Last week I attended the release of a global survey of internet filtering, conducted by the OpenNet Initiative and hosted by the Oxford Internet Institute. The results indicate that internet filtering is growing "in scope, scale, and sophistication." In the 41 countries evidence was collected in, some level of Internet filtering was detected in 25.
Internet filtering limits access to internet content. OpenNet's research identified four types of internet filtration: 'political content, social content, content related to conflict and security, and internet tools', such as VoIP services.
If you believe the internet you're accessing right now is the 'real deal', this research should challenge your assumptions. Many countries engage in internet filtering, including the UK and the US. BT, one of the three main internet-service providers in the UK filters out sites with child pornography, for example. OpenNet found significant evidence of internet filtration in countries known for reducing internet content – China, Iran, Burma and North Korea.
The focus of OpenNet's survey was state-sponsored internet filtration. In the UK, online filtering follows offline laws. A limited amount of countries were surveyed, and the type of testing only captures a few ways that internet access can be limited. Individuals filtering options exist for the household -- indeed this is one selling point for services such as AOL. Large companies may filter content on the machines in their network. And both the UK and the US have a takedown scheme that allowed material suspected to be illegal or infringing to be removed from the internet – and sometimes these takedown notices themselves are fraudulently issued.
Commercial filtering software or 'censorware' is a major tool for internet filtration. Recently, the wireless network in City of Boston was caught filtering out 'legitimate' content such as sites like BoingBoing.net. The commercial censorware flagged Boing Boing for having 'banned combination phrase found' on the site. Once censorware is implemented, additional keywords or sites can be easily added to the list of things users are unable to access.
From the discussions I participated in at the conference, two critical questions remained at the end of the day. What types of nonstate-controlled filtration exists, and what role do private entities play in this type of filtration? And, just as critically, is internet filtering necessarily wrong?
Perhaps internet filtering should be framed within a conversation of open communication between internet users and content filters. Certainly, we can all agree that child pornography is an absolute wrong, not to mention illegal. But what is the cost of internet filtration, of any type?
Based on the data gathered by the OpenNet, they conclude 'Very few countries limit their filtering to a narrowly defined set of targets'...'filtering regimes, once put into place, generally expand beyond their initial mandate'. If we ‘build-in’ the means of filtering and censoring internet content into the network, and the discussion of this technology is limited and closed, are we limiting future innovation and enterprise in the network – and miss an opportunity for an open dialogue on safely and the internet?
Much more information on the social and political contexts of internet filtration is available at the OpenNet Initative's website. You can even test websites URLs to find what countries block them, and suggest sites to be tested.
Comments