DEMOS

I attended David Omand’s lecture. His thoughts, though interesting, struck me as timid. His argument can be summarised by saying there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the basic structure of government when it deals with security issues. Rather, David argues what we need to do is make the current arrangements work better – by boosting the size and power of the Cabinet Office – and underpin this by adopting a national security strategy.

 

I disagree with both diagnosis and prescription. The problem is not simply that the centre of government – the Prime Minister and Cabinet Office - lack power or staff. There are systemic faults that undermine HMG’s response to the so-called ‘seamless threats’ (John Reid’s words) that we now face. In my mind, one of the biggest is the overbearing power of the Treasury to set budgets for individual agencies and departments (often incoherently) before establishing requirements, but there are others too.

 

Nor do I fully understand the faith David has in a national security strategy. If we look at the US experience we can see that such a strategy does nothing to prevent bad policy decisions. The decision to invade Iraq was made despite the release of an updated NSS in 2002. Nor did this strategy do anything to force the State Department and Pentagon to collaborate well in Iraq after regime change had been completed.  I am not arguing that a security strategy is useless, but, by any measure, a strategy is not the panacea that its adherents so often claim.

Fair points from Derek Leatherdale, but we need to make a start somewhere.Any Government is going to need to look to Treasury Ministers to control public expenditure (the demands will always outstrip the available revenues) and we should not complain when control is exercised. The question rather is whether there is the process and the necessary analysis to enable resources to be allocated rationally in relation to priorities. At present, on national security, this is a gap. And that is where I argue that we need change in the centre of government to provide both the process and the analysis. "Strategy" is not something confined to a strategy document (although public presentation is important): it is a process that enables those with the key interests to work through the issues around goals, priorities and funding needs in a structured way. The US National Security Strategy may not be to everyone's taste but at least we know what it is. What is the UK's?David Omand

I don't think anyone claims a national security strategy is a panacea for bad policy decisions. And it is important to realise that the very process of developing a security strategy would have an impact on Whitehall; on how the Government articulates a vision of the present (and future) security environment, which departments will lead on what policy, and how they would work together. Finally a public security strategy  would allow the Government to communicate its vision, policy and strategy to an anxious public. An important tool at a time of instability and uncertainty. Read the case for a national security strategy

Financial control is necessary. But I would not wish to disguise incoherent and unbalanced expenditure decisions under the camouflage of 'financial control'. While it is fair to say that demands will always outstrip the resources, the problem is (seriously) compounded by this government's insistence on devoting massive amounts of money to social programmes, leaving much less for the departments of government that deal with security issues - Home Office, Police, FCO, MoD etc etc. Before anyone lynches me, I am not advocating zero social expenditure. However, in my view, delivering security is not a 'nice to have' after building the millenium dome or funding the Olympics, but an essential prerequisite. The balance of financial priority is out of kilter. Furthermore, the money that is available for security is incoherently spent - for instance, insufficient amounts going towards funding of Police CT capability, so that they struggle to deal with the CT workload which other parts of government place on them. To the extent that a security strategy 'process' could help mitigate these issues, I am (as David is) in favour of it.

David is also right to say 'we have to start somewhere' in reforming our approach to security. First steps are fine and I wholeheartedly support them.  But what about the situation after the first steps? I guess what I was expecting to hear at his presentation was his view of the medium and long term. But David's explanation of the second, third and fourth steps, as it were, was notable by its absence. That is why I used the word 'timid'.

Lastly, on the NSS itself, and following Charlie's comments, I would just add a note or two of caution to the debate. A serious strategy would explore avowedly political issues. It should concern itself with approaches to extremely complex policy dilemmas. A strategy might, for instance, lay out the conditions in which the Government deems it suitable to employ military force. Such a strategy may help cohere government but it can also divide the public and confuse (or enrage) other countries. For evidence of this, and without wishing to labour the point, I look to the release of the US NSS in September 2002 - in which a policy of preventive (as opposed to preemptive) war was defined. This did not prove to be an asset to US diplomacy coming, as it did, in the build up to the invasion of Iraq. I can't help thinking, therefore, that we are all in favour of a national security strategy, just so long as it doesn't say anything we don't like. And if that's the case, and it is merely an anodyne statement of of utopian ideals, then it will not be very useful.

Or am I being too pessimistic?