lives are of equal value, regardless of race, gender and class, but all of us have creativity and ability within us that just needs to be released by the teacher.

These ideas overlapped with the anti-racism struggle that was emerging at the same time. Indeed, I believe that one reason

progressive teaching methods established such deep roots in Britain is because of this entanglement with race. Ethnic minority children were seen as particularly disadvantaged by traditional methods that came to be seen as oppressive, imperialist and racist.

Fast forward to 2002. In that year Diane Abbott did something extraordinary. She established a yearly conference called London Schools and the Black Child, under Ken Livingstone, the then Mayor of London. Then, in 2011 under Boris Johnson's leadership, a different sort of Black Child conference was put on by city hall, without the support of Diane Abbott. It attracted less than one fifth of the black families that had previously attended Abbott's conferences. While the speakers spoke eloquently about the same issues, they spoke with a different emphasis. Among others, Tony Sewell (CEO of Generating Genius, a charity that helps bright black boys get into Russell Group universities), Lindsay Johns (who works with black youngsters in a Peckham mentoring programme) and Michael Gove (current Education Secretary) all spoke from the right, or at least not from the left. As such, some black families felt the conference could not really be for them.

Not only did much of the black community boycott the 2011 conference organised by Boris Johnson, but some blacks were so outraged by current education policy that they stood outside the conference protesting. Led by Lee Jasper (Ken Livingstone's race and policing adviser), the protestors held placards saying, 'We don't want Latin. We want opportunity.'

Many people might have assumed that learning Latin simply is opportunity. When one learns English, maths, science at school, future doors open. It should be obvious. But speak to many leaders of the black community in Britain and indeed to most teachers and they will all agree that Michael Gove is a bad man. He's bad, it would seem, because he wants British children, whatever their colour, to learn traditional knowledge at school. He wants all children, not just rich white children to access an old-fashioned education that will make them culturally literate. Gove wants them educated enough to one day choose their careers rather than lose out on a job opportunity to a young

recent immigrant whose English is a second language but who speaks it better than they do. But still they protest.

Is it simply because Michael Gove is a Tory? In part I think it is. Most black Britons continue to regard Tories as inherently unsympathetic to them (despite the fact that many black people hold deeply socially conservative views). But in part it is because they reject what they see as an education system that has historically marginalised their children. While Gove's position on knowledge is inspirational and right, neither Gove nor any of the knowledge advocates recognise sufficiently the historical legacy of our education system and the misrepresentation of ethnic people in our old history books. 'Latin' is a symbol of that out-of-date, unrepresentative, racist regime. As is the recent, failed, attempt not to include Mary Seacole—the 'black Florence Nightingale'—in the history curriculum.

The liberal reformers were right about one thing. By the 1970s and 1980s there was a growing sense that the old narratives no longer reflected the diversity of modern Britain, if indeed they ever had. *Our Island Story* is an example of a book used in schools some 50 years ago. While it gives a coherent and chronological analysis of history, it also paints Britain as the saviour of the colonised world. Africans and Asians are considered happy to have been civilised by Britain and never is there any recognition of their desire for self-determination. Clearly, this way of teaching history had to change.

But part of the tragedy of modern British education is that the justified rejection of this historical narrative also led to the rejection of traditional teaching, teaching which is of most value to those who have the least support at home. Traditional teaching gives knowledge to children in school who cannot otherwise access it. The very people teachers are most trying to help—the poor, the ethnic minorities—are the ones who have suffered the most from the reign of progressive teaching.

Not all of these children have the luxury of sitting at home around the dinner table, listening to their educated parents' discussions and learning historical, geographical, and scientific knowledge as they go. While most state-educated children are drawing pictures on sugar paper in groups to explore their

feelings around a historical event, children whose parents can afford £33,000 per year in fees are soaking up tons of knowledge at Eton in their history lessons as well as benefiting from their parents' influence. And the divide between the haves and the have-nots widens further.

Of course it doesn't help that David Cameron hails *Our Island Story* as his favourite book as a child without qualification. Had Cameron realised that such a statement might offend ethnic minorities, I'm sure he would not have said it. Add to this the campaign of right-leaning think tanks like Civitas to have *Our Island Story* reintroduced into schools and one can see why most ethnic minority leaders do not trust the Conservatives and believe the curriculum alienates their children.

So blacks campaign for more 'black history' to be taught and this strengthens the hold of the progressive mindset that has our teachers in shackles. The more teaching becomes progressive, the less black children and indeed all children learn in history lessons altogether. Convinced that their children don't know any black history because teaching isn't progressive enough, the blacks continue to campaign. And the vicious circle continues.

Progressive methods do not teach 'black history' properly. Dropping ethnic people, like Mary Seacole, into our history syllabus is tokenistic: it neither teaches history nor black people's genuine contribution to it, because before you can do that you need to be teaching history properly. And before you do that, we need to recover knowledge in the whole curriculum. And before we can do that, we need to address the ideology that says knowledge is oppressive because British history so often tells 'his story' and he's white.

What does black history mean anyway? Does the history of apartheid in South Africa have anything to do with the ancient kingdoms of Africa, or the speeches of Martin Luther King or the French general Thomas-Alexandre Dumas? Not really. Teaching black history in a progressive/skills curriculum is a far cry from teaching history in a knowledge curriculum that ensures that ethnic people are represented appropriately and accurately. The answer is not to give a tick list of Rosa Parks, Mary Seacole, Martin Luther King and Equiano to teachers. That exacerbates

the problem. It makes teachers and educationalists feel that the only way of teaching history in a way that accommodates all the different backgrounds in the classroom is to jump around, ignoring chronology and context, giving children bits of information here and there, making sure that some of those bits are ethnic.

Some people cannot imagine teaching a chronological, coherent and connected history of Britain that includes ethnic people. But it is possible to teach a knowledge-rich and traditional history curriculum without making ethnic people seem like passive dupes. In fact, the only way to teach black history properly is to ensure history as a whole is taught in a coherent and chronological manner with the teacher standing at the front of the class.

Teaching children knowledge, whatever their colour, will mean they will be better placed to read a broadsheet newspaper and to understand the world around them. Is knowing the history of your country racist? Are chemical bonds, magnetic forces, algebra, and the rules of French grammar racist? Is learning Latin racist? Some progressives complain in the liberal press about the idea of our children being taught Shakespeare, or grammar, or anything that sounds too old-fashioned. But they don't seem to understand that because of the lack of knowledge being taught in our schools, huge numbers of our school leavers are unable to read those very newspapers. Just under 20 per cent of our school leavers are functionally illiterate and just over 20 per cent are functionally innumerate. Worse still, some of those in the 80 per cent who are capable of decoding the words in newspapers lack the cultural and historical knowledge to understand the topics being discussed.

The purpose of teaching history according to one recent article, written by a teacher in the *Guardian*, should be 'to empower minority groups and dispel prejudice, challenging negative stereotypes'. What this teacher fails to realise is that this cannot be achieved, as is so often attempted, in a vacuum of contextual knowledge about the past. But if deep down, teachers are convinced that teaching knowledge is racist, they simply

won't teach it no matter how aware they are of the folly of skills-based lessons.

Somehow we have to figure out how to make those who are against Gove's reforms of the curriculum feel secure with tradition. Knowledge isn't oppressive or racist. It is liberating. Tradition is what has given us our most successful revolutionaries. Stokely Carmichael who led the Black Panthers and was a major figure in the civil rights movement in America dropped gang life so inspired was he at his science specialist school and so busy was he reading Darwin and Marx. Mandela went to an elite Methodist mission school. In his Dream speech, Martin Luther King alluded to the Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg Address, the Old Testament, the New Testament, and Shakespeare's Richard III. Revolutions are created with traditional thinking. All of those who stand against Gove do so thinking they are fighting oppression when in fact their stance is what anchors it.

Race plays a complex, under-considered role in preventing the change we need in our schools. The sooner we recognise that, the sooner we can begin teaching our children properly – and the sooner we'll end the educational inequality that blights this country.

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9 A decade of solidarity? Polish integration in the UK post-enlargement

Sam Scott

I am a British citizen writing about Polish integration in the UK.¹ Though I do not speak Polish and have no network of close Polish friends, my partner Dagmara is Polish. Through her, I am continually reminded, via the ebb and flow of commonalities and differences, that the world remains both large and small and that being a ‘migrant’ involves continual negotiation between multiple homes. The professional coat that my partner wears to work, for example, means that she is a more knowledgeable architect in English (the language of her advanced training) than in Polish: and would need to retrain were she ever to want to practice architecture in Poland.

