DEMOS

I fully agree with Faizal that the repercussions of these plans are extremely unpredictable.

 

Along with you, I am concerned that the rhetoric of these proposals needs to be carefully considered.  In addition to asking “do we think there is a wider cultural value in reinforcing the message against ‘hand-outs’”, we should also consider the danger of reinforcing a message which stigmatises the safety net – a safety net which, (lest we become too self-assured) we should remember we may all be in need of one day.

I’m also a bit jittery that the wording of ‘work in the community’ is dangerously reminiscent of ‘community service’. If these plans appear punitive it will support some of the stereotypes and misconceptions of those on benefits - misconceptions which are extremely harmful to those most in need.

Moreover the language of James Purnell’s argument and the subsequent wording of the policy will be central in the reception and self perception of claimants. If the language of a ‘work for benefits’ policy reinforces the reciprocity of citizenship (which is all too often neglected) that may be a good thing. The notion of reciprocity should be constantly reinforced so that we learn to be more giving as well as more demanding citizens.

But the idea of reciprocity in this context is potentially dangerous. If claimants feel that their four weeks of community work are a fair exchange for one years worth of unemployment benefits this may alleviate feelings of guilt that act as an incentive to find work – thus once again negatively distorting claimants cost benefit calculations to enter employment.

 

Frank Field, former welfare reform minister has concerns which, to me, also seem legitimate. Mr Field is worried that by demanding people work to receive benefits, their objective may become incapacity benefits rather than paid employment. I agree that there is a real risk that this policy could create a scramble for the status of ‘unable to work’.

To ensure this isn’t the case, as Faizal suggested, we need to be clear on what the ‘incentives’ are, and how these plans could alter them.

I believe that to alter claimants’ cost-benefit calculations, it is not just the incentives within unemployment that need to change, but also the incentives outside it. By this I mean that policy should focus on improving the welfare of those on the lowest wages in employment – because it is often this section of society that those on benefits look to when considering whether benefits or employment is in their interests. By improving the job security, working conditions and rights for the lowest paid, there will be greater incentives to enter employment with the added benefit that the lives of Britain’s poorest workers will also be ameliorated.

 

As the erratic nature of this comment suggests, the repercussions of this policy are diverse and far reaching. To make sure that only the repercussions we want are realised the formulation of this policy is going to require very careful thought.

As promised here is the social psycholgy research I mentioned (hat tip: Duncan). It doesn't deal directly with this issue but examines the link between entitlement and penalization. The research focused on a daycare centre which fined people for picking up their children late. This didn't achieve the desired result of people picking up their children on time, instead parents viewed the fine as a charge for after hours care, and so continued to arrive late. I wonder if there is a similar danger in making people work for welfare - will they then feel that they are entitled to their benefits as they have worked for them, and does this create a new perverse incentive?

If government does go down this route, reading Frank Field's and Johann Hari's views makes me wonder if part-time, fixed period employment focused on capacity building, is a better option than full-time community work.

One thing that seems to have been forgotten by both politicians and welfare-state-averse members of the public is that most people who receive state benefits have already worked for them, to the extent to which most employment-related benefits are dependent upon making sufficient National Insurance contributions. Although not as egalitarian or 'socialist' as a universalist welfare regime (where people receive the same from the state irrespective of how much they've paid in) the upside of a contributory regime should be that it assures the general public that someone receiving a state benefit, like someone who's receiving an insurance pay-out, deserves to receive it. Contributory systems should have functioned to already allay the suspicion and stigma attached to receiving benefits; however, in recent years it seems that this aspect of our welfare system has been forgotten, and thus claimants will be suspected of 'stealing' - from the state, and from everyone else - something they have, in fact, already paid for.

At the most fundamental level, notions of justice seem to be mapped onto the principle of reciprocation: something-for-something is 'just', whereas something-for-nothing (and nothing-for-something) is 'unjust'. Rather than introducing a new scheme (based on a 'debit' principle: benefits first, payment later) to try to assure people that state benefits are 'justly deserved', there should probably be more effort to remind people about the existing scheme (based on a 'credit' principle: payment first, benefits later).