Her social coat is truly technicolor: Dagmara has more international but less British friends than I and is in regular contact via Skype with family back in Poland. Then there is her cultural coat: this is insulated with threads from home – the occasional Polish meal, the frustration with the Polish football team, a residual interest in Polish current affairs – but a lot of warmth now comes from international and British cultural reference points. In short, she is integrated in the UK but retains a hybrid, transnational social identity and has become part of an international social and professional milieu.

The Polish are now the most common foreign nationality in the UK and the Polish-born population is now 579,000 (up from 58,000 over the 2001–2011 census period).² The half-million plus Polish community is very heterogeneous but my single example shows how integration can and does occur without the complete loss of cultural references to one’s homeland. Dagmara’s form of integration – some host country bridging capital and some international migrant bonding capital but relatively little co-

ethnic bonding (to use Robert Putnam's now famous terminology) – is not the conventional pattern of migrant settlement.

However, it seems to be becoming an emerging integration paradigm for migrants enmeshed within middle-class professional spheres, and especially those in mixed-nationality relationships and/or international workplaces. My experience is also not unusual: mixed-nationality relationships mean that there are now up to 3 million people in the UK of mixed ethnicity constituting the largest and fastest growing ethnic group.³

Does the same type of integration happen in the low-wage workplace and amongst those living within mono-national households? Well, partly it does. The English-speaking Poles have joined the British low-wage service economy *en masse* and work alongside native citizens. Though they may or may not get on socially, there is no narrow ethnic enclave economy where migrants remain hidden and isolated from British-born workers.

This said, language is undoubtedly key and outside of the front of shop service work, there are jobs where Polish might be the only language spoken. My fieldwork, for instance, has taken me to farms and food processing plants where workers are organised into language groups: with only the leader of these teams able to speak fluent English. The point here is that workers least able to integrate will also be those most likely to be hidden from public view because of the way in which language determines their employment opportunities (see also White, 2011: 138). Moreover, many jobs for Polish migrants, especially those with limited language skills, remain temporary and this lack of security in employment (and thus also housing) is all too often associated with a 'toe in the water' approach to life in the UK.

Where there is concern about Polish integration, then, it is specific to workers limited to low-wage jobs unable to speak enough English to progress socially or professionally and often employed on insecure contracts living in marginalised private rented housing (Markova and Black, 2007: 66). Even here, though, there is room for some optimism. Historical precedents, for example, suggest that the current influx from Poland will not cause politicians to re-visit the question of 'parallel lives' and 'failed multiculturalism'.⁴

There have been, albeit modest, Polish influxes before (for example see the early work of Dr Kathy Burrell at the University of Liverpool) and there have also been much larger low-wage Catholic migrant influxes (from Ireland). In the case of both the historic Polish and Irish communities integration has simply not been a major problem into the second and third generations. Correspondingly, we have not seen the persistence of spatial segregation amongst the historic Polish and Irish communities and, in many cases, surnames and the occasional family ancestral holiday remain the only lingering traces of a migrant past.

Whether or not the current mass of low-wage Polish workers remain rooted to the bottom of the UK labour market, whether they stay in the UK over the long-term, and the extent to which their children follow their employment lead remain, however, open questions. Certainly the employers I spoke to during the course of field research felt that the low-wage Poles were doing more than enough professionally to prove themselves worthy workers (Scott, 2013a, 2013b).

The question is whether this effort will pay off: will it lead to social mobility either for them or deferred for their children? In this sense, questions of integration are bound up in questions of intergenerational social mobility (and immobility). It is also worth noting here, in respect to the prospects for upward mobility, that the Polish community in the UK is in a particularly strong position: being both youthful and well-educated (Fihel and Kaczmarczyk, 2009: 34–36).

An additional integration factor is the nature and configuration of migrant families (for example see the work of Professor Louise Ryan at Middlesex University). There are certainly many Poles in the UK temporarily who have clear family commitments back home that they plan to return to, eventually. Ryan et al (2009), for example, note how the Poles they spoke to in London were on the whole ‘uncertain about how long they would remain in Britain and when or even if they would return to Poland’. This sense of being ‘in limbo’ is common to most first generation migrants and is fundamentally bound up with the split location of one’s closest friends and family. Simply put, it is difficult to commit to a host country,

irrespective of whether one is a professional middle-class or a low-wage migrant, when one remains tied to family back in the home country.

Integration is also fundamentally influenced by one's residential geography. In the UK few migrants live in mono-national or mono-ethnic ghettos but many Poles do now live in what have been termed 'global neighbourhoods' (Logan and Zhang, 2010). The emergence of such neighbourhoods is important because they do offer more of an opportunity for mixing than the ghetto. The question is whether this mixing occurs, and, whether there are route ways up and out of the more deprived global neighbourhoods?

Integration, then, can have an important spatial component and there is an urgent need for more attention to be directed towards the increasingly global neighbourhoods that now house new migrant communities. Specifically, do such neighbourhoods offer an opportunity for all groups to learn to live together, or, are they home to new forms of ghettoisation whereby the majority continue to avoid such areas and/or the diverse groups living within them remain socially and culturally separate from each other. Anecdotally, for example, one hears of inter-ethnic rivalry and community tensions especially when new arrivals appear to be competing with established minorities for resources like housing, employment, education and health.

Overall, integration is something that, ten years on from EU enlargement, cannot yet be proclaimed to have succeeded or failed as far as the Polish are concerned. What is clear is that there are many Polish migrants living in the UK with a strong return orientation – possibly though a 'myth of return' (Anwar, 1979) – and that this tends to be strong amongst those with limited English-language skills, in insecure employment, living in all Polish households.

In addition, there is a particular important group of Polish 'commuter migrants' (though they are officially not 'migrants' *per se*) i.e. those coming to the UK over the short-term for a period of less than 12 but more than one month. Indeed, the UK Government's openness to immigration from the EU was very much linked to the idea that it would be a 'turnstile' form of

migration (Sriskandarajah *et al.*, 2008) rather than permanent settlement. In 2006, for instance, a staggering 221,000 Poles came to the UK for a period of between 1 to 12 months and, even though this figure had fallen to 84,000 by 2010, the Poles still form one of the most important commuter migrant groups (second only to commuter migrants from the USA) (Vargas-Silva, 2012: 6–7).

A further temporal aspect to Polish integration in the UK revolves around the new Polish community's relationship with the established post-war Polish migrant community. This relationship has certainly not been as clear-cut or positive as might have been expected and whilst recent Polish migrants have been attracted to areas of the country that in the past also attracted Polish migrants, the two communities have experienced a complex, uneven and at best partial rapprochement. As Garapich (2007: 10) observes:

Every researcher will hear from members of the old Polish diaspora in the UK an identity statement similar to the one expressed by an eighty year old lady in a letter to the Polish Daily, the newspaper catering to this diaspora: 'We are different, we came from a country that does not exist any more'. These kinds of statement are constantly made at meetings, in the press, and even through the Church. They are always accompanied by a mainly negative description of newcomers.

Thus, it seems that shared national identity may unite migrants in some contexts but in others there are more enduring social fissures (such as age and generation) that get in the way.

These temporal dimensions to integration underline the dangers of generalising. It is simply not acceptable to talk of Polish integration in the singular and this is as true socially as it is temporally. Most notably, Polish migrants in mixed-nationality households, those in English-speaking and largely British or international workplaces and the children of Polish migrants all generally experience high levels of integration.

In contrast, evidence shows that those within all-Polish households, especially housewives and househusbands who are not engaged in paid employment, are the least integrated (White,

2011: 165). Within the EU at least, integration is a function of personal circumstance more than the aggregate comparative characteristics of particular national groups (Poles versus British, French versus British etc.). Granted, outside the EU, where the identity frontiers are wider, and where the legal context is different, this argument may be less applicable.

The Poles, though, can bring their families to the UK much more easily than non-EU migrants. They have free labour market access. They can commit over the long-term to life in the UK without the need to acquire citizenship. They are now entitled to welfare services should they fall upon hard times. Moreover, they are a less visible migrant community likely to experience less discrimination and fewer integration barriers as a result. These facilitating factors, wrapped up within membership of the EU, mean that the Polish experience of integration is likely to be less structurally constrained and more personally diverse and fragmentary than for many non-EU communities.

The big question for the future concerns second generation Poles emerging out of the 2004 EU enlargement migration. The second generation (if historic precedents are anything to go by) are unlikely to remain culturally distinct, but will they remain within the kind of low-wage agricultural and service work of their migrant parents? Moreover, if they do experience upward social and spatial mobility (as seems likely) then who will then take their parents' place at the bottom of the UK labour market? In other words, where next for the UK's low-wage labour markets?

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Notes

- 1 For an official definition of 'integration' see Ager and Strang (2004). Compare this to White's (2011: 138-9) notion of 'sufficient integration'.
- 2 See: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_310441.pdf

- 3 See: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15164970>
- 4 The term 'parallel lives' come from the 2001 Cattle report (see especially page 9).

10 White exit and how to stop it

Eric Kaufmann

Is there white flight in Britain? 2011 census results, released at the end of 2012, astounded many: in London, the white British share of the population dropped from 58 to 45 per cent. At a time when the capital's economy was roaring and the city added a million to its ranks, its population of white British people nosedived by 620,000. More than that, white British population losses seemed greater in more diverse areas such as Redbridge or Newham. Across the country, places that gained minority population seemed to lose white British and vice versa – 38 local authorities made the top 50 for greatest minority gain and largest white British loss, with Birmingham in first place. Is this, as some headlines suggest, the 'retreat' of white Britain in the face of immigrant diversity, an attempt by white Britons to maintain ethnic boundaries through exit? Or is it a liberal story of mobility towards nicer, greener pastures, with white British in the lead because they are better off than minorities? My project, a joint venture between Birkbeck College and Demos funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, has tried to find out.

Let's begin with London. Why were there 620,000 fewer white British people there in 2011 than 2001? Our first port of call is the census. Tragically, 2011 may be the last census, so this could be our final glimpse into how British society is shifting at local level. An especially useful part of the census is the ONS Longitudinal Study, a sample of 1 per cent of the population which is tracked from census to census.¹ Despite the fact that white British has only been an ethnic option since 2001, the ONS LS permits us to reconstruct patterns in earlier years by assigning ethnicity to people based on 2001 figures. This exercise shows that the 620,000 white British loss is in fact driven not by an excess of deaths and emigration over births and immigration, but because of straightforward outflow to the rest of England and


Wales. Some 600,000 more white Brits left the city for the rest of the country than entered from it. On the other hand, the comparable figure for ethnic minorities was under 100,000. Based on their 2001 population stock, white British left the city at three times the rate minorities did during 2001–11. So far, so good for the white flight hypothesis. In fact, between 1971 and 2011, London minorities lost only about a quarter as many as the white British to the rest of the UK while gaining immensely from international migration. No wonder, according to the ONS LS, the city's white British share fell from 86 per cent in 1971 to 78 per cent in 1981, 71 per cent in 1991, 58 per cent in 2001 and 45 per cent in 2011.

Is this ethnic replacement real or a spurious by-product of more important factors? Consider the optimistic thesis: whites are wealthier and therefore more able to leave. Actually, no. Among white British, those with higher educational credentials were less likely to leave (net of inflows) London than those with high school only qualifications, while the working and middle class were more likely to be net leavers than managers and professionals. Among minorities, socioeconomic factors played little part. All told, the difference in economic profile between white British and minorities can't explain why white Brits left the city in larger numbers than minorities. This is not to say economic factors are unimportant, but these appear to affect white British and minorities equally. Again, the white flight position seems vindicated.

Yet a closer look at net migration trends from London casts some doubt on the white flight argument. The net white British outflow during the 2000s was 13.4 per cent. But it was 11 per cent in the 80s and 90s and nearly 15 per cent in the 70s when London was much less diverse. Something on the order of half a million more white British left London each decade than entered it. Furthermore, the ONS LS shows that London was 86 percent white British in 1971, with just a small share of minorities. This is hardly sufficient to push white British out of the city at a rate of 15 per cent in the 1970s.

If growing diversity was repelling whites from London, we'd expect an accelerating white British outflow over the

Figure 1 **Showing the increases and decreases in the White British population in London and surrounding local authorities from 2001 to 2011**



Source: Historic Census of England and Wales, 1841–1901; Hechter, M, UK County Data, 1851–1966 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1976. SN: 430, <http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-430-1>; ONS Census, 1971–2011

decades, but instead, stability is the pattern. A little digging in the historic census reveals that the last time more people moved to London from the rest of England and Wales than left in the other direction was the 1860s. In fact, the share of white British leaving London is about the same today as in 1971 or 1891. For over a century, London has lost people to the rest of the country. Escaping the city rather than white flight seems to be the culprit. The only reason London's population was able to rise between 1871 and 1939 was an excess of births over deaths. As the birth rate dropped, London's population declined, from 8.6m on the eve of World War II to 6.7m in 1991. Rebound in the city's population since 1991 has been exclusively driven by growth in the foreign-born population, as figure 1 shows. It seems there's life in the counter-urbanisation theory after all.

Perhaps. But why then does ethnicity seem so important? Our statistical analysis shows, for instance, that white British living in mixed ethnicity households were much more likely to stay in London than white British living in homogeneous homes. 12 per cent of British households involve a mix of ethnic groups – including mixes of white British and white ‘other’ – be this between partners, housemates or between generations. In London, this share is much higher. In fact in inner London, fully one-fifth of white British people are living in them. White British who live in mixed-ethnic households were much less likely to leave the city during 2001–11. We may surmise they are more comfortable with diversity and more networked with other ethnic groups, as well as being affected by the location preferences of their non-white British housemates. This appears to explain their relative satisfaction, compared to white Brits in monocultural households, with diverse London.

From a minority vantage point, there are also indications that cultural assimilation is associated with spatial dispersion. For example, UK-born minorities were more likely to head outside the M25 than their foreign-born co-ethnics. Minorities who considered their national identity English rather than British or ‘other’ were more likely to have left, and less likely to have entered, London in the 2000s. In addition, the small number of mixed-race or white-other people who assimilated their ethnic identity between 2001 and 2011 to white British were significantly more likely to have left the city, though this could be affected by enumeration error between censuses. Minorities in mixed ethnic households, another indicator of integration, are much more likely to leave London than those in all-minority households. Similar findings have been found in the USA, where whites in mixed-race households are more likely to live in diverse areas. In the most homogeneously black or white areas of major US cities such as Detroit, as much as a third of all diversity is contained within, rather than between, households.²

As new pockets of relative diversity have opened up outside the M25 – Woking, Watford, Crawley, and so on – these have begun drawing minorities from London. As a result we should expect minority outflow from London to continue to rise. The

outflow rate for minorities has doubled in each of the past two decades and will likely continue to do so. But the overall segregation picture shows no sign of change because England's ethnic dynamics are powered by three trends:

- 1 minorities are leaving their areas of ethnic concentration - an effect most pronounced among Afro-Caribbeans and least among Pakistanis, but which includes all groups to some extent;
- 2 minorities are generally bypassing heavily white areas for new 'superdiverse' mixed-minority wards;
- 3 white British people are avoiding the rapidly growing 'superdiverse' wards.

Why white avoidance? Our work suggests this has less to do with income or cultural repulsion than cultural attraction. Our work with both a specially-commissioned [YouGov](#) poll and longitudinal census and survey data shows that white liberals and white conservatives leave diverse places for white areas at the same rate. Racists and non-racists show almost no statistically significant differences in where they move. The notion that those who don't like diversity leave for white areas while tolerant whites remain has little basis in fact – stayers are most hostile to ethnic change. Of course, it could be that white liberals are just as averse to diversity as white conservatives but decline to admit this on surveys. Still, it is surprising that we see *no* effect. So this leaves us with a theory of cultural attraction as the best explanation for what we see. Namely, that white areas have high cultural appeal for whites whereas minority areas have less cultural attraction for minority groups. How can this be explained?

Historically, certain cultures had greater prestige than others in particular places. Rome conquered Greece but became Hellenised. When they conquered Britain, however, Romans latinised the natives in part because their culture was more appealing. Leading American social scientist Karl Deutsch writes that relative prestige often determines who assimilates to whom. In Argentina, Germans did not assimilate: German culture had higher status than Argentina's Spanish core. In America, however, the same Germans looked up to the Anglo core and

duly changed their names from Müller to Miller, Rittinghuysen to Rittenhouse.

In the same way, Britain's ethnic minorities are attracted out of their areas of concentration towards the mainstream but white British are not pulled into minority areas except while in their 'edgy' twenties. For minorities, discomfort explains why they avoid wards which are over 90 per cent white. Whites, though, gravitate to these same white wards because the culture and prestige of them exceeds that of diverse areas – even when outward appearances are identical. Christian Lander's satirical book and website, *Stuff White People Like*, claims white liberal North Americans are drawn to amenities like coffee, yoga, snowboarding and vegetarian restaurants. These generally don't appeal to minorities, which explains why liberal enclaves such as Vancouver's Kitsilano are among the whitest spots in North American cities. White attraction rather than revulsion explains why whites cluster, and why white-minority segregation remains so persistent across the West.

Can any policy lessons be drawn from this? American trends suggest inner suburbs – zones of transition between cities and leafy outer suburbs – have difficulty attracting whites. Such areas, such as swathes of outer London, may evolve into mixed-minority zones with little or no white presence.³ Areas with a low white share tend to lose white British people fastest, and white British are least likely to be comfortable living as a minority or having their children in 'majority minority' schools. Yet white British people living in diverse areas are the most tolerant segment of white Britain. For many reasons, policy makers should try and encourage them to stay. Positive discrimination in favour of whites to maintain integrated neighbourhoods, as in the Starrett City project in New York in the '70s and '80s, is illegal as well as unadvisable. However, some sense of the risk of white depopulation is important: housing, benefit and schooling policies in inner suburban areas such as Croydon or Barking should avoid measures that accelerate the departure of white British residents.

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Notes

- 1 The permission of the Office for National Statistics to use the Longitudinal Study is gratefully acknowledged, as is the help provided by staff of the Centre for Longitudinal Study Information and User Support (CeLSIUS). CeLSIUS is supported by the ESRC Census of Population Programme (Award Ref: ES/K000365/1). The authors alone are responsible for the interpretation of the data.
- 2 Ellis, M et al, 2007, 'The Effects of Mixed-Race Households on Residential Segregation,' *Urban Geography*, vol. 28, no 6, pp 554-77.
- 3 Richard Alba and Steven Romalewski, 'The End of Segregation? Hardly,' Center for Urban Research, 2013. <http://www.urbanresearch.org/projects/hardly-the-end-of-segregation>

11 The village in the city: illiberal minority behaviour

Jasvinder Sanghera

The crimes of forced marriage, honour based violence, honour killings and female genital mutilation continue to make the headlines as the curtain is gradually raised on the persistence of these practices in some of Britain's minority communities. Even as many ethnic minority Britons of the second and third generation are happily mixing into British society and absorbing many of its liberal cultural norms, there are significant exceptions to this rule – and in some cases the more traditional cultures are growing further apart as a result of the high immigration of the past 15 years. In these traditional cultures people are becoming even more entrenched in their 'home' culture, creating not only geographical separations but psychological separations and making possible the kind of abuses that go on behind closed doors often in the name of tradition, religion and culture. It is my personal experience and that of many others that these abuses are fundamentally about resisting or preventing cultural integration into wider British society.

I was born here and England is the only country I can call home. But growing up in a very traditional Indian Sikh home I was constantly warned of the dangers of integration. I recall my mother saying how 'the worse insult I could bring to her front door was that I was behaving like a white woman.' We were being taught to be intolerant of others and I also soon discovered that being born in Britain did not give me and others like me the rights enjoyed by the established population to liberty, equality, independence, freedom, the right to education and the right to choose a partner in marriage.

One of the most pressing issues here is the extent to which well-meaning local authority officials and other professionals are perpetuating the problem. There is, historically, a fear of being

labelled racist if they offer the same level of protection as they would to a young white woman. And there is also the practice of wheeling out the minority worker to deal with the minority problem which builds segregation into professional practice.

Moreover, I am not aware of any other form of abuse in which the authorities mediate with perpetrators, as is the practice in many cases of forced marriages whereby professionals seek to compromise with family members. And why are victims returned to perpetrators with a specific legal injunction in place with no or little monitoring of the victim? As a campaigner of over 20 years I still know of such experiences and hear professionals clearly state they have been told not to get involved, to be 'culturally sensitive' or to accept 'it's what they do'.

A teacher recently told me how he had pinned up helpline posters of my honour crime charity, Karma Nirvana, in his school in England and how within 24 hours the head teacher tore them down saying that she did not wish to offend communities.

But what do we actually know about the extent of the problem? According to official government figures around 400 school children – mainly girls from South Asian communities – are forced into marriage every year in the UK. Karma Nirvana operates a national helpline that has dealt with over 30,000 calls since its inception in 2008.

The Forced Marriage Unit dealt with 1,485 cases in 2012 of which 13 per cent were under 13. The government has also said that we are dealing with the 'tip of the iceberg' as forced marriage becomes a criminal offence in the course of 2014.

The high profile murder trial of Shafiea Ahmed in 2012 underlined how many victims live within a hermetically sealed cultural environment. Shafiea was encouraged to mediate with her perpetrators even though her abuses included being beaten, abused, imprisoned and abducted mainly because she wanted to lead a normal British life. Justice Roderick Evans said she lived in two worlds – the relatively free world of school and the other home world where she was in rural Pakistan and seen by her parents to be dishonouring her family for being a normal adolescent teenager. The prosecuting barrister Andrew Edis QC described the lives of many in Britain when stating how within

this family dynamic you have three choices to, ‘escape, submit or die.’

The ITV documentary *Forced to Marry* broadcast on ITV on 9 October 2013 revealed how two undercover reporters called 56 mosques asking if they would perform the marriage of a 14-year-old girl. Two thirds of those contacted refused to perform the marriage, and many of them made it clear they found the request abhorrent. But 18 of the respondents agreed stating how this would not be a problem and the ensuing conversations were all about how tradition, religion and culture were stronger than any British laws.

Another documentary the BBC Panorama (2012) *Britain’s Crimes of Honour* highlighted how thousands of crimes in Britain are going unreported. Also, the programme conducted a poll that revealed the support for honour systems was not dying out with the older generations, rather, two-thirds of young British Asians agreed that families should live according to the concept of ‘honour.’ Of the 500 young Asians questioned 18 per cent also felt that certain behaviours by women which damaged her family’s honour justified physical punishment.

Many individuals who are currently seeking to join the British way of life are placing themselves at risk of being cast out or attacked. It will be a long hard struggle to root out the honour culture which continues to break the lives of young women who glimpse a world outside the village in the city.

Jasvinder Sanghera is founder and CEO of the charity Karma Nirvana, which supports victims and survivors of forced marriage and honour-based abuse.

12 Is there a positive case for segregation in a liberal society?

Michael S. Merry

In the early twenty-first century, copious environments – particularly the workplace – are more mixed than ever before. Occasionally, too, spatial mixing yields substantive interaction cutting across real differences. Yet across the world, most societies remain deeply segregated by ethnicity, language, class, religion and political creed. Given the ignominious historical associations that attach to segregation in certain times and places, its continued persistence for many is alarming, an affliction crying out for a remedy. Indeed, with good reason, many will see segregation in itself as evidence of injustice. From this conviction it follows that any social inequities occasioned by segregation can only be mitigated through policies more carefully fine-tuned to achieve ethnic, racial or social class ‘integration’.

Noteworthy in most discussions is how imprecise the concept of integration is. Conservatives and liberals alike employ the term to mean different things, though it is safe to say that ‘integration’ is nearly always directed towards minority groups and is meant to signify things like first language or religious preference, educational success, labour market participation, endorsement of mainstream cultural values, and even attitudes and dispositions with respect to various institutional norms. For my purposes, it will suffice to say that, by integration, most persons imagine environments that are spatially mixed on many fronts, but also mixed in terms of more substantive interaction – formally and informally – involving greater levels of social cooperation across various markers of identity and status.

Whether implicitly or explicitly, the integration narrative typically is framed by two principles: equality and citizenship. With *equality* we find the belief that by mixing persons from different backgrounds – and perhaps especially socioeconomic

backgrounds – we will bring the less fortunate into contact with the more fortunate and these opportunities for mixing will grant the former access to the cultural and social capital of the latter. The result ostensibly will be greater upward mobility for the less fortunate by gaining access to the relevant social networks and resources that the privileged enjoy. And with *citizenship* we find the belief that by mixing persons from different backgrounds we will reduce prejudice, remove stereotypes and generally aid in fostering harmonious interactions between those who otherwise might be inclined to view one another with suspicion. The outcomes ostensibly will lead to greater levels of mutual cooperation, greater social cohesion and a healthier body politic.

Variations of the integration argument can be found in the housing, business and labour market literature, but without question it is most often heard in the educational domain. Yet the idea that mixed school environments will yield more justice seems as presumptuous as it does improbable, particularly when the scholarly literature documents the same phenomena year after year, namely: (a) high levels of spatial clustering in neighbourhoods with both voluntary and involuntary causes; (b) sorting and selection mechanisms schools use that produce segregation from within; and (c) how disciplinary procedures and special education labels disproportionately affect poor and minority groups. Added to these structural phenomena, parents enjoy rights and protections to choose where to live and which school their child will attend; even children express preferences about those with whom they like to spend their time. Meanwhile, many concerns expressed by those most egregiously affected by segregation are routinely dismissed or ignored. Indeed, appeals made by disadvantaged (and often stigmatised) minority groups for *pragmatic alternatives* to the standard integration narrative are repudiated by those who continue to advocate for *more* integration.

Perhaps it is time to reassess, for it is doubtful whether integration is always or even often the most sensible or effective strategy to foster greater equality and citizenship. First, a single-minded defence of integration is naive, given persistent facts about the reasons behind both involuntary and voluntary forms

of segregation. Second, while it may be true that *under special conditions* integration can promote equality and citizenship, the conditions conducive to these outcomes typically are hard to come by, especially for the less fortunate. Third, many forms of segregation not only facilitate greater equality and citizenship than we may be prepared to admit; these also may be a more realistic course to follow in pursuing justice. In what follows I only begin to sketch the outlines of an argument for pursuing justice for stigmatised minority groups under non-ideal conditions, i.e., persistently high levels of segregation. In an attempt to capture creative manoeuvres that *respond* to existing segregated conditions, I adopt the provocative label ‘voluntary separation’. By voluntary separation (hereafter VS), I refer to a *pragmatic and only partially institutionalised response by certain – usually disadvantaged and stigmatised – minority groups to existing segregated conditions.*

Now, because I know how quickly many readers will stumble on this choice of words, let me explain how I am using these terms. By ‘pragmatic’ I simply refer to strategies that creatively *resist, rearrange* and *reclaim* the terms of one’s segregation. ‘Voluntary’ is trickier because all voluntary actions are of course structured – and constrained – by innumerable involuntary realities. The poor generally have fewer liberties than the rich; the disabled generally have fewer liberties than the able-bodied; and, in the West, Hindus generally have fewer liberties than Christians (though in India it is the other way around). At the same time, many forms of clustering do not occur simply because of structural barriers. In fact, both the voluntary and the involuntary often intertwine: for example, housing discrimination and a desire to live near others similar to oneself often coincide, producing spatial concentrations.

But there is every reason to believe that Pakistani concentrations in Birmingham, Cuban concentrations in Miami or Turkish concentrations in Rotterdam would exist even in the absence of racism or discrimination. More to the point, not being able to choose one’s original predicament does not mean that one is unable to turn spatial concentration to one’s advantage. Hence it is proper to refer to various forms of

segregation as ‘voluntary’ to the extent that there is *intentionality* behind decisions and actions to circumstances not necessarily of one’s choosing. It is voluntary – and not, say, merely involuntary or ‘reactive’ – because the latter implies either victimhood or a loath defensiveness not typically present in efforts to redefine and redirect what it means to pursue justice.

VS, as I defend it, adopts the exact same framing principles used in the integration account. That is to say, one cannot simply claim that a voluntary or separate status will suffice for justice. *Certain enabling conditions also will need to be present.* These might include things like neighbourhood safety, social networks, entrepreneurial opportunities, qualified teachers, transportation infrastructure, etc. Moreover, *it is reasonable to expect that separation is capable of producing certain outcomes.* Groups claiming ‘voluntary separation’ that violate the basic principles of equality and citizenship – neighbourhood associations that exclude others because of ethnic/racial difference, for example – are without defence. However, I argue that so long as the right kinds of enabling conditions are present (or can be fostered), VS is every bit as capable – and in many instances even more so – of producing important forms of equality and citizenship. Indeed, within segregated communities one may be able to promote greater equality of recognition, treatment and self-respect than one is likely to find in mixed environments. Moreover, segregated communities often produce many forms of civic virtue necessary for ‘bonding’ communities together, but also for ‘bridging’ with others whose communities may be organised around a different set of concerns. Fostering strong communal ties is not inherently inimical to broader expressions of equality and citizenship. Rather, doing so often serves as the foundation upon which broader expressions of mutual concern and collective action can occur.

Certain things follow from this. First, as a pragmatic strategy VS affords persons the right to be with others like themselves *if they want to*. Voluntary association is in any case a normative good. And it turns out that minority groups in particular often have reason to stay together for the benefits such proximity affords. Those benefits may include a shared

language, cultural or religious background, but also shared appreciation for what it means to be a minority in a society that to one degree or another fails to demonstrate equal recognition or treatment. Those most likely to adopt VS as an appealing strategy will be members of groups subjected to various harms and stigma. Strength can be found in solidarity. Indeed, organised efforts to resist discrimination and oppression typically benefit from spatial concentrations of persons who share similar backgrounds, characteristics and concerns. Of course, these same groups also will want to foster a variety of enabling conditions necessary for flourishing and justice, and institutional supports always help to achieve these goals. Even so, their success does not depend upon an environment being ‘integrated’, at least not in the sense in which integration advocates typically understand this term. In any case, there is not likely to be justice when dominant groups – and the privileged in particular – continue to view stigmatised minorities either with pity or contempt.

Second, even under conditions of concentrated disadvantage, possibilities for redefining and redirecting what it means to be ‘separate’ are feasible. Institutional levers certainly can help by, say, adopting weighted pupil funding strategies or subsidising after-school programmes. But as Robert Sampson’s work on ‘collective efficacy’ also powerfully demonstrates, ‘by cultivating a sense of ownership and cultural commitment to the neighbourhood, residents [can] produce a social resource that feeds on itself and serves as a kind of independent protective factor and durable character that encourages action in the face of adversity.’¹ As conditions improve and social attitudes change, stigma and disadvantage slowly dissipate for some groups; for others, it remains an ongoing struggle. *But the struggle rarely is for more spatial mixing*; rather, with strong attachments both to place and other group members who share similar attributes and concerns, the struggle is for an alleviation of poverty, safer living conditions, improved educational opportunities, and an expansion of meaningful prospects in the labour market.

Summing up, insofar as VS is instantiated in communities and schools it is driven among other things by a desire for equal recognition and status, as well as community membership and

self-respect. Under the right conditions and with the right purposes in mind, VS is a justifiable response to social inequality where parity of recognition, treatment and participation in integrated environments often is in short supply. None of this entails a repudiation of integration as an ideal; nor does my argument entail the denial of significant gains that increased levels of integration have occasioned. Indeed, to the extent that integrationist ideals take a long-term view of a more just society, they continue to serve an important purpose; they embody goals whose aim is to facilitate a pursuit of justice, even if its actualised expressions much of the time continue to elude us. Nor do I claim that VS offers a miracle cure; sometimes it will work and sometimes not. Much depends upon the specific circumstances, the features and aims of the group in question, and the presence or absence of relevant enabling conditions. But notice that this is also the case with so-called integrated environments.²

In arguing that we re-think the terms and demands of integration, I hope at least three additional points for consideration ensue. First, I hope that many of us will be more candid about *our own* decisions and actions, particularly with regard to where we choose to live and send our own children to school. The fact remains that many of us who publicly register our dismay about segregation and affirm our commitment to integrated neighbourhoods and schools, too often exercise our own voluntary prerogatives in ways that support the status quo. Second, there is something odd about the mainstream view that only *minority* concentrations are problematic. Rarely does one read about the need to ‘disrupt’ the spatial concentrations of *majority* groups. Integration arguments almost always assume that minorities need to move towards – and adapt themselves to – majority populations and norms and demonstrate that *they* are integrated by accessing what dominant groups allegedly possess. But this is a deeply prejudicial belief about minority concentrations at best, and often it is unwittingly subversive of what many minority groups have reason to care about and pursue. Finally, I hope that more of us will even-handedly assess whether integration under non-ideal conditions – as defined by members of dominant groups – is really capable of ushering in justice for

those who need it most. It just may be that many types of VS not only do a better job of facilitating valuable forms of equality and citizenship, they may do so in a way that simultaneously affirms the crucial importance of voluntary association.

Michael S. Merry is Professor of Philosophy of Education at the University of Amsterdam and author of Equality, Citizenship and Segregation: a defense of separation (Palgrave Macmillan).

Notes

- 1 Sampson, R, 2012. *Great American City: Chicago and the enduring neighbourhood effect*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p 398.
- 2 For a more exhaustive theoretical and empirical examination of these matters, see Merry, M S, *Equality, Citizenship and Segregation: a defense of separation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

13 On the ground 1: Keighley

Kris Hopkins MP

Keighley is my home; it is where I went to school and where I first entered the world of employment – in a chip shop. In 2010 I was elected as Keighley's MP. The chance to represent the interests of your constituents is a great honour, but even more so when it is your own community you are being invited to serve.

In my maiden speech, I described my seat as the jewel in the nation's crown, and I meant it. But Keighley is not a place without its difficulties.

While parts of my constituency are very affluent, others – particularly in the town of Keighley itself – are among the most deprived in the country. And economic prosperity is not the sole divider, because racial and cultural differences also continue to play their part.

To understand these, it is important to appreciate the recent history of Keighley. In common with other neighbouring towns and cities in the north, Muslims now make up the second largest religious group in Keighley, with more than 13 per cent according to the 2011 census. This historic change in population trend stems from the 1950s when significant numbers of immigrants began to arrive from the Mirpur region of Azad Kashmir, in Pakistan, and the Sylhet region of Bangladesh. This happened primarily at the invitation of employers who needed to fill vacancies in the thriving local mills.

The workers who arrived came with a strong work ethic and a desire to get on in life. Many of them wanted to buy houses and did so. But, through time, the decline of the textile industry – prompted by fully automated manufacturing processes and the availability of cheaper labour overseas – led to the closure of mills and the loss of jobs.

This had a particularly negative impact on immigrant workers. And it meant that their children would not, in the main,

have the same opportunities as their parents to get on and make their contribution to society. Other factors also began to create a divide between the indigenous population and those of South Asia.

Primary among them was the custom for young British South Asian men to find a bride in Pakistan, a bride who often did not speak English and had little opportunity to learn the language. This, in turn, led to their children not hearing English spoken in the home and not being properly exposed to the language until, at the very earliest, they were enrolled at nursery.

A tradition also evolved, one which I believe to be detrimental, of families from British South Asian backgrounds choosing to live closely together and thereby having minimal contact with others outside their ethnic group.

As a pupil attending middle school in central Keighley in the mid-1970s, I can only recall three British South Asian children among my classmates. It was a time when the National Front was desperately seeking to stoke up local racist tensions. I remember being shocked when a young British South Asian boy was the victim of a pre-meditated racist attack at a bus stop; the two white boys were even more shocked when I intervened to stop it. Many more racially-motivated assaults have happened since then, with both whites and British South Asians bearing responsibility.

Territorial conflicts have often been behind these, as segregation in housing became entrenched, and these were exacerbated by further drug wars between rival South Asian gangs. The drugs also tended to be sold mainly to white users – with the police in those days, but thankfully no longer, often turning a blind eye – which increased local community tensions further.

In more recent years, Keighley has attracted negative publicity because of a high profile problem of paedophilia and sexual grooming. This is the most harrowing issue I have had to deal with in my 16 years in public life as a ward councillor, council leader and, more recently, as the MP. Like my Labour predecessor Ann Cryer, I have spoken out against these crimes many times. But my speech to the House of Commons in

November 2012 caused a furore because I concentrated my remarks on the sickening activities and behaviour of some British Pakistani men in this country, including in Keighley.

As I said then and repeat again, the vast majority of child abusers in this country are white. But it is a simple fact that a small minority of British Pakistani men are working together in gangs and actively targeting white underage girls for sex, and committing acts of rape, in a model identified by the Home Office as street grooming. As we know from a series of well-publicised court cases across the country, it is happening in lots of places, particularly across the north in towns such as Keighley, and it must be stopped.

Looking ahead, is the town now on a better path? Most certainly. The BNP Leader Nick Griffin was overwhelmingly rejected by voters across the constituency at the 2005 General Election. And the close cooperation between the police and the South Asian community in dealing with a recent English Defence League rally has done much to strengthen bridges of trust.

But there are still some harsh truths to be faced if we want to maintain Keighley on a positive trajectory. A better education for our younger people is essential, and this begins with doing what we can to encourage parents to take proper responsibility for their child's learning, including ensuring that they arrive at school with the ability to speak good English. And this is not just an issue for the South Asian community; it is also the case that many white children enrol at primary school with speech and language problems which can be traced back to the home.

While we have a fast-growing young population in Keighley – almost 21 per cent of residents in the constituency are aged 15 or under according to the 2011 census – we must turn them into an aspirational, ambitious, and talented workforce in waiting. And they must be taught the social skills to enable them to interact and integrate with the whole of the community, not just those of their own ethnic group. In segregated communities, school is often the only place where cross-cultural and inter-racial integration takes place on a regular basis, and where familiarity and tolerance can be nurtured and developed. Keighley schools are already playing a lead role in this process,

and we must encourage more inter-school activities such as sport and drama, particularly between institutions where either white or South Asian pupils are dominant.

We need also to find ways to encourage more leadership by local women. We must challenge the male dominated culture in the South Asian community, and find ways to empower South Asian women and help them to gain more influence inside and outside the home. We need to do this, not only because it is right, but because the tradition of patriarchy in that community contributes to its economic poverty. In my experience, mum is not only best placed to instil ambition and aspiration into boys but also, crucially, girls. And, indeed, this applies to white working class communities too where, in some homes, no one has worked for more than a generation. Increased investment in society will surely only bring benefits to mothers and confidence to their children.

Finally, on child grooming, we require more leading members of the South Asian community in Keighley to stand up, condemn what has been going on and encourage all useful information about those suspected of involvement to be passed to the police. Over recent months, this has happened with significant numbers of arrests being made as a consequence. For my own part, I am pleased that the Government has accepted my proposals to give the police more powers to tackle organised child sexual exploitation in hotels and bed-and-breakfasts. The confidence that will be generated by being seen to work together, across all ethnic groups, to deal with this scourge on our community will do nothing but good.

In conclusion, despite living in the *X Factor* age where people now demand immediate results, it is hard graft, forward-thinking and goodwill that will bring the positive benefits for Keighley that all of us who care about the area wish to reap. Given time, I believe that our town – my town – can be regarded nationally as a model for religious tolerance, ethnic mix and community engagement.

Kris Hopkins is Minister for Housing and the Conservative Member of Parliament for Keighley.

14 On the Ground 2: Tower Hamlets and Newham

Max Wind-Cowie

It is tempting, when it comes to policy questions as complex and apparently intractable as that of integration, to look for what has worked elsewhere in the world. Why can't we be more like the Canadians? Or the Swedes? Or – less frequently and less understandably – the French? The truth is, of course, in asking such a question one is really no better off than when asking 'why aren't humans more like seagulls?' We simply are not. The Canadian experience of mass immigration has been more controlled, less focused at the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum and takes place in the context of almost limitless space. The Swedish have not been quite as successful as some outsiders imagine - as demonstrated by the recent riots in immigrant communities - and besides which they are smaller and richer than we are. And the French? Well, I need hardly labour the differences.

No. If we are to look for practical examples of what may work in terms of integration then it is far better that we look to smaller but more relevant examples closer to home in Britain itself. What has happened in different communities struggling to deal with sudden and significant diversity – here in the UK – can educate us in what might work, in what factors point to relative success, what kind of political processes lend themselves to positive integration and, crucially, what does not work. For the purposes of this essay I intend to look at two communities, chosen for their geographical proximity to one another and for the radically different paths that they have taken.

Newham and Tower Hamlets

Newham and Tower Hamlets are boroughs of London that nestle, next to each other, on the eastern edge of the city. Neither is particularly wealthy. But both populations live within sight of

the riches of the City and both are well connected to central London. They are very alike yet are distinct in terms of their make-up and their local cultures.

Newham has an estimated population of 307,984, according to the 2011 Census – and it is growing fast. Newham grew by around 64,000 people in the period between the 2001 census and 2011; this is a 23.5 per cent increase and is equal to the second highest growth in the country (<http://www.aston-mansfield.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/FINAL-Newham-Profile-April-2013.docx>). It is also one of the most ethnically diverse areas in the UK.

Newham has the lowest White British population in the whole of England and Wales – with just 16.7 per cent of residents, as well as both the second highest Bangladeshi and fourth largest Black African populations in the UK. But when we talk about Newham's diversity it is important to remember that we are using that term in its original context. There are many and multiple different communities living in Newham – not two or three competing blocs of ethnic groups. Almost every ethnic identity known to man can be found on the streets of Newham – as the table below illustrates.

Tower Hamlets shares a land border with Newham and a great deal of cultural history, both being the core part of London's traditional 'East End'. Tower Hamlets has around 237,900 residents and is one of London's most densely populated areas. It too is 'mixed' – although the population is very much more strikingly divided. 53 per cent of Tower Hamlets' residents are White British and 30 per cent are Bangladeshi. The next largest ethnic population are Indians – who represent just 2 per cent of the population.

While Tower Hamlets is certainly not a monolithically white neighbourhood, I would ask whether these breakdowns as compared to Newham's point to a community that can genuinely be described as 'diverse' at all. In Newham, six distinct ethnic groups comprise 10 per cent or more of the population. In Tower Hamlets there are two such groups. Newham has drawn significant proportions of its populations from Europe, Britain, Africa and the Indian sub-continent. Tower Hamlets has managed to

Table 1 **Population of Newham by ethnicity**

Ethnic Group	%
White British	16.7
Indian	13.8
Black African	12.3
Bangladeshi	12.1
White Other	11.4
Pakistani	9.8
Other Asian	6.5
Black Caribbean	4.9
Mixed White & Black Caribbean	1.3
Other Mixed	1.3
Chinese	1.3
Mixed White & Black African	1.1
Mixed White & Asian	0.9
White Irish	0.7
White Gypsy or Irish Traveller	0.2
Other Black	2.4
Arab	1.1
Any Other	2.3

distill the bulk of its population into two camps of origin – Britain and Bangladesh.

These differences are not anyone's fault. They are the product of a number of interlocking factors that are largely the cumulative product of behaviour rather than the deliberate design of policy. Nevertheless, these intrinsic differences are hugely significant to the long-term direction of both communities.

Politics and power

Newham and Tower Hamlets also share a political system. Both boroughs have adopted the 'Executive Mayor' system of government – meaning that both directly elect a leader who then interacts with the local council in much the same way as a President does with his or her legislature. This invests considerable power in the hands of the elected executive – something that was widely regarded as a positive development in these areas' regeneration. Having a single individual who can

drive policy, make representations on behalf of the borough and be held personally accountable means that strong leadership becomes possible in places that require it. But the 'Executive Mayor' model also significantly raises the stakes. In a council election it is often necessary for coalitions to be built – both inside and outside political parties. Electing a single individual to exercise often sweeping power strips away both these requirements to compromise. It is a win-all scenario.

In Newham, the mayor is Sir Robin Wales – a Labour politician who has successfully established himself and his party as the only real power in the land. At the last local elections, Labour won every single seat on Newham Council. In Tower Hamlets, the Mayor is the 'Independent' Lutfur Rahman - who was elected following a bitter dispute within the local Labour Party, characterised by a stark division between local white British and ethnic minority activists and a bloc of predominantly Bangladeshi discontents led by Rahman. Amidst accusations of Islamist links and financial mismanagement, Rahman managed to beat the official Labour candidate and take power in Tower Hamlets. The Council is also bitterly divided. A mix of 'Independent' and 'Respect' Councillors offer succour to the mayor while they are opposed by Labour members and a smattering of Conservatives. Speak to any Labour or Conservative Councillor in Tower Hamlets and you will hear stories of division, smears, homophobic, sexist and racial slurs and an atmosphere of mutual contempt. It is a mess.

Why? Why is Tower Hamlets politics broken while in Newham there is such breathtaking unity? I am not here to argue that single party rule in Newham is necessarily healthy but it is surely preferable to the stark and discomfortingly ethnic lines along which Tower Hamlets appears to have degenerated? And the proof – from the integrationist's perspective – is in the pudding.

Wales has made a great deal of his personal mission to drive forward integration and ethnic cohesion in Newham. The list of initiatives is long and occasionally esoteric – taking in everything from the withdrawal of non-English publications in libraries to the provision of music lessons to all Newham

children in order to create a shared language in music. Sir Robin has also overseen controversial decisions designed to break down ethnic division by ensuring that public funds never contribute to isolation and segregation. He has refused, for example, to make funds available to single-ethnicity groups for celebration events. It's not that you can't celebrate being Bangladeshi in Newham at the council's expense. It is simply that you cannot celebrate being Bangladeshi among only Bangladeshis and expect the taxpayer to foot the bill – you have to open up and play with the rest of Newham if you want public subsidies.

Contrast with Tower Hamlets, where disputes over the provision of council funds are mired in debate and controversy – often with an unhealthy emphasis on ethnic competition. In December to February 2010/2011, for example, Mayor Rahman used his office to direct £150,000 to three Mosques which some allege are involved in extremism (<http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/andrewgilligan/100082445/lutfur-rahman-council-pays-at-least-50000-a-month-to-front-organisations-for-extremist-ife/>). The resulting controversy demonstrated the level of fear and anxiety that resulted from the election of a man who is perceived by many as the representative of just one of Tower Hamlets' two competing ethnic groups. The Bangladeshi community has 'captured' City Hall and, so the anxiety runs, are now using it to fund friends and consolidate power.

While Robin Wales emphasises harmony within his hyper-diverse community, Lutfur Rahman can sometimes appear happy to sow the seeds of further separation.

The reasons for these differences can, I believe, be found in the simple arithmetic of demographics. The genuine diversity of Newham enables an emphasis on integration because no single group is strong enough as a voting bloc to demand special attention and treatment. Wales is free to take controversial decisions in relation to race and religion – in the interests of wider holistic community of Newham – because he does not owe his power to a particular interest group. Rahman is not. Even if he wanted to, Rahman is less free to make decisions that de-prioritise sectional interests within his core support group of Bangladeshi residents because they are simply too large a part of

the electorate. This is less of an issue among ethnic groups where traditional community hierarchies have largely broken down and individual needs therefore trump collective needs at the ballot box. But where the ties of ethnic and religious obligation still predominate it is a real and pressing problem – especially if such a community represents one of only two significant communities within a political space.

Another example of how demographics affects decision making can be seen in the Newham Mayor's decision on the development of a 'super-Mosque' in the area. Wales declined the planning application – partially on the grounds that such a large and imposing development might destabilise the community cohesion that Newham has worked so hard to build. The Mayor is known to admit privately that his decision would have been impossible in a place like next-door Tower Hamlets. Saying 'no' to such a significant ethno-religious bloc would be political suicide.

What can we learn?

On the Left, many critics of the immigration and integration debate like to tell us that it is not about culture or language or manners but rather resources. In a competition for resources it is inevitable that 'migrants' get the blame, they say. Fine. But resources and politics are inextricably linked in our country and so a concern for how politics and power work is absolutely necessary if cohesion and social harmony are your objective. Newham and Tower Hamlets demonstrate how the pre-existing demographic mix of a community can contribute to either virtuous or vicious circles of integration and segregation. True diversity acts as a curb on mono-ethnic domination and on inter-ethnic competition. Being a community divided into two ethnic populations creates the potential for inter-ethnic competition and a 'winner-takes-all' approach to political power.

We need to take this seriously if we wish to prevent segregation and promote integration. I propose two macro-proposals to take these lessons into account and one

recommendation for how we might tackle the specific problems of Tower Hamlets.

- 1 *A statutory duty to integration*: Local authorities should have and solicit a statutory duty to ‘promote integration’, rather than to merely support ‘social cohesion’. This duty would harden the obligation on public bodies to support and promote the active integration of differing ethnic groups with one another. This is not about prescribing the Newham approach – different interventions will work in different ways in different places – but it is about making integration central to the objectives of public bodies.
- 2 *Ethnic boundary reviews*: There has been much recent discussion and debate about how to equalise constituency population boundaries in England and Wales. That debate emphasises the fairness of having equal numbers of voters, constituency by constituency – but the ethnic make-up of constituencies can also be important. The Electoral Commission should consider whether it is possible to look at the ethnic mix of potential constituencies to examine whether they have an electorate that reflects, in ethnic terms, the make-up of the wider area of which a constituency is part. For example, in London, whether proposed new constituencies genuinely reflect the overall genuine diversity of the city. (Similar thinking might be applied to school catchment areas.)

And what about Tower Hamlets? Frankly, I think we should abolish it. It is a borough that has, in part because of demographics, descended into a poisonous and unhealthy politics of ethnic division. It doesn’t need to be that way. We should break up the borough and incorporate elements of it into the surrounding boroughs so that the particular demographics of Tower Hamlets are watered down and so that real democratic participation and integration are possible. This would be a radical step. But it is better than simply hoping to play Rahman at his own game and win back power for mainstream politics. The divide is real and it is intractable. The answer is to start afresh.

Overall, we can learn from East London more than we can from international examples. Demographics affect, and sometimes dictate, politics and power. You can see that in action in East London. We need to intervene in the demographics, ensure that as far as possible diversity is real, if we want to use our democratic politics to promote a virtuous circle of integration rather than a vicious cycle of separateness.

Max Wind-Cowie is a Demos Associate and former Head of the Integration programme at Demos.

15 Conclusion

David Goodhart

Just before Christmas I spoke at a BBC debate in Birmingham about immigration. The audience was a combination of middle class white liberals and a more socially diverse ethnic minority mix, some of whom were unafraid to express their dismay at competition from east European immigrants. But at one point I unintentionally united the whole audience against me.

A retired white policeman spoke up to say that amid all the discussion of the economics of immigration something had been forgotten: love. He was referring to his wife from the Caribbean. Later I pointed out that, sadly, the policeman's story is rather unusual, and that relatively few immigrants of the post-colonial wave from the 50s to the late 80s did come here and marry white Brits – I quoted the very small figure for marrying/partnering 'out' by South Asians, especially South Asian Muslims, but added that the big exception to this story was African-Caribbean men, almost half of whom partner out. These facts were met with howls of protest by the audience and by most of my fellow panelists, one of whom told me I was being horribly insensitive.

I was surprised by the reaction. But it was a useful reminder, in the light of this essay collection, that there are some things that remain banal in a seminar room yet hard to express on a public platform. Generalising about the patterns of behaviour of different ethnic groups, including patterns of mixing with the majority population – even when based on solid facts – can still be seen as insensitive. This sensitivity arises in part from the history of racial stereotyping and derogatory generalisations about minorities that were still commonplace 30 years ago. But it is time that we moved on. Of course, everyone is an individual; ethno-cultural background is not destiny and many people float free from their roots. But as everyone also knows there is such a thing as society and society is in part made

up of groups. Modern liberals are often uneasy about group attachment: ‘What’s the fuss, we are all just individuals aren’t we?’ But group attachments of many kinds remain strong. Societies are composed of people who come from places and social networks, speak in a certain way, have certain traditions and ways of doing things (the idea of multiculturalism is partly premised on the overwhelming importance of these traditions to people).

To give a simple example relating to differences in ethnic minority social mobility: people of East African Asian background in Britain invariably go to good universities and into well paid professional jobs and people of Kashmiri Pakistani background, whose families have usually been in Britain longer, are often still driving taxis or working in restaurants. This is neither a mass coincidence nor is it to do with genes or race, it is rather to do with different cultural habits and different starting points; as Shamit Saggar points out in his essay, East African Asians had many advantages over Kashmiri Pakistanis when they began arriving in the late-1960s.

The Demos Mapping Integration project wants to make well-grounded generalisations about integration/segregation, and the different patterns of minority life that have a bearing on it, as commonplace as discussions of social class. We need to narrow, if not completely close, that gap between the seminar room and the wider public debate.

The actual integration story in Britain is varied. On the one hand there is a story of declining discrimination, an increase in mixed race children, upwardly mobile minorities and unselfconsciously mixed suburbs. But elsewhere there is also a story of white (and brown) exit and parallel lives—and what Robert Putnam has called ‘hunkering down’ – especially in parts of the north of England. Most people from the white British majority are resistant to becoming the minority in any given area and this has led to almost half of the ethnic minority population of Britain living in wards that are less than 50 per cent white British. Is that too much ethnic clustering for a good society?

There is no clear answer to that question but we now know so much about so many things relating to the new patterns of life

in Britain that ignorance of the trends themselves is inexcusable. And as the ethnic minority population (including white minorities) of England and Wales has surged ahead from around 7 per cent in the mid-1990s to close to 25 per cent two decades later our knowledge of patterns of clustering and dispersal in housing, jobs, schooling and so on is surely of enormous value to politicians and policy makers.

For this reason, at the heart of the Demos Mapping Integration project will be the Integration Hub website. This will, when completed, offer a user-friendly, overview of our understanding of these complex matters. By pulling together in one place some of the vast amounts of information held in government, academic and private sector databases we want to offer an authoritative, politically neutral resource for the country, one which showcases the invaluable work that academics and government statisticians have been doing in this field over recent years.

Our plan is to subdivide the integration-segregation story into five main chapters on the website – residence, education, economy (including employment and welfare), social (including leisure, relationships and well-being) and attitudes (including religion, politics and national identity). These will then be further broken down into four areas of focus: a headline overview, the recent history of whatever is under scrutiny, the local and regional story, and, finally, the debate about what it all means and different analysis offered by the experts.

There are no simple answers to the conundrums of integration and segregation in liberal societies, and we will not always know what the policy implications are of the data we are gathering together. Reasonable people disagree not only about the main obstacles to integration – crudely, how much is due to racism/poverty and how much to the internal cultures of the more separate minority groups – but also about what an integrated society looks like.

On the other hand most people also accept the desirability of some convergence in social and economic outcomes and in everyday norms and understandings, and therefore the need for reliable knowledge about these trends. But perhaps, as Trevor

Phillips points out in his opening essay, the one thing we can truly all agree on is that it is valid to have mixed feelings about the whole idea of integration. While recognising that powerful ‘people like us’ feelings persist in many communities, placing strict limits on the desire to mix, we also believe that a decent society is one with lots of contact between citizens and a sense of mutual recognition across lines of difference. Helping to forge a degree of political consensus on how to navigate between these poles is at the heart of the Mapping Integration story.

Modern colour-blind liberalism demands, rightly, that everyone be treated the same; but that does not mean that everyone *is* the same. And that raises issues about how we live together: about contact, trust and familiarity, about areas people feel comfortable living in and areas they don’t, schools they are happy to send their children to and those they are not.

Debate about these matters requires not only a less nervous attitude to the realities of ethnic difference than my Birmingham audience displayed but also an acceptance of the desire for people of both majority and minority backgrounds to favour communities that are stable and familiar. People can, of course, trust and cooperate with people who do not look or sound like them but it is easier to do so when change is gradual.

And we need, here, to recognise the existence of what one might call legitimate asymmetries between majority and minority behaviour. For example, it is now accepted that a degree of everyday ethnic solidarity is justifiable for minorities in a way that it has not been for the majority community since the 1960s. Similarly, should we not accept the preference of majority Britons to remain part of the preponderant group where they live, something that is seldom a realistic possibility for minorities? If we want to prevent white exit we should start with a less censorious attitude towards the ‘exiters’, especially as Eric Kaufmann’s essay shows that exit is not primarily motivated by racial discomfort.

There is in fact plenty of polling evidence to suggest that people want to live in more mixed communities than they actually do. There will of course be many different definitions of mixed but it seems difficult to maintain communities that have

the sort of 70:30 majority/minority balance that most people in both groups say they are happy with.

This is part of the justification for thinking hard about how policy might nudge us in the direction that we say we want to go – in relation to where we live, who our children go to school with and so on. This requires respecting peoples' intuitions about familiarity and continuity while also encouraging greater mixing and comfort with ethnic difference. Policy here is an inexact science; we are feeling our way and the Demos Mapping Integration project intends to be at the centre of the unfolding debate.

David Goodhart is Director of Demos and leads the Mapping Integration project.

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Few topics inspire more heat and less light than integration. A debate on the topic can cover all manner of subjects including demographic change, social relationships across ethnic boundaries, the interaction between race and social class, and questions of national identity and cultural adherence. As a consequence, integration has the distinction of being a public policy question which can become less intelligible the more it is aired. But these questions aren't mere debating points: they have huge potential societal impact.

As this collection reveals, there is a great deal of data out there on the British integration story, and it shows a varied picture. On the one hand there is a story of declining discrimination, an increase in mixed race children, upwardly mobile minorities and unselfconsciously mixed suburbs. But elsewhere there is also a story of parallel lives and what Robert Putnam has called 'hunkering down'. The real concern about segregation is two-fold. First, is it likely to undermine social peace and solidarity? And second, will it deprive any group of opportunity, or reduce their life chances?

Our contributors offer some suggestions. And while it's too early to draw too many conclusions, what they say challenges us to look afresh at the question of ethnic diversity and its impact on our wellbeing. For this reason, this collection marks the launch of the Demos Mapping Integration project, which will have the Integration Hub website at its heart. This will, when completed, pull together existing data held by government, academic and private sector organisations to offer a user-friendly, authoritative and politically neutral overview of our understanding of these complex matters. In so doing, it hopes to close the gap between the ordinary voter and policymakers on a vital but sensitive subject.

